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Abstract 
This thesis examines the representation of the negotiation of black 
women's subjectivity in four South African allegorical novels. Using 
aspects of postmodern discourse, and feminist and postcolonial 
literary and cultural theories on identity formation and subjectivity, 
I propose that it is in the allegorical mode that the four writers are 
able to offer black women as female gendered subalterns the space to 
negotiate subjectivity and to assert agency. Given the history of 
sexism, racism and imperialism in South Africa, the politics of place 
impact crucially on the practice of writing literature, so that the 
tensions between the representation of others and self-representation 
becomes crucial in identity formation. 
Through the four texts, I propose that there is a spectrum of 
practices, and that each offers different possibilities for black 
women's subject formation: from the most limiting liberal discourses, 
through the interrogation of those discourses, to an autobiographical 
moment of self-reclamation. 
It is my contention that J.M. Coetzee's Waiting for the 
Barbarians (1980) offers a complex allegory of subaltern subjectivity, 
while at the same time proposing that such subjectivity remains beyond 
the scope of the white liberal humanist discourse's ability of 
expression. Consequently, I argue that Wilma Stockenstrom's The 
Expedition to the Baobab Tree (1983) may attempt to move beyond 
Coetzee's novel in situating the subaltern as the narrating subject of 
vii 
the text, but can still only posit the possibility of her 
subjectivity. It is with Bessie Bead's A Question of Power (1974), I 
argue, that the attempt to inscribe the subaltern subject 
autobiographically is most marked, and in which the very notions of 
insurgency are linked to the transgression of boundaries of race, 
class, gender and sanity, in a white supremacist, patriarchal, 
imperial social order. In my analysis of Mike Nicol's The Powers That 
Be (1989), I shCYw how stereotype, its inscription and simultaneous 
interrogation, offer and mask the possibilities of subaltern 
subjectivity, in allCYwing for critical positions which map the 
insurgency of the subaltern subject and her agency in the ruptures 
within the dominant social discourse. 
Therefore, the thesis holds that allegory offers possibilities 
for the South African writer to engage with the insurgent subaltern 
that remain absent from mainstream, realist discourse. 
viii 
Introduction 
The major critical engagements with and within South African 
literature have often been historically overdetermined by the demands 
of macropolitical debates in the broader South African cultural 
context, especially in relation to the manifest effects of apartheid 
ideology and practice. Consequently, much critical attention has been 
Marxist and Lukacsian in focus (Lilford 1996:lS-19), looking 
critically at the relationship between the worlds represented in 
literature and the worlds inhabited and addressed by the literary 
texts -- the central thesis of such criticism has often been that the 
literary representation was not mimetically true enough to the 
phenomenological reality. Annamaria Carusi (1993:9S) ascribes this to 
a rupture in South African literary discourse between the 
practices of literature and of literary criticism on the 
one hand, and the type of discourse about literature 
produced by post-structuralist theory and by post-
modernism generally on the other. 
One of the unfortunate problematics associated with this "rupture" has 
been the demands posed to writers to focus on particular modes of 
engagement with contextual politics, and the focus on phenomenology 
which has sometimes implied an uneasy construction of the tr·ansparency 
of language, its ability to render 'truth' which lay outside of 
itself. In South Africa the privileged modes of literary 
representation in the light of these prescriptive discourses have been 
realism and social realism~ 
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However, South Africa has a rich history of non-realist writing, 
deriving from varied sources such as the African oral traditions of 
the indigenous languages and cultural practices, as well as the 
religio-cultural traditions of the European settler populations, and 
in the latter half of the twentieth century, a particularly rich 
tradition of allegorical writing. As I argue in the first chapter, 
this is paired with a more general critical re-evaluation of 
allegorical genres (Quilli9an 1979:155), and new perspectives on the 
politics of representation opened up by theories of structuralist and 
poststructuralist engagement (Hawkes 1977:7-8). Except for the study 
of individual writers, for example Teresa Dovey's booklength study of 
,J.M. Coetzee' s oeuvre (1988b) , and some superficial discussion of 
fabulation as a trope in South African literature (Christie, Hutchings 
& MacLennan 1980), not much attention has been given to non-realist 
literary practices. This has often been attributed to the narrow 
demands set by the South African critical establishment for what is 
considered political and polemical criticism . 
It is my contention in this dissertation that allegorical 
writing in South Africa offers spaces in which the negotiation of 
subjectivity, and the representation of that process and its success 
or failure, can be dealt with differently and more constructively than 
is often supposed in Marxist and Lukacsian criticism. Using debates 
in contemporary feminist theories on gendered subjectivity and its 
negotiation and representation in textuality, I argue that the 
subaltern woman's subject position, principally evidenced by the 
f 
•' 
agency granted her in performative textuality to claim her self and to 
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represent that self, is explored at.length in allegorical writing, 
chiefly because of the foregrounding of the constructedness of 
discourse per se. In this way, the discussion of subjectivity and 
agency in postmodern discourse, and the ways in which allegory 
features so importantly in postmodern and poststructuralist critical 
debates, provide an interesting and fruitful nexus for the exploration 
of the possibilities for negotiating and representing subaltern 
subject positioning and agency in literary texts. Then, using the new 
relationships between literary texts and the politics of context 
explored and examined by postcolonial discourse, I posit that the four 
texts under examination in this dissertation offer spaces in which 
subaltern subjects can be represented, or rather, that the possibility 
that the subaltern does indeed have subjectivity, even if it remains 
discursively inexpressible because of conflicting discourses -- such 
as the conflict of representation and self-representation between the 
Magistrate and the barbarian woman in Waiting for the Barbarians --
can be examined. 
Much of the dissertation takes the form of close critical 
analysis, with special emphasis placed on the examination of the 
representation of the effects that the nexus of race, class, and 
gender have on identity constitution, and how contextual literary 
politics affect the way in which we read the tension between the 
representation of subalterns by others, and attempts at subaltern 
self-representation. Necessarily, the central thesis holds that 
allegory provides the South African writer with g-reater freedom to 
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explore both the possibilities and limitations which enable and 
circumscribe subaltern subjectivity and agency. 
In the following section of this introductory chapter, I 
elaborate, briefly, the progression of the central argument of the 
thesis through the various chapters. 
In the first chapter I attempt to outline the relationship between 
allegory and historiographical discourse, showing how allegory does 
not disavow history so much as interrogate it as discourse (Slemon 
1988:162). Therefore, since allegory is implicated in processes of 
interpretation (Fletcher 1964), as well as the politics of 
signification (Quilligan 1979), and in the late twentieth century is 
manifestly influenced by debates in post-structuralism and semiotics 
(Eco 1990; Connor 1989), it constitutes itself as an interesting mode 
in and through which to examine the relationships between subjects and 
the discourses in which (and in opposition to which) they are 
constructed. 
Examining each of the four novels which are critiqued in greater 
detail in subsequent chapters in the light of theoretical work on 
allegory by among others Angus Fletcher (1964), Gay Clifford (1974), 
Maureen Quilligan (1979), and Deborah L. Madsen (1994), I show how 
they can be read as allegories of subaltern subjectivity, engaging 
with theoretical debates on the constitution of subjectivity in 
language and through language use. This is followed by a 
. contextualised critique of the texts and the central argument in terms 
of contemporary debates on the (self)representation of black women, 
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both in South Africa and elsewhere. Using the work of bell hooks 
(1995a, 1995b, 1992, 1984 & 1981) and Carole Boyce Davies (1994) on 
black female identity, its discursive constitution and representation, 
along with more specifically South African feminist scholarship on 
black women and representation (Driver 1996, 1993, 1992a, & 1992b), as 
well as critical debates on the nexus of race and gender on power 
relations and access to representation (Lewis 1993; Hassim and Walker 
1993), I propose that gendered subjects are negotiated in textuality. 
These new subjects, I propose, in agreement with Julia Kristeva (1986 
& 1984) and ~lene Cixous (1976), are situated in the kind of textual 
discourse which offers interrogations of and inscriptions against 
patriarchal, imperial, racist discourses which overdetermine and deny 
black women both subjectivity and agency, principally through the 
proscription of textuality. 
In the second chapter I offer a close critical analysis of 
Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians, in the light of critical debates 
on the novel itself as ,well .as theoretical debates about subjectivity 
and agency. Using the work of Laura Mulvey (1975), John Berger (1972) 
and Teresa De Lauretis (1984) among others, I examine the implication 
of the visual mechanism in subject positioning, and how it resembles 
the ways in which language is implicated in the positing of 
subjectivity. Following on from this, I investigate how the barbarian 
woman's subjectivity is circumscribed by and in the Magistrate's 
narrative act, principally through an assessment of the Magistrate's 
construction of an identity for her when he reads the signs of her 
torture as the signs of her self. In conclusion, it is my argument 
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that the Hegelian master-slave dialectic is interrogated in the text 
through the foregrounding of the manner in which the barbarian woman, 
and more pointedly her body and her speech, is policed by the 
Magistrate. 
In the third chapter I examine how subjectivity as performance 
is engendered in Wilma Stockenstr~m's The Expedition to the Baobab 
Tree, arguing that alterity, speech and the female body are linked in 
the narrative. Given the insights of French feminist theory in this 
regard, especially the work of Luce Irigaray (1985a) and Cixous (1986 
& 1976), I propose that the slave woman speaks her self into history 
and textuality. Thus, again, subjectivity is posited through 
performative language use. I also examine the process by which the 
slave woman re-orders time (and by implication, all systems of 
ordering and organization complicit with racist, patriarchal, 
capitalist, imperial discourses) and the ways in which it 
circumscribes her sense of self. In the concluding section of this 
chapter I analyse the tensions between reading, writing and speaking 
in this novel. 
The fourth chapter of the thesis focuses on Bessie Head's A 
Question of Power, and I investigate the fruitful intersection of the 
allegorical with autobiography. Using debates in critical work on 
autobiography and black women's writing, I propose that Head's text 
offers new possibilities for the articulation of subaltern identity. 
Furthermore, because of the nature of the text, I also examine it in 
the light of critical debates within feminism and post-structuralism 
on 'madness' and female identity, suggesting that it is through the 
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speech act that the social order is over-turned so that 'madness' and 
'sanity' are both interrogated, and shown to be constructions and 
tools of social and sexual control. 
In the concluding chapter I focus on the most recent of the four 
texts, Mike Nicol's The Powers That Be, examining its interrogation of 
the dominant social order and its discursive constitution in late 
apartheid south Africa. Through a critique of stereotype, I 
investigate the ways in which Nicol's novel is situated ambivalently 
like the other texts -- both within and outside of the discourses 
it is attempting to critique and deconstruct. 
My contention is, therefore, that it is allegory that 
foregrounds the constructed nature of identity, and in doing so, 
offers the most interesting possibilities for the representation and 
negotiation of subaltern subjecti vity and agency. 
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Signs & Wonders: 
Allegory and Subjectivity in South Africa 
There is a long history of allegorical writing in Southern Africa, 
exemplified in such early works as Olive Schreiner's The Story of an 
African Farm (1881) and Alan Paton's cry, The Beloved Country (1948), 
both of which use biblical motifs allegorically to comment on the 
patriarchal relations intrinsic to colonial discourse and the 
unethicality of apartheid racist discourse respectively. However, it 
is only since the 1970s that the use of allegory has become more wide-
spread and theoretically interrogative in South African literature. 
Quilligan (1979:155) argues that "[w]e seem in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century to have reentered the allegorical age". In this 
regard she is one of a group of critics who have reappraised allegory 
in relation to the debates on cultural value in the twentieth century 
(Fletcher 1964; Clifford 1974), and linked it to contemporary debates 
in cultural production (Jameson 1991; Connor 1989; McHale 1987). 
Consequently, in the following chapter, I examine the ways in 
which South African allegorical novels of the late apartheid era offer 
exploratory comments on issues of subjectivity and agency in a social 
order that denies the subaltern -- and here I mean "the subaltern as 
female (sexed) subject" (Spivak 1987:218), as Rey Chow (1996:127) 
states, "the native as a voiced subject", the black woman as an 
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oppressed subject in patriarchal imperialist racist South African 
apartheid discourse the modes and means of (self) representation, 
and in which access to (self) representation is reserved as the 
'natural' privilege of a minority class of white writers. Drawing on 
the theorists of allegory, I propose that it is through allegory that 
black women's subjectivity can be negotiated in and through literary 
texts in a social context which otherwise denies them both agency and 
subjectivity. 
I. Allegory and History 
Angus Fletcher (1964:1) suggests that allegory is "omnipresent in 
Western Literature from the earliest times to the modern period". 
This vague and all-inclusive statement, though, masks the different 
periods in which allegory operates as a mode of writing and reading. 
Grant Lilford (1996:10) traces the etymological roots of the term to 
the Greek a:~\E'yopia:, which itself derives from the combination of the 
roots a:J\J .. o<; (other) ang a:yopia: (speaking) , and links this to the 
allegorical features of the Homeric epics. 
According to Maureen Quilligan (1979:135), a second phase of the 
allegorical is instituted in the middle ages, with biblical motifs and 
a marked reliance on the methodologies of scriptural exegesis 
featuring strongly in texts like Piers Plowman and Dante's Divine 
Comedy. For Lilford (1996:12), allegory requires active participation 
from the reader in the construction of textual truth, since "the 
answer lies within the reader and the text is me.rely a guide". In 
this regard Northrop Frye (1957:341) proposes that "[c]ommentary 
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is allegorization", so that, by its very nature allegory is 
intertextual, "an absorption of and a reply to another text" (Kristeva 
1986:39). 
The third historical cycle of allegory derives from debates in 
Rational discourses on literature and the politics of cultural value. 
Here, as Lilford (1996:12) shows, Goethe is the primary figure in the 
devaluation of allegory in favour of Symbolic representation and 
criticism. Fletcher (1964) and Madsen (1994) examine this in greater 
detail. It is this devalued status of allegory which is inherited by 
the twentieth century, and which Quilligan (1979) and Fletcher (1964) 
set out to redress. 
Lilford (1996:13) investigates, briefly, the links between 
allegory, and more pointedly Christian allegory such as John Bunyan's 
The Pilgrim's Progress, and the colonial enterprise in Southern 
Africa. He posits an association between imperial missionary work, 
the devaluation of African traditional belief, and myth. In his 
argument, apropos of Frye (1957:54), "allegory is a structural 
element in literature: it ••. cannot be added by critical 
interpretation alone". Hence, historically, allegory has always been 
concerned with questions of value (Madsen 1994:135) and with 
interpretation and commentary (Frye 1957:341). 
M.H. Abrams (1993:4) defines allegory as 
narrative fiction in which the agents and actions, and 
sometimes the setting as well, are contrived to make 
coherent sense on the "literal", or primary, level of 
signification, and at the same time to signify a second, 
correlated order of agents, concepts, and events. 
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Fletcher, a central figure in the t;..rentieth century critical re-
evaluation of allegory, argues that "allegory says one thing and means 
another. It destroys the normal expectations we have about language, 
that our words 'mean what they say'" (1964:2). Allegory would 
therefore be implicated in the post-structuralist and semiotic 
critical processes of elucidating the arbitrary relationship bet;..reen 
signs and their referents (Hawkes 1977:19-28 & 123-150; Eco 1976:3-46; 
Kristeva 1984:21-24), and become associated with processes of 
interpretation and reading, as Umberto Eco (1990:8-17) proposes. 
Steven Connor (1989:90) and Brian McBale (1987:142) point out the 
indeterminacy of contemporary allegory, so that they concur with 
Quilligan (1979:67), who argues that allegory "slide[sJ tortuously 
back and forth between [the] literal and metaphorical understanding of 
words, and therefore ••• focus(es] on the problematical tensions 
between them". As such, it is necessarily "a radical linguistic 
procedure" (Fletcher 1964:3), in that "one coherent set of 
circumstances ••• signi,fy a second order of correlated meanings" 
(Abrams 1993:S). In an elaboration of this argument, Fletcher 
proposes that 
we must avoid the notion that all people must see the 
double meaning for the work to be rightly called allegory. 
At least one branch of allegory ••• serves political and 
social purposes by the very fact that a reigning authority 
(as in a police state) does not see the secondary meaning 
( ibid • : 7 - 8 ) • 
Given that Nick Visser (1992:484-496) traces the history of censorship 
in South African culture throughout the period of colonial settlement 
to the present, allegory would seem to be the ideal mode for South 
11 
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African writers to critique the oppressive socio-political context 
which they inhabit, and which is addressed by their writing. After 
all, as Fletcher (1964:22) argues, allegory "appears to express 
conflict between rival authorities, as in times of political 
oppression ••• to avoid censorship of dissident thought". This 
concurs with Lilford's (1996:13) assertion that "throughout the 
colonial and post-colonial history of southern Africa, various 
allegories have sought to define cultural and political identity". 
Examples of such allegorical texts in the late apartheid era include 
Lewis Nkosi's Mating Birds (1987), and Andr~ Brink's Cape of Storms: 
The First Life of Adamastor (1993). In this regard, Abdul JanMohamed 
(1986:91-92) faul~s allegorical texts, and more specifically Coetzee's 
Waiting for the Barbarians, for being Manichean and ahistorical, but 
Stephen Slemon (1988:161-163) contests this, arguing that postcolonial 
allegories often show up the constructedness of history, the ways in 
which historiography is constituted as discourse. This is 
particularly evident in the novels by Coetzee and Nicol examined in 
this dissertation. 
This view of allegory, that it interrogates rather than disavows 
history and historiography, fits in well with McHale's argument that 
if there are several distinguishable allegorical meanings, 
then the literal level circulates among them, so to speak, 
never coming to rest, each level in turn functioning as 
literal relative to the others ..• indeterminate allegory 
is a means of inducing an ontological oscillation 
( 19 8 7 : 142) • 
Lilford (1996:10) characterises Coetzee as a ''sceptical and secular 
allegorist[] ••. grappl[ing] with the nature of truth in the text, 
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i nterrogating the truth value of previous texts", and this would 
situate his work as one of McHale's "indeterminate allegories". As I 
argue in the second chapter, this also concurs with Dovey (1996, 1988a 
& 1988b). I would propose that the novels of each of the other three 
writers under examination in this thesis -- Wilma Stockenstr~m, Bessie 
Head and Mike Nicol -- can be characterised thus as well. These views 
reiterate Paul de Man's (1981:2) argument that "(i]n the wavering 
status of the allegorical sign, the system of which the allegorical is 
a constitutive component is being itself unsettled". According to 
Lilford (1992:82), in a discussion of the work of Coetzee and 
Marechera, "(a)llegories in these novelists call representation, 
truth, and even allegory into question", so that, by implication, the 
work eventually also calls itself (its truth value and processes of 
interpretation) into question. 
As such, it would seem that allegory, as a mode, is chiefly also 
concerned with signification, with processes of representation and 
signifying. Therefore, as Kristeva (1984:164) argues, "(t)he text 
establishes language as a symbolic system with a double articulation: 
signifier and signified", and brings the relationship between the two 
(signifier and signified; denotative and connotative meaning; primary 
and secondary levels of meaning; the words and what they mean) under 
interrogation, destabilizing it in order to show up the 
constructedness of what is often assumed to be a 'natural' link 
between the different levels of signification and meaning. 
13 
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a. Waiting for the Barbarians 
Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians has been read as an allegory of 
colonialism (Dovey 1996; Wade 1990; Jolly 1996 and 1989; JanMohamed 
1986; Watson 1986 and 1980), as a Lacanian allegory of subjectivity 
(Dovey 1988a and 1988b), and as a Manichean political allegory of 
South African politics in the late apartheid period (JanMohamed 1986; 
Attwell 1993; Dovey 1996). In an interesting departure from these, 
Lilford (1996) offers a reading of the novel as an allegory of 
gardening and drought. It is not my purpose to provide a 
comprehensive argument and exegesis of the allegorical elements and 
structure of Coetzee's novel here, but to explore how a combination of 
the critical approaches mentioned above may be fruitful in approaching 
the text as a self-interrogating allegory on subaltern subject 
representation. It is this reading which I pursue in the s econd 
chapter, examining the ways in which the barbarian woman's 
relationship with the Magistrate becomes an allegorical insc ription 
for the processes by which the sub j ectivity of black women in South 
Africa have been and continue to be rendered in fictiona l discour s es, 
while it acknowledges at the same time, almost paradoxically, that 
such subjectivity remains beyond the reach of the white writers (and 
the liberal humanist discourses inhabi ted by these writers) who 
attempt to inscribe it. Thus when Fletcher (1964:107) argues that 
" [ t]he silences in allegory mean as much as the filled- i n-spaces " , the 
silence of the subaltern in allegory seethes with meaning. 
David Attwell (1993:74) argues that the novel is "recognizable 
partly as a fictionalization of this particularly paranoid moment in 
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apartheid discourse", reading it as a response to the historical 
cultural-political events of the late 1970s in South Africa. In this 
regard, he seems to concur with and elaborate on Rosemary Jane Jelly's 
argument that "[t)o reject the strange geography of the novel, to 
desire it to be immediately recognizable, is to reject the narrative 
itself, to diminish the fiction" (1989:71). As Attwell (1993:73) 
states, "the novel's non-specific milieu [suggests) ••• a strategic 
refusal of specificity, a refusal that is the result of being 
painfully conscious of one's immediate historical location". Sheila 
Roberts (1982:47), however, argues that because the novel "does not 
name its country, ••• [and) makes no pretence at being a naturalistic 
work of identifiable time and locale", Coetzee is "only a South 
African writer in so far as he is South African" (lac.cit.). She then 
states, paradoxically, that the novel could only have been written 
because Coetzee is a South African, and in this she reflects so many 
critics who seem unwilling to engage fully with the demands of the 
narrative, and of Coetzee's interrogation of boundaries and 
categories. One example of such critical blindness has been Nadine 
Gordimer's review of Coetzee's text (1984). In a critical 
deconstruction of this position and the novel itself, Dovey (1988:134) 
proposes that "this novel uses allegory against itself to undo the 
traditional rationality of allegory ••• [so that) allegory announces 
its connection, not to the world, but to other texts". As Kristeva 
(1986:37) argues, "any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; 
any text is the absorption and transformation of another", and 
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Coetzee's novel has been read as such a text by Dovey (1988b), among 
others. For Kristeva (1984:59-60) 
inter-textuality denotes this transposition of one (or 
several) sign system(s) into another ••. it specifies that 
the passage from one signifying system to another demands 
a new articulation of the thetic -- of enunciative and 
denotative positionality. 
This would concur with Attwell's argument that "the question is 
ultimately not about the laws of history but about who controls the 
signs of power" (1993: 86), i .n other words, who has the power to 
represent whom. Consequently, Jean-Phillipe Wade (1990:283), in 
arguing that "allegory reveals the conventionality and instability of 
all writing", shows that Coetzee's text interrogates not only history, 
but also the liberal South African protest novel, foregrounding what 
Eagleton (1996:71) calls "liberalism's obliviousness of one particular 
thought-system: that which sustains its own position". Thms the novel 
would be situated in a discourse which "implies the abandonment of a 
former sign system, the passage to a second via an instinctual 
intermediary common to the two systems, and the articulation of the 
new system with its new representability" (Kristeva 1986:60). It is 
because of this position that Wade can assert that 
allegory not only enables the reader to consider the 
meanings offered, but also, crucially, to observe the 
processes of their construction, thus preventing the 
possibility of the reader misrecognising them as being 
"naturally" given by the real (1990:282). 
For Dick Penner (1989:76), therefore, "[i]ntentionally, the setting is 
no-time, no-place, a quality which underscores the allegorical nature 
of the novel". This concu·rs with Robert M. Post's statement that 
"Waiting for the Barbarians takes place on the frontier of an 
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anonymous country •.• sometime in the past " (1986:67), and also with 
Benita Parry (1996:59), who reads the setting of the novel as an 
"unnamed and unspecified imperial frontier". As Fletcher (1964:73) 
proposes, "[t]he mode seems to aim at both clarity and obscurity 
together, each effect depending upon the other". Julian Gitzen 
(1993:9) argues that the "pointedly fictitious setting increases the 
novel's allegorical force". It is in this sense that Coetzee's novel 
resembles Stockenstr~m's The Expedition to the Baobab Tree - - both are 
paradoxically South African while simultaneously resisting being read 
as only about South Africa. If, therefore, as Fletcher (1964:113) 
suggests, "[a]llegories are based on parallels between two levels of 
being that correspond to each other, the one supposed by the reader, 
the other literally presented in the fable", then the ways in which 
the world represented in the novel correponds to the South Africa in 
which the novel is written and published and in which its author 
resides -- is constructed in the process of reading. As a result, 
'~he complete discourse is pervaded by doubt, double- meani ng, and 
ironic detachment" (ibid.:84). It is this very quality that allows 
Coetzee's novel to interrogate the political context and the greater 
discourses of which it is a localised, historicized manifestation 
(Attwell 1993), while at the same time being criticised as ahistorical 
(JanMohamed 1986). 
But Coetzee's engagement with his context, his interrogation not 
only of the political context itself, but of the way in whi ch context 
is discursively constituted and represented i n the discourse of the 
liberal protest novel, concurs with Fletcher's argument that 
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[a]llegories are classically used for didactic and moral 
suasion (sic). They may, during times of political 
revolution, present totally new theories of ethics 
( 19 6 4: 12 0) • 
This reiterates Madsen's argument that "[a]llegory flourishes at times 
of intense cultural disruption, when the most authoritative texts of 
the culture are subject to reevaluation and reassessment" (1994:135). 
Waitino for the Barbarians therefore interrogates the ways in which 
South African liberal discourse interprets and constructs history, 
showing how these are discursive constructions, reading and writing 
practices (Dovey 1996:143-144), not phenomenological, 'natural' 
givens; and by extension, the novel itself becomes a discourse, open 
and subject to the very processes of interrogation and critical 
reading to which it subjects liberal discourse. This argument is 
explored at length by Dovey (1988b:242-254). It is Clifford (1974:43) 
who argues that "allegories often share qualities with straight 
instructional or theoretical works written at the same period". As 
Peter Strauss (1992:393) shows, Waitino for the Barbarians "seems to 
have an unusually direct reference to the situation of the white 
liberal in South Africa", and I would suggest, more pointedly, white 
liberal writing. Again, this echoes Madsen's argument that "it is the 
self-conscious concern with interpretation that relates [allegories} 
so closely with value" (1994:135). Interpretation is consciously 
explored at various levels in the novel: the Magistrate's attempts to 
decode the poplar slips and thereby (re)construct a complete, 
teleological histor,1 for the barbarians become futile, and he realises 
this, just as his attempts to decode the barbarian woman, and later 
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his own narrative, fail. Coetzee's novel can thus be read both as an 
inscription (albeit ironic) and a fierce interrogation of the politics 
of representation in the liberal protest novel. Therefore, as 
Kristeva would argue, Coetzee's novel demonstrates that 
linear history appears as abstraction. The only way a 
writer can participate in history is by transgressing this 
abstraction through a process of reading-writing; that is, 
through the practice of a signifying structure in relation 
or opposition to another structure. History and morality 
are written and read within the infrastructure of texts 
(1986:36). 
For Fletcher (1964:199), "allegory is chiefly concerned with sin 
and redemption", and the Magistrate reflects this concern in his 
attempt to expiate his existential guilt in his relationship with the 
barbarian woman. From the Christian s1~bolism of the foot washing, 
through the quest to decode the meanings of the glyphs on the poplar 
slips which would only follow (according to his own thinking) his 
decoding of the scars on the barbarian woman's body, the Magistrate, 
like Joll, has an almost manic religious fervour for the 'truth'. 
Madsen (1994:135) contends that "(i]nterpretation in allegory is 
thematized as the quest for a transcendental center or origin of 
meaning ... in terms of which narrative truth will become legible". 
But Coetzee's work shows that such expectations, such a quest, will 
always necessarily fail, as the Magistrate does not and cannot reach 
the falsely teleological resolution masqueraded as narrative truth, 
realising that whatever conclusions he comes to will necessarily be 
yet another allegory, one possible interpretive construction among 
several possibilities. As Eagleton (1996:114) shows, "[t]eleology, 
thinking of life, language and history in terms of its orientation to 
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thinking of life, language and history in terms of its orientation to 
a telos or end, ••• of history or language as a simple linear 
evolution misses the web-like complexity of signs". 
As Clifford (1974:53) demonstrates, 
the greatest allegories are intransigent and elusive not 
simply for defensive reasons such as political caution but 
because they are concerned with a highly complex kind of 
truth, a matter of relationships and process rather than 
statement. 
Coetzee's novel refuses to become a prescriptive statement on any one 
political ideology or representational ethic. Instead, it 
interrogates several ideological positions, including its own, in 
quest of what Penner (1989:84-86) calls Coetzee's ethical vision. As 
Dovey (1988a:141) suggests, 
Coetzee's novels [are characterised] by a "double-sided" 
allegorical structure, which involves both the allegorical 
reading of a prior mode of discourse, and a self-reflexive 
allegory of the way in which the novelistic discourse 
inevitably works to erect an identity for the speaker, an 
identity which will ultimately be divested of authority by 
the authority of the discursive context in which the novel 
is read. 
I would therefore submit that while the Magistrate is the only source 
of information in the text, he is at best an unreliable and 
ambivalently situated source, so that despite his best efforts to 
circumscribe the subjectivity of the barbarian woman in his own 
discourse, she remains elusive, uncaptured. If, as Fletcher (1964), 
Clifford (1974), Quilligan (1979), De Man (1981) and Joel Fineman 
(1981) claim, the allegorical mode is about interpretation, in that it 
"makes an appeal to an almost scientific curiosity about the order of 
things" (Fletcher 1964:69), then the ways in which the Magistrate 
attempts to interpret the barbarian woman and the scars on her body, 
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become allegories of interpretation and the circumscription of other 
identities. As Debra A. Castillo (1986:86-87) observes, "[t]he 
magistrate can only write what he has already read, can only explicate 
the story that has already revealed its truth, can only assign meaning 
where meaning is single and transparent". And Coetzee's novel, 
through the Magistrate's narrative, shows that such singularity and 
transparency of meaning is impossible and false in its assertion of 
truthfulness. 
b. The Expedition to the Baobab Tree 
If Coetzee's novel interrogates allegory at the same time that it 
presents itself as an allegory, Stockenstr~m's novel cannot lay claim 
to such extreme complexity and self-interrogation. Rather, it seems 
to offer an allegorical history of its own to counter the master 
narrative of South African apartheid historiography and its 
representation in Afrikaans literature. 
Clifford (1974:1~-15) proposes that "[t]he fundamental narrative 
forms of allegory are the journey, battle or conflict, the quest or 
search, and transformation". Fletcher (1964:151) argues that 
"allegorical progress may first of all be understood in the narrow 
sense of a questing journey". Be elaborates on this by demonstrating 
how this progress 
is represented by voyages, land journeys .•. there is 
always a material description of travel from a home to 
some distant place, and then either a return, or a 
continuation of the voyage ad infinitum (ibid.:153). 
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The slave woman's narrative in Stockenstr~m's novel is certainly an 
"expedition", though the ambivalence of where the expedition is from 
and to is a crucial part of the narrative. In the original Afrikaans 
text it is simply a "kremetartekspidisie", literally a "baobab 
expedition", so that the title of the English translation imposes a 
false "directedness" on the journey. Throughout the narrative there 
are several expeditions: the journey of the slave woman from the 
interior to the coastal city as a child, her later journey back to the 
interior of the continent, her subsequent loss of or abandonment by 
the others on the expedition, her journey to the baobab tree, her 
various excursions from the tree into her surroundings, and her final 
journey after drinking the poison gift of the little people. As the 
slave woman herself states, "I have so much to tell of a trip to a new 
horizon that became an expedition to a tree" (30). Brink (1992) 
discusses the implications of Coetzee's retitling of the novel. 
As my analysis in the third chapter of this thesis shows, the 
slave woman's narrative is also a textual negotiation of subjectivity, 
and in that sense a journey towards selfhood. As Kristeva (1984:67) 
argues, "textual experience represents one of the most daring 
explorations the subject can allow himself (s i c), one that delves into 
his constitutive process ff. Because she i s unable to wr ite - - "if I 
could write" (30) -- she speaks her narrative, and this is emblematic, 
almost allegorical, of the inability (at the time) of many black women 
to come to voice in literature (Driver 1992b & 1988). Brink (1992:6-
7) submits that "these thoughts have been transferred, by an invisible 
mediator, an implied narrator .•• translated into a language 
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intelligible to the reader". This relationship between black women, 
writing, speaking and literature is explored in depth in the fourth 
chapter, but suffice it to say here that several critics have shown 
that the relationship between black women and the novel as genre is 
uneasy (Driver 1996 & 1988; Daymond 1996), and that there is a 
problematic history around auto/biographical representation of black 
women by white women (Driver 1992b & 1988). Brink (1992:6) points to 
the problematic nature of Stockenstr~m's novel, in that it represents 
an other -- despite its admirable attempts to renegotiate the 
imbalances in South African literary representation, it remains a book 
about a black subject written by a white author, so that it is 
implicated in and complicit with the social hierarchies described by 
Dorothy Driver (1996; 1990 & 1988), Shireen Hassim and Cherryl Walker 
(1993) and Desire~ Lewis (1997; 1996 & 1993) that allow white writers 
privileged access to the representation of blackness, without 
reciprocity. 
If, as Clifford (1974:23) posits, 
[i]n journey •.• the traveller is an instrument whereby 
systems can be explored. Because he (sic) is an outsider 
he often possesses a special kind of objectivity about the 
newly encountered system as a whole ... so the questions 
asked by the traveller are a natural pretext for 
explanation[,) 
then Stockenstrom's slave woman represents an appropriat e subject 
through which to explore the system of colonial, patriarchal, and 
racist relations of the coastal city, which functions as an 
allegorical representation of apartheid South Africa, though it is not 
only limited to that referential meaning. 
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After all, the slave woman embodies hooks's assertion that "[t]o 
be in the margin is to be part of the whole but outside the main body" 
(1984:v). She also embodies Salman Rushdie's (1992:210) description 
of the migrant subject which I invoke later in this chapter in the 
discussion around subjectivity and agency. The slave woman occupies 
contradictory subject positions -- as illustrated in the third chapter 
-- which allow her to explore the power structures of her own world 
(the world of the slaves) as well as that world inhabited by her 
masters. However, as my discussion in the fourth chapter shows, and 
in agreement with Cixous (in Cixous and Clement 1986:71) who proposes 
that "if there were no other one would invent it", the slave woman is 
incapable of exploring the world of the little people, who speak "a 
language for geckos and tapping beetles" (67). 
c. A Question of Power 
If the quest in Stockenstrom's novel is a variation of physical 
journeys that become emblematic of (an) existential journey(s), then 
Head's A Question of Power exemplifies Fletcher's contention that 
[i]t does not even need to involve a physical journey. 
Travel is not the only way one can change places. The 
whole operation can be presented as a sort of 
introspective journey through the self (1964:153). 
In this way Head's Elizabeth and Coetzee's Magistrate resemble one 
another. Just as the Magistrate's narrative is an introspective, 
self-analytical quest for truth, so Elizabeth's descent into 'madness' 
and Head's recovery of her self through the representation of that 
'madness' in the autobiographical text are quests. But it is 
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interesting that the protagonists in all four texts are displaced 
persons: Coetzee's Magistrate is displaced from the capital of Empire 
to the outpost in the borderlands, and the barbarian woman is brought 
to the frontier town after a raid into barbarian territory; the 
displacements of Stockenstr6m's slave woman have been delineated in 
the previous section; Head's Elizabeth is firstly a refugee from South 
Africa in Botswana, and then exiled from 'sanity' and re-placed in 
'madness'; Captain Nunes and all the villagers in Nicol's novel arrive 
at the settlement from elsewhere. 
Head's self-representation -- the relationship between 
autobiography and self-reclamation in A Question of Power is discussed 
in detail in the fourth chapter -- is also an introspective journey 
into her own "inner hell[]" (12). And if, as Clifford (1974:42) 
argues, allegory demands 
an audience prepared to undertake what is essentially an 
energetic form of reading, in which the reader's critical 
abilities are constantly brought into play by a desire to 
know and understand[,] 
then Head's autobiographical novel resembles Coetzee's novel: both are 
particularly difficult texts, since the reader is required to engage 
in "an imaginative exercise in perceiving connections vertically and 
horizontally: vertically to significances outside the text, and 
horizontally to objects and events within it" (lac.cit.). In Head's 
case this involves exploring the relations between the world narrated 
in the text and the phenomenological, historical world of Head, 
subject and writer; in addition, the reader must engage actively with 
the ways in which the signs within the text relate to one another, in 
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another, in how the language and the representation of 'madness' 
interrogates perceived notions of 'sanity', and the ways in which 
race, class, gender and sexuality influence these constructions. As 
Caroline Rooney (1991:110) shows, the novel represents "not only the 
violent realisations of a constructed truth, but the violence of the 
construction of its realisation, or coming into being". 
As such, not only does A Question of Power become an allegory of 
subaltern subjectivity, 'madness' and the effects of racial prejudice 
on those subjected to it, but it also explores how these are 
constructions, necessary as they may be to the negotiation and 
establishment of subjectivity. This argument, at one extreme, would 
hold that in Frantz Fanon's terms the condition of the native is 
necessarily a nervous condition, so that an allegory of subaltern 
subjectivity would be an allegory of 'madness', on the understanding 
that such an allegorical reading would interrogate 'madness' as a 
construct. Jacqueline Rose (1994), Roger A. Berger (1990) and Carol 
Margaret Davison (1990) propose that Head's novel does this remarkably 
well. Thus, when McHale (1987:145-146) suggests that "allegory 
projects a world and erases it in the same gesture, inducing a flicker 
between presence and absence of this world", it can be argued that 
Head's Elizabeth projects the world of her torture at the hands of 
Sella, Medusa and Dan, then erases it in an attempt to reclaim a 
renegotiated and reconstituted sanity, and a different kind of 
subjectivity. As Rooney (1991:111) argues, 
[w]hile Elizabeth may be said to be the subjected or 
oppressed site where meanings are constructed, she is also 
the subjectless or effaced host of a parasitic 
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deconstruction [emphasis added]. 
Leigh Gilmore (1994:xiv) contends that "[a]utobiography is positioned 
within discourses that construct truth, identity, and power, and these 
discourses produce a gendered subject". As such, A Question of Power 
is a revealing allegory of subjectivity, insofar as "interpretation in 
allegory is thematized as the quest for a transcendental center or 
origin of meaning ••• in terms of which narrative truth will become 
legible" (Madsen 1994:135). Like the Magistrate in Waiting for the 
Barbarians, Elizabeth discovers that such transcendental truth is 
illusory, always already constructed, and that the transcendental 
subject of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy is untenable. 
d. The Powers That Be 
If Coetzee's novel interrogates allegory as a mode at the same time 
that it inscribes itself as an allegory; Stockenstrom inscribes an 
alternative to the dominant discourses of South African history and 
historiography in her novel; and Head enacts a process of self-
reclamation through writing and negotiating new subjectivities through 
the repudiation of realism for allegorical modes; then Nicol's novel, 
the most recent of the four texts under examination in this 
dissertation, shows how allegory 
is ironic in that images and figures are simultaneously 
one thing and another or several others, and also reveals 
a deliberately willed ambiguity in the recurrence of 
double plots and identities, transformations and 
metempsychosis, the fantastic, and -- very importantly 
by the ways in which the concept of time operates. Time 
and historical sense are presented as relative, and what 
one might vulgarly call the 'great moments' of many 
allegories obviously attempt to create a sense of 
timelessness and a-temporality. It is also at such 
moments that the mythopoeic aspect of al]..e!gory is most 
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strongly felt (Clifford 1974:95). 
Nicol's novel is set in an indeterminate historical period -- we can 
only assume it is some time in the twentieth century, given the 
presence of radio communication in the text -- and a geographical 
location that resists specific identification -- one assumes it is 
somewhere on the west coast of Southern Africa. The social order of 
Captain Nunes's world is not stated to be overtly racist -- though the 
forbidden wedding of Fagmie Jabaar to a white bride hints that it isr 
as William Finnegan (1989:9) argues, "the history of South Africa is 
interleaved with the history of the village" -- but its operations 
mirror those of the apartheid regime. Like Coetzee's text, therefore, 
Nicol's novel shows a world "out of time, [and] a belief in the 
possibility of pattern revealing itself in variousness" (Clifford 
1974:105). Finnegan (1989:9) argues that "Nicol spins a parable about 
the perils of commodity fetishism that is at least as compelling as 
the more pointed allegory about the apartheid state". This concurs 
with Clifford (1974:11) who shows how "in allegory the concern is 
always with process, with the way in which various elements of an 
imaginative or intellectual system interact, and with the effects of 
this system or structure on and within individuals". As Augustin 
Shoote tells Nunes, "[w]hat you are doing is inhuman. They may be the 
laws but that does not make them right" (6). But Nunes constructs his 
ethical vision in a binary structure, so that for him "the treatment 
of morals [is] a war between virtue and vice ••• between two warring 
armies of moral germs, the good and evil viruses" (Fletcher 1964:199). 
Nunea's model of political dissidence and crime as disease, concurs 
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with Fletcher's position that in allegory "'sin' ••• is a general term 
for any contagious error, and that political depravity would be 
subsumed under it, if the work were a political allegory" (ibid.:208). 
This reflects Mondling's view of "the wars of independence ••• [as] 
nothing more than an excuse for mayhem and plunder" (32-33). And the 
view of the political dissident as a virus complements the view of the 
"mixed-bloods" (51) as tainted with degeneration and blood flaws 
(Coetzee 1988:136). But Nicol's text demonstrates that while "the 
same procedure of isolation is followed with those who are in anyway 
suspected of being unclean, who have become unclean by violating a 
taboo" (Fletcher 1964:209) -- Joll's isolation and interrogation of 
the barbarian prisoners, and later of the Magistrate himself in 
Coetzee'a novel, mirrors Nunes's isolation and interrogation of 
various villagers in Nicol's work -- it also demonstrates that "the 
contagion may be walled in, instead of walled out, an irony of which 
many allegorists are acutely aware" (ibid.:214). Thia notion of the 
containtment of the contagion within is taken to its extreme with 
! 
Nunes's apparent spontaneous self-combustion, when he "burst into a 
pillar of flame that reached the ceiling" (172), which could be read 
as an allegorical and apocalyptic vision held in the late apartheid 
South Africa of what was perceived to be the oppressive regime's 
fateful path towards self-destruction. 
Nicol's novel is therefore an attempt to sher., up the paranoia of 
dominant Afrikaner Nationalist apartheid discourse, and its 
dialectical relation to the paranoia in liberal humanist discourses at 
the time. Subsequently, the subject positions envisaged by Nicol's 
29 
Allegory & Subjectivity 
_text are circumscribed by this paranoia, and often foreground the 
performative aspects of identity constitution, especially in the 
moments of masking, so that identity is always shown to be 
constructed, rather than 'naturally given', which is an exploration of 
identity as sign, as an element in a signifying chain, and as such, as 
an unstable system. 
II. Gender, Genre, and Subjectivity 
In a discussion of feminist criticism, Terry Eagleton (1996:129) 
states that 
though the oppression of women is indeed a material 
reality, a matter of motherhood, domestic labour, job 
discrimination and unequal wages, it cannot be reduced to 
these factors: it is also a question of sexual ideology, 
of the ways men and women image themselves and each other 
in male-dominated society. 
It would therefore seem crucial to examine representation as the site 
where such imaging occurs. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1987:241) 
states, "a sympathetic text where the gendered subaltern has been 
represented [should be] unravel[ed] ••• to make visible the assignment 
of subject-positions". Cecily Lockett (1988:21) suggests that in 
South African literature "black women ••• are the 'other'"; they would 
seem to be, as Rushdie (1992:144) states, "the Other, the reversed 
twin in the looking- glass, the double, the negative image, who by his 
(sic) oppositeness tells one what one is". As such, woman as 'other' 
constitutes "the repressed that ensures the system's functioning" 
' 
(Cixous in Cixous & Clement 1986:67). This argument is elaborated by 
Patricia Hill Collins (1996:310), who suggests that "[r]ace and gender 
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oppression may both revolve around the same axis of disdain for the 
body; both portray the sexuality of subordinate groups as animalistic 
and therefore deviant". As Spivak (1988:287) states, "[i]f, in the 
context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and 
cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow". 
This view of black women in South African discourses of representation 
has been discussed at length and in depth by various critics (Gilman 
1986; Lewis 1993; Hassim and Walker 1993; Lockett 1988; Driver 1993, 
1992a, 1992b & 1988). Lockett (1988:35) traces the conventionalized 
representations of black women in South African literature, and 
concludes that 
South African writers and readers, whether black or white, 
need to take cognisance of the often damaging type-casting 
of black women in our literature and begin the process of 
creating a literary space for depictions of black women 
with aspirations beyond those imposed by race and gender. 
Her discussion centres on the representation of black female figures 
in the work of white authors (male and female) and black male writers. 
However, perhaps because it lay beyond the confines of her 
investigation, she fails to give account of the ways in which black 
women's self-representation, or representations of black women by 
others, have attempted to interrogate and explore the constructions 
(and constrictions) of these stereotypes in order to move beyond the 
constitution of identity for black women within their limiting terms. 
Obversely, Carli Coetzee (1993:21) consciously avoids texts by 
colonised subjects, and proposes a critical contest of the 
"(o]ppositional criticism" (ibid.:9) of Said's Orientalism, by 
"examin[ing] the possibilities of transgression and complicity in the 
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texts of both men and women" in relation to colonialist discourses on 
both the South African landscape and what she terms the "indigenous" 
(ibid.:24) subjects of the colonial enterprise. However, and in 
consequence of Lockett's argument, as Spivak (1987:219) states, 
"questions of the subject-constitution of the subaltern female gain a 
certain importance". The texts examined in this thesis offer such 
interrogations and, especially in the case of Read's A Question of 
Power, alternatives to the stereotypes of silenced, marginalised, 
voiceless, dangerously savage or animalistic black women. As hooks 
(1992:44) shows, 
black female identity was made synonymous again and again 
with 'victimisation'. The black female voice that was 
deemed 'authentic' was the voice in pain; only the sound 
of hurting could be heard. No narrative of resistance was 
voiced and respected. 
However, the four texts examined here attempt to offer a 
different repertoire of representations of black women from the 
conventional images offered in South African literature. As Spivak 
(1987:203) states, "it is only the texts of counter-insurgency or 
elite documentation that give us the news of the consciousness of the 
subaltern". I would posit that each of the texts examined here 
contains a "narrative of resistance", and, moreover, in Read's case 
especially, even a narrative of survival. As Shoshana Felman 
(1993:13) states, "survival is, profoundly, a form of autobiography". 
Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians illustrates how the hackneyed 
image of the animalistic black woman is a construction by another --
it is the Magistrate who observes that "[p)eople will say I keep two 
wild animals in my room, a fox and a girl" (34). Stockenstr~m's slave 
32 
Allegory & Subjectivity 
woman may, 11 [ 1) ike the wild animals .•. make my paths 11 (8), but the 
novel is a strong exposition of subjectivity, and its expression and 
construction in language. Head's autobiographical A Question of Power 
is perhaps the most important of these texts for this thesis, since it 
attempts to represent the process of self-reclamation in the face of 
and, simultaneously, from the position of dehumanisation -- as hooks 
(1995a:78) states, "[d]evaluation of black womanhood is central to the 
maintenance of white supremacist capitalist patriarchy". The self-
conscious, self-interrogating style of Nicol's narrative presents the 
stereotype for examination principally through the allegorical mode, 
for example the way in which Fagmie Jabaar's wife marks the absence of 
black women by being masked and marked as one. As Mamphela Ramphele 
(1995:i) asserts, 
[s]torytelling is a historical imperative ••. particularly 
so for women, especially black women. Women have to find 
a script, ,a narrative to live by, because all other 
scripts are likely to depict them in roles that fit the 
conventional stereotypes. 
However, Boyce Davies (1994:8-9) suggests that "the category 
Black woman ••• exists as multiple performances of gender and race and 
sexuality based on the particular cultural, historical, geopolitical, 
class communities in which Black women exist". This echoes Honti K. 
Bhabha's argument which is reiterated often throughout this thesis 
-- that "(a] repertoire of conflictual positions constitutes the 
subject (so that t]he taking up of any one position, within a specific 
discursive form, in a particular historical juncture, is thus always 
problematic" (1994:77). This concurs with Edward w. Said's argument 
that in the postcolonial moment 
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the formation of cultural identities [should be] 
understood not as essentializations ••• but as 
contrapuntal ensembles, for it is the case that no 
identity can ever exist by itself and without an array of 
opposites, negatives, oppositions (1993:60). 
As such, identity becomes performative, as well as constitutive, 
constructed and negotiated within specific discursive formations. 
Therefore, 
abstracting subjectivity from time and space becomes an 
impossibility because practices are always open and 
uncertain, dependent to some degree upon the immediate 
resources available at the moment they show up in time and 
space (Pile & Thrift 1995:29) 
In this regard hooks (1995b:3) asserts that "[r]epresentation is a 
crucial location of struggle for any exploited and oppressed people 
asserting subjectivity and decolonization of mind", since it is often 
in textuality that this performativity is foregrounded and explored. 
This concurs with Peter Hitchcock's (1993:6) indication that "the 
inequalities of symbolic exchange always already prescribe a vertical 
axis of struggles over sign". And as Bhabha (1994:89) avers, "[t]he 
question of the representation of difference is therefore always also 
a problem of authority". These statements echo Hitchcock's (1993:12) 
postulation that "(h]ow subaltern subjects represent themselves (which 
is itself deeply problematic) never coincides with how they may be 
represented". This concurs with Spivak's assertion that "the 
retrieval of subaltern consciousness (is] the charting of .•• the 
subaltern subject-effect" (1987:204). She goes on to delineate how 
that which seems to operate as a subject may be part of an 
immense discontinuous network ••• of strands that may be 
termed politics, ideology, economics, history, sexuality, 
language, and so on ..• Different knottings and 
configurations of these strands, determined by 
heterogeneous determinations which are themselves 
dependent upon myriad circumstances, produce the effect of 
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an operating subject (lac.cit.; emphasis added). 
Historically, in South Africa, access to representation has been the 
privilege of white writers (Driver 1996; Hassim and Walker 1993; Lewis 
1997 & 1993), Stockenstr~m's text could be said to be an exemplary 
inscription of such a paradigm, since, despite its attempts to 
engender a subject position for a black woman in an originally 
Afrikaans text -- Afrikaans as the language of the 'master race' is 
significant here, as Brink (1992:6) points out -- it cannot but fail 
to transcend the problematics of the discourse which it inhabits and 
in which it is constituted, precisely because the black woman of the 
text is an invention of the white woman writer's imagination. It 
might even be argued that the text fails to "speak to the question of 
the subaltern without speaking in place of her" (Hitchcock 1993:xiv). 
What sets The Expedition to the Baobab Tree apart from many other 
texts by white Afrikaners representing black female subjectivity (Elsa 
Joubert's Poppie Nongena is perhaps the most obvious example in the 
genre for Afrikaans literature) is that it does not pretend to 
realism. Joubert's text is controversially set up -- like many of the 
autobiographical texts which, as Driver (1992b) argues, reflect the 
unequal access to processes and forums for (auto)biographical 
representation as a narrative based on a set of interviews with a 
phenomenological black woman on whom the chief protagonist is then 
supposedly based. Such texts therefore lay claim to rather spurious 
legitimacy by relying on historiographical and phenomenological 
discourses of truth and subjectivity to lend truth value to the 
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literary fiction. ~ Eagleton (1996:117) argues, 4 propos of Roland 
Barthes, 
[r]ealist literature tends to conceal the socially 
relative or constructed nature of language: it helps to 
confirm the prejudice that there is a form of 'ordinary' 
language which is somehc,,., natural. 
Stockenstr&n's text, in contrast, is overtly allegorical, as the slave 
woman narrator remains significantly nameless, as do the territories 
between which she moves; the novel also does not specify historical 
time, and in fact seems to interrogate the impulse for 
overdetermination inherent in historical time, so that the 
indeterminacies are moments and modes of resistance to fixity, 
offering a systematic critique of the position of black women in the 
contemporary context: South Africa in the 1980s. This relates to 
earlier arguments about the relationship between allegory and the 
subversion of censorship. 
Catherine Belsey (1985:47) argues that 
it is language which provides the possibility of 
subjectivity because it is language which enables the 
speaker to posit himself or herself as 'I', as the subject 
of a sentence. It is in language that people constitute 
themselves as subjects. 
This is a reiteration (and also necessarily an oversimplification) of 
a much more elaborate argument proposed by among others Jacques Lacan 
(1977) and Emile Benveniste (1971). This is echoed by Spivak 
(1987:212), who shows that "the 'self' is itself always production 
rather than ground". Thus the subject position invoked by these texts 
and therefore also the subjectal space and the type of subjectivity 
is that of "the subject on trial/in process" (Kristeva 1984:58), 
not the "transcendental subject" (Eagleton 1996:49) of Husserlian 
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phenomenology, which ''was to be seen as the source and origin of all 
meaning: it was not really itself part of the world, since it brought 
that world to be in the first place" (ibid.:50). A.s Hitchcock 
(1993:8) states, "[t]here can be no absolute monopoly of language or 
language use because signs as communication are shared (and even if 
the speaker does not want to share, signs are stolen)". This, of 
course, invokes Bakhtin's notion of dialogism, which "does not assert 
the self-presence of the speaking subject, [since] multiple voicing 
fractures the monolithic and monologic discourse of pCYwer ••• and 
calls into question the 'logic' of omnisubjection" (ibid. :xvi). 
Still, it is significant that in each of the texts it is in the coming 
to speech, as Cixous (1976:256) would have it, that subjectivity is 
asserted and reclaimed simultaneously. When the barbarian woman in 
Waiting for the Barbarians comes to speak for the first time, she is 
defying the Magistrate's attempt to describe her as blind; the slave 
woman in The Expedition to the Baobab Tree learns to use language to 
her CYwn advantage, employing strategies of silence, parroting, and 
later, assertion, to establish her CYwn identity, her CYwn subject 
position, a speaking "I". A.s Belsey (1985:47) states, "it is language 
itself which, by differentiating between concepts, offers the 
possibility of meaning ••• it is only by adopting the position of 
subject within language that the individual is able to produce 
meaning". And as Eagleton (1996:52) states, "all experience involves 
language and language is ineradicably social". This also implies that 
language is historically and discursively situated, so that the 
subjectivity posited in language is such as well. This concurs with 
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Said's argument that "no one has the epistemological privilege of 
somehet,,/ judging, evaluating, and interpreting the world free from the 
encumbering interests and engagements of the ongoing relationships 
themselves" (1993:65). This becomes evident in Head's A Question of 
PCY,,1er, where Elizabeth has to admit to Tom that she is mad as a first 
step tCY,,1ards telling her story in full, the story which is then 
related by the third person narrator of the text. This relationship 
between autobiography and third person narration is discussed by 
Philip Lejeune (1989:6), who argues that "there can be identity of the 
narrator and the principal character without the first person being 
used". What results, specifically in the texts by Head and 
Stockenstr~m, is a subject "that is at the same time inside and 
outside the ideology of gender, and conscious of being so, conscious 
of that twofold pull, of that division, that doubled vision" (De 
Lauretis 1987:10). This echoes the positions of among others Bhabha 
(1994) and hooks (1984). And therefore, as Hitchcock (1993:9) shCY,,1s, 
"subjectivity is a register of potential social change, and not its 
unconditional guarantee". 
The position constituted by the discourse outlined above would 
be a "subject of enunciation" (Kristeva 1984:22-23) and consequently, 
the matrix of enunciation structures a subjectal space in 
which, strictly speaking, there is no unique and fixed 
subject ••• The subjectal space thus appears as a series 
of entities, which are infinite to the extent that 
maternal discontinuity is projected there (ibid.:91). 
And, as Hitchcock (1993:10) states, "it is in the processes of 
positioning that the agency of the oppressed subject can be defined". 
His argument is in agreement with that of Spivak (1987:197), who holds 
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that "the agency of change is located in the insurgent or the 
'subaltern'". This positioning can be traced in the utterance and 
enunciation in the texts under examination here: Coetzee's 
Magistrate's enunciation of his own subjectal space in his utterance 
which is also his text, shows the impossibility of expressing an Other 
subjectivity truthfully or 'objectively' within the confining and 
constricting discourses of the self; Head's Elizabeth attempts to 
speak that Other-ness, that difference, which Stockenstr~m's slave 
narrator a)so attempts to speak. Therefore, "language is the 
otherness in self and ••• the subject is authored in communication" 
(ibid.:9). This concurs with Eagleton's discussion of Bakhtin's 
notion of dialogism, where 
consciousness was the subject's active, material, semiotic 
intercourse with others, not some sealed interior realm 
divorced from these relations; consciousness, like 
language, was both 'inside' and 'outside' the subject 
simultaneously (1996:102). 
Thus, as Spivak (1987:203) proposes, "subaltern consciousness ••. is 
never fully recoverable ••• it is effaced even as it is disclosed". 
It is hooks (1995b:3) who argues that "the development of an 
aesthetics of viewing [is] central to claiming subjectivity". 
Significantly, this echoes Berger (1972) and Mulvey (1975), who 
discuss the constitution of subjectivity through the reciprocity of 
sight. In Coetzee's novel, visibility and invisibility become the 
positions from which subjectivity is negotiated. The Magistrate feels 
objectified by Joll's hidden gaze, and is surprised when he realises 
later that he had been an object in the field of vision of the 
barbarians when he had thought himself invisible. Bhabha (1994:112) 
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argues that the oppressed are overlooked (in both senses of the term) 
by the oppressors, so that they become exchangeable, indistinguishable 
from one another. The slave woman in Stockenstr~m's novel finds this 
true, in accordance with Irigaray (1985a). HoWever, as hooks 
(1995b:xii) argues, "[t]he system of white-supremacist capitalist 
patriarchy is not maintained solely by white folks. It is also 
maintained by all ••• who internalize and enforce the values of this 
regime". And the slave woman of Stockenstr~m's novel certainly 
discovers her own complicity with the system, but the implications of 
her complicity far outweigh those which the Magistrate discovers in 
relation to his own in Coetzee's novel. This concurs with Cl~ent's 
argument (in Cixous and Cl~ent 1986:137) that "the master's discourse 
-- from the point of view of its political and economic p01Jer -- is 
transferred onto and shapes any discourse dealing with kn01Jledge to be 
transmitted", which is a reiteration of the Hegelian master-slave 
dialectic. The slave woman of Stockenstr~m's novel discovers this in 
her parroting of her masters, first in relation to the other slaves on 
the expedition, and later in relation to the little people. What can 
be considered her extreme interpellation of her self as constructed by 
others -- she drinks the poison of the little people at the end of the 
novel -- can be said to illustrate Cixous's position that "the only 
way to bar [the pCYwer of mastery] is to execute the master, kill him, 
eliminate him" (in Cixous and Cl~ent 1986:140). When the slave woman 
drinks the poison, knowing that it will be her last act, she is ending 
the discourse of mastery, even though (and probably because) she will 
never be able to understand the motivations of the little people, as 
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they remain an enigma to her. This echoes the Magistrate's 
enslavement to his image of the barbarian woman, and his inability to 
decipher her self and the scars which he (mis)reads as her self. Just 
as the Magistrate in Coetzee's novel refuses to learn the barbarian 
language until it is too late, so the slave woman in Stockenstr~m's 
novel never learns the little people's "click language", so that they 
remain unknowable to her, even if it is in a measure by her own 
choice, her decision not to learn their language. 
These texts, therefore, all examine the conflicting and 
contradictory discourses that are implicated in any subject position, 
in the negotiation of subjectivity, and how there is constant flux so 
the subject is truly "in process/on trial" (Kristeva 1984:233). 
III. Agency and Writing 
Hitchcock (1993:7) argues that "[i]f the oppressed are the major media 
of dialogics, it is only to the extent that their utterance often 
upsets the status quo by challenging the logic of dialogue as equal 
linguistic exchange". This implies that the opressed have some kind 
of agency, since the dialogic process "denotes a relational capacity 
to selfhood (the addresser coauthors and is coauthored by the 
addressee)" (ibid. :xv). 'A3 Eagleton (1996:100) states, "language [is] 
grasped as utterance, as involving speaking and writing subjects and 
therefore also, at least potentially, readers or listeners". Kristeva 
(1984:87) would elaborate that 
[w]riting represents-articulates the signifying process 
into specific networks or spaces; speech (which may 
correspond to that writing) restores the diacritical 
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elements necessary for an exchange of meaning between two 
subjects. 
This concurs with Cixous (in Cixous & Clement 1986:72), who posits 
that writing constitutes itself as a space that does not necessarily 
reproduce the dominant ideologies of the context out of which it 
ar-ises and which it addr-esses, but "invents new worlds". Eagleton 
(1996:165-166), in concordance with Kristeva (1986), states that 
"women, and certain 'revolutionary' literary works, pose a radical 
question to existing society precisely because they mark out the 
frontier beyond which it dare not venture". These invented worlds of 
Cixous, and the invented selves that construct them and are 
constructed in them -- invention here becomes what Eco (1976:245) 
defines as "a mode of production whereby the producer of the sign-
function chooses a new material continuum not yet segmented for that 
purpose and proposes a new way of organizing (of giving form to) it in 
order to map within it the formal pertinent element of a content-type" 
-- are often ar:·rived at through exile. It is significant that all of 
the novels under examination here, involve their subjects in some kind 
of displacement. In this regard, Salman Rushdie's (1992:210) 
characterisation of border and boundary crossing, and its consequences 
is quite interesting: 
To migrate is certainly to lose language and home, to be 
defined by others, to become invisible or, even worse, a 
target; it is to experience deep changes and wrenches in 
the soul. But the migrant is not simply transformed by 
his (sic) act; he also transforms his new world. Migrants 
may well become mutants, but it is out of such 
hybridization that newness can emerge. 
This new subjectivity, in its link with migration and displacement 
also involves the foregrounding of the constructedness of identity 
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(Rapport 1995:268). Head's Elizabeth, as well as Coetzee's barbarian 
woman and Stockenstr~m's slave woman, all experience the loss of 
language and home, the definition of their selves by others, 
victimisation, and the transformation of their selves by their 
environment. However, and this is crucial, they also become active 
agents in these new worlds, transforming not only the ways in which 
they perceive these worlds and their place in it, but also the ways in 
which these worlds perceive them -- the barbarian woman's presence and 
her enigmatic defiance alter the ways in which the Magistrate 
positions himself within the discourses of Empire, so that he 
eventually inhabits much the same position that she did; the slave 
woman's narrative, though impossible phenomenologically, inscribes a 
radical textual subjectivity that offers a counter-narrative to 
linear, patriarchal, capitalist history in the world of the text's 
, 
addressee; and Head's Elizabeth transforms the hostile environment of 
the Botswana village she lives in, and redefines 'madness' and 
'sanity' as patriarchal categories for effecting social control, 
thereby renegotiating her self in relation to her world, and the place 
of that self in the world. As Felman (1993:33) states, 
[w]ith respect to woman's madness, man's reason reacts by 
trying to appropriate it: in the first place, by claiming 
to "understand" it, but with an external understanding 
that reduces the madwoman to a spectacle, to an obiect 
that can be known and possessed. 
This concurs with Foucault's assertion that in the seventeenth 
century, with the medicalisation of the discourse on mental illness, 
(1965:70), "[m]adness had become a thing to look at". Therefore, 
these texts engage in an exploratory project where 
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the search is for places from which the subject can speak 
in order to change things and this involves a critique of 
the relationship between power and knowledge (Pile & 
Thrift 1995:285). 
The kind of subject that results from these processes of 
representation and interrogation, is best characterised by Kristeva 
(1984:178-189), who states that 
[t]his new subject ••• explains, cogitates, and knows, but 
he (sic) is also elusive because he transforms the real. 
In explaining, cogitating, and knowing, he emphasizes one 
pole of heterogeneous contradiction over the other: he 
stresses process over identification, rejection over 
desire, heterogeneity over signifier, struggle over 
structure. 
Thus, the subject is truly "on trial/in process" (ibid. :23): it is in 
the process of narrating the self that the self comes to posit its own 
existence, and paradoxically, that its very existence is questioned, 
interrogated, examined. And this doubling process, instead of 
resulting in a self-cancelling non-subject, constitutes the agency of 
the subaltern subject. Aa Attwell (1993:24) states, "(a]gency, in the 
context of a fragmented state of nationhood like South Africa's, 
therefore serves as an umbrella concept for such notions as 
legitimacy, authority and position". Spivak (1987:204) complicates 
this view by showing how "the subaltern's view, will, presence, can be 
no more than a theoretical fiction to entitle the project of reading". 
Thus, when, in agreement with Cixous (in Cixous & Clement 1986), 
Kristeva (1984:210) proposes that "the text as signifying practice 
points toward the possibility of a subject who speaks his (sic) 
being put in process/on trial through action", it is the action of 
speech which constitutes the agency which is the ground upon which 
subjectivity is negotiated, so that "it is irreducibly discursive" 
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(Spivak 1987:203). The barbarian woman in Coetzee's novel may not be 
the narrator, but as I show in the second chapter, her willed silence 
and intractable responses to the Magistrate's questions illustrate the 
(self) control she practices, and constitutes the agency which implies 
her subjectivity. The slave woman narrator of Stockenstr~m's novel is 
an "auto-diegetic narrator" (Rimmon-Kenan 1983:96), so that her agency 
resides in her narrative act, which is an attempt to engender a 
textual self, a subject position that is therefore necessarily in 
process/on trial. As Kristeva (1986:67) states, "textual experience 
[also] reaches the very foundation of the social". Head's Elizabeth, 
while extradiegetically narrated, because of the autobiographical 
nature of the text -- and the relationship between narration and 
autobiography is examined in detail in the fourth chapter -- has her 
subjectivity engendered and simultaneously interrogated in the text. 
Consequently, as Ramphele (1995:i) states, "[o]ne is always ambivalent 
about telling one's story". Nicol's novel is constructed from various 
stories and histories told, often in contradiction to one another --
Montague Planke's account of events is in direct opposition to Captain 
Sylvester Nunes's, and Lady Sarah's stories are an attempt to redress 
the lies Nunes suspects and she knows the villagers have told him. 
Thus, as Kristeva (1984:190) argues, the texts examined here show how 
[i]n capitalist society, where class struggle unsettles 
all institutions and where every subject and discourse are 
ultimately determined by their position in production and 
politics, to keep heterogeneous contradiction within a 
simple subjective representation is to make it inaudible 
or complicitous with dominant bourgeois ideology. 
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Each text attempts to defy the simplicity of the transcendental 
subject of Husserlian phenomenology, and offers a "revolutionary 
critique of the established social order (relations of production 
relations of reproduction)" (lac.cit.) through the positing of 
subaltern subject positions constituted differently, and in opposition 





J.M. Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians 
J.M. Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) offers a seminal and 
groundbreaking ap~roach to the discourse of subaltern representation 
in South African fiction, in that its engagement with the allegorical 
mode offers a remarkable point of departure for an examination of the 
role of the allegorical in offering a critique of representational 
politics in South African fiction, and specifically the representation 
of the subaltern (as) subject. 
While many critics have attended to the allegorical aspects of 
the novel in various degrees of depth and interest (Dovey 1988a & 
1988b; Gitzen 1993; JanMohamed 1985; Parkinson Zamora 1986; Penner 
1989; Van Zanten Gallagher 1991; Wade 1990), and others have examined 
the text in relation to qiscursive practices in Coetzee's oeuvre and 
its engagement with South African literary and cultural politics 
(Attwell 1993; Castillo 1986; Eckstein 1990; Haluska 1987; Penner 
1989; Treiber 1992; Vanzanten Gallagher 1991; Watson 1986 & 1980), no 
critic, however, has given sustained and detailed attention to the 
relation between the allegorical levels at which the novel operates, 
and the critical debates it engenders on the representation of 
alterity. I develop such ·an argument through an examination of the 
text in the following chapter, to articulate the particular 
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contribution of Coetzee's novel to the larger debate on the 
representation of the subaltern in Southern African fiction. 
I. Other Ways of Seeing 
An examination of the ways in which the visual construction of the 
subaltern subject functions in the interrogation of the binary, 
hierarchical epistemology of power represented in the novel, and with 
which Coetzee engages critically throughout his writing practice, is 
crucial to an understanding of the complexity of the "criticism-as-
fiction" (Dovey 1988b:11) of Coetzee's project in Waiting for the 
Barbarians. Using theoretical debates in feminism on the visual 
construction of female subjectivity and its denial (Mulvey 1975; De 
Lauretis 1984), as well as arguments centred on the representation of 
subjectivity, language and signification (Irigaray 1985a and 1985b; 
Cixous 1981), I intend to examine, through close textual analysis, the 
representation of the relationship between the Magistrate and the 
barbarian woman, and how Coetzee's interrogation of issues around 
agency and constructions of subjectivity in textual discourse. 
Cixous (1981:90-91) postulates that patriarchal "[tJhought has 
always worked by .•. dual, hierarchized oppositions". She argues that 
"[w]herever an ordering intervenes, a law organises the thinkable by 
(dual, irreconcilable; or mitigable, dialectical) oppositions", and 
furthermore, that "logocentrism subjects thought -- all the concepts, 
the codes, the values -- to a two-term system, related to 'the' couple 
man/woman" (ibid.:91). It is also her contention that this 
hierarchization subjects the entire conceptual 
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organisation to man .•. [resulting in a) male privilege, 
which can be seen in the opposition by which it sustains 
itself, between activity and passivity ••. [so that] woman 
is alwaY3 on the side of passivity (lac.cit.). 
Throughout the novel, it becomes evident that the Magistrate is for 
the most part the active agent of his own narrative, at both the 
levels of narration and structural manifestation (Kristeva 1986:48), 
and especially in his "curious and, on the · surface, unlikely 
relationship" (Harvey 1981:5) with the barbarian woman. As Minna 
Herman Maltz (1990:22) demonstrates, much of the narrative is 
motivated by the waY3 in which "the Magistrate is disturbed by the 
inexplicable nature of his feelings for the barbarian girl". The 
entire novel is a text narrated, as it is composed, by the Magistrate, 
whose very act of narration is an attempt at control -- at perhaps the 
most fundamental level -- while he progressively realises that such 
control is illusory. The reader is constantly made aware of the 
Magistrate's quest for narrative control, which parallels his desire 
for the revelation of some greater narrative truth; this dual desire 
is illustrated by his confession of his "struggle ... with the old 
story, hoping that before it is finished it will reveal to [him] why 
it was that [he] thought it worth the trouble" (24-25). At the same 
time, paradoxically, in confessing this need for control and its 
absence, the Magistrate assumes a form of control, the position of 
power which is that of the autodiegetic narrator, the one who 
generates his own text (and, as Dovey 1988b and Castillo 1986 show, 
the text of his self) in the process of speaking it, and more 
specifically a subject speaking his text of the barbarians (and more 
pointedly the barbarian woman) as objects in and of his utterance. 
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This subjectivity, this position of power which he inhabits and 
assumes, is often asserted around issues of vision, the politics of 
visibility and more significantly, invisibility -- of seeing without 
being seen, of looking without being seen to do so. As Michel 
Foucault (1971:200) states, "{v]isibility is a trap", and as Berger 
(1972:7-8) argues, "[i]t is seeing which establishes our place in the 
surrounding world", and "[w]e only see what we look at [so that t]o 
look is an act of choice". Foucault (1973:xiii-xiv) finds that "[t]he 
residence of truth in the dark centre of things is linked, 
paradoxically, to this sovereign power of the empirical gaze that 
turns their darkness into light". In his first meeting with Jell, the 
Magistrate marvels at 
the two little discs of glass suspended in front of his 
eyes in loops of wire ••• [t]he discs are dark, they look 
opaque from the outside, but he [Jell] can see through 
them (1) • 
Clearly, he is disturbed by Joll's ability to look at him without 
being seen to do so. Here Jell becomes the subject who possesses the 
power to look without being constituted as an object open to being 
seen to be looking. This encounter is significant in that it 
prefigures some of the Magistrate's Olo1D predicaments with looking and 
being looked at in relation to the fisherfolk and the barbarian 
prisoners, and most significantly, the barbarian woman with whom he 
becomes increasingly fascinated. He protests that he would be able to 
"understand it if [Jell] wanted to hide blind eyes. But he is not 
blind" (1). In order to minimise the unease which the invisibility of 
Joll's eyes mark in him, the Magistrate reduces it to the level of 
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ridicule, but remains haunted by "the image of a face marked by two 
black glassy insect eyes from which there comes no reciprocal gaze but 
only [his own] doubled image cast back at [him]" (44). It is 
important to note that in the revision of the way in which he sees 
Joll, the Magis trate ascribes non-human eyes to Joll's image, and 
specifically insect eyes with their capacity for multiplying and 
diminishing the object being viewed, and in so doing constructing a 
completely different, a wholly other way of seeing. 
The need for reciprocal vision is crucial for the Magistrate, 
for while his gaze establishes reciprocity for the invisible gaze of 
Jell as subject, Joll's refusal to provide reciprocity for the 
Magistrate's gaze reduces the latter to the position of object in 
Joll's sight. This illustrates Hegel's argument about the 
Master/Slave dialectic in Phenomenology of Spirit, that "[s]elf-
consciousness exists in and for itself when •.. it so exists for 
another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged" (1977:111). 
The Magistrate dreads the lack of acknowledgement by an other of his 
s e lf, and in the incident with Jell, this affirmati on centres on the 
reciprocity of looking. And as Berger (1972:9) states, "[t]he 
reciprocal nature of vision is more fundament al than that of spoken 
language". This is also an important feature of the speech patterns 
of the interchanges between the Magistrat e and the barbarian woman. 
The position of power which Joll holds relative to the 
Magistrate prefigures the Magistrate's own position later in relation 
to the fisherfolk Jell brings into the s ettlement fo r inte rrogation 
and torture, and the barbarian prisoners who are captured 
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subsequently. The Magistrate finds himself one of those who "stand 
watching them eat as though they are strange animals" (18), and in his 
power to look, the objects of his gaze are reduced to animals, denied 
their humanity. Still, he "do[es] not want idlers coming in to stare 
at them" (18), that occupation being a privilege he has annexed for 
himself, as he "spend[s] hours watching them from the upstairs 
window", and like Jell he remains "invisible behind the glass" (19). 
This structuring of vision recalls Foucault's panopticon, where "in 
the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the 
central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen" 
(1977:202). This is also perhaps the first moment in which the 
Magistrate resembles Joll. His power to gaze at the prisoners from a 
superior vantage point is to lead to his first encounter with the 
barbarian woman when later Joll returns with barbarians, not merely 
fisherfolk. Thus the fisherfolk, and later the barbarian prisoners, 
are "in a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power" (ibid.:201). 
Mulvey (1975:436), in her pioneering essay on scopophilia and 
narrative cinema, argues that "[i]n a world ordered by sexual 
imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and 
passive/female". In this she concurs with De Lauretis (1984:37-38), 
who argues that 
[t]he representation of woman as image (spectacle, object 
to be looked at, •.. and its concurrent representation of 
the female body as the locus of sexuality, site of visual 
pleasure, or lure of the gaze) is so pervasive in our 
culture ••• that it necessarily constitutes a starting 
point for any understanding of sexual difference and its 
ideological effects in the construction of social 
subjects, its presence in all forms of subjectivity. 
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This reiterates Cixous's (1981:90-91) argument on patriarchal language 
and its impulses of hierarchizing quoted earlier. The relationship 
between the Magistrate and the barbarian woman certainly demonstrates 
this, as it seems that the barbarian woman's construction by the 
narrator, the Magistrate, is a significantly visual process 
represented in language. The role of sight -- in the light of the 
barbarian woman's "blindness" -- is therefore crucial in examining the 
discourse on subaltern subjectivity engaged in and critiqued by 
Coetzee, because, as has been demonstrated by the discussion around 
visibility and invisibility, looking without being seen to do so, and 
the ways in which the encounters between Joll and the Magistrate 
illustrate this, "{t]here is power in looking" (hooks 1992:115). 
The Magistrate's first encounter with the barbarian woman is 
described in his narrative as a moment when she appears as an object 
in his field of vision. He details how "the shuffling group of 
prisoners roped together neck to neck, shapeless figures" emerge into 
the yard, and how "[o]ne of the women has to be helped. She shakes 
all the time like an old person, though she is young" (24). This 
becomes the moment of first visual contact which marks (and masks) the 
Magistrate's real interest in the barbarian woman, since throughout 
the rest of his narrative he tries to recall and recapture an image of 
the barbarian woman prior to this, just as he tries to (re)capture the 
reason for his interest in her. However, as he admits, he can barely 
"claim ever to have seen them [the prisoners]" given that he did 
little ·~ore than pass [his] gaze over their surface abse ntly, with 
reluctance" (24). As Bhabha (1994:112) states, "[i] f discriminatory 
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effects enable the authorities to keep an eye on them [the subaltern], 
their proliferating difference evades that eye, escapes that 
surveillance". The Magistrate recalls the group, but is unable to 
differentiate between them, and later to recall the barbarian woman as 
a single unit in that group. The first moment of recognition, of 
specific interest, though, is when the Magistrate focuses on the 
barbarian woman's physical description, detailing "the straight black 
eyebretws, the glossy black hair" (25), exercising his "determining 
male gaze [which] projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which 
is styled accordingly" (Mulvey 1975:436). This moment, in which the 
barbarian woman is significantly figured as an image, illustrates De 
Lauretis's argument that "what the representation of woman as image, 
positive or negative , achieves is to deny women the status of 
subjects" (1984:57-58). This concurs with Mulvey's point that "[i]n 
their traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked 
at and displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual ••• 
impact so that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness" 
(lee.cit.). This display of the spectacular confirms Berger's point 
that "[m]en survey women before treating them. Consequently, hetw a 
woman appears to a man can determine how she will be treated " 
(1972:46). And yet, despite this singling out of the barbarian woman, 
or rather, the image he has constructed of her, the features the 
Magistrate focuses on are ones "of the barbarians" (25) more 
generally, rather than of the woman specifically. Several critics 
have discussed the "blankness" which the barbarian woman's image 
constitutes for the Magistrate (Castillo 1986; Eckstein 1990; Dovey 
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1988b). As the reader (through the Magistrate) comes to realise, it 
is an absence, rather than a presence, that sets the barbarian woman 
apart from everyone around her. As De Lauretis (1984:57) shows, "it 
is the elision of woman that is represented". It is only when "the 
next day she is not there" that the Magistrate "speak[s] to the 
gatekeeper" (25), enquiring after her. Therefore, while she is 
visually encoded in his narrative, he pursues his interest in her only 
when she . does not appear as an object in his directed gaze. It is 
also significant that it is in the Magistrate's dreams of the children 
playing in the snow, that he attempts to reconstitute the barbarian 
woman's marklessness, as Penner (1989) and Lance Olsen (1985) argue. 
However, the barbarian woman is more than simply an object in 
the gaze of the Magistrate. He describes how "[t]wice more during the 
day [he] pass[es] her. Each time she gives [him] a strange regard, 
staring straight ahead of her until [he is] near, then very slowly 
turning her head away from [him]" (25). It becomes apparent that the 
Magistrate is himself an object in the gaze of the barbarian woman. 
Here, it seems, "the woman as icon, displayed for the gaze and 
enjoyment of men, the active controllers of the look, ••. threatens to 
evoke the anxiety it originally signified" (Mulvey 1975:438), for this 
"strange" behaviour unsettles and disconcerts the Magistrate. As 
Berger (1972:9) argues, "[t]he eye of the other combines with our own 
eye to make it fully credible that we are part of the visible world". 
The barbarian woman's activity is immediately qualified by the 
Magistrate as uncanny, Other -- "she gives [him] her strange regard" 
(25; emphasis added). As De Lauretis (1984:38-39) states, 
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any image of woman -- is placed within, read from, the 
encompassing context of patriarchal ideologies, where 
values and effects are social and subjective, aesthetic 
and affective, and ••• permeate the entire social fabric 
and hence all social subjects, women as well as men. 
Thus the Magistrate;s image of the barbarian woman is a construction 
which is complicit with, as it is implicated in, the patriarchal 
imperial codes of Empire. 
Upon making enquiries, the Magistrate is told that "[t]he woman 
is blind •.• She is one of the barbarians the colonel brought in. She 
was left behind" (25). The Magistrate still has only a visual 
conception of the strange, barbarian woman, but she fascinates him 
(perhaps because he only has a visual image of her). Again, it is 
interesting to note that while the woman is the object of the 
Magistrate's active gaze, she is passive even in the explanation of 
her presence -- "She was left behind" (lee.cit.; emphasis added). It 
seems that the narrator possesses that "curiosity and the wish to look 
intermingle[d] with a fascination with likeness and recognition: the 
human face, the human body .•• the visible presence of the person in 
the world" (Mulvey 1975:435). 
However, it is when language enters the relationship at the 
level of speech that the discourse on the issues of control, and the 
po litics of power and agency, become more over t. As Attwell (1993:3) 
proposes, "Coe tzee leans toward a reflective examination of the 
constitutive role of language in placing the subject within history". 
For the Magistrate "give[s] orders; (and] she is brought to [his] 
r ooms" (26). He r e we see ·the hierarchy of power clearly demonstrated: 
the Magistrate issues a command, the barbarian woman is delivered to 
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him (literally and figuratively); he, utters speech in language, and 
the woman is brought to him so that she seems to have no active part, 
no volition even, in her presence before him. This illustrates 
Berger's argument that "men act and women appear" (1972:47). The 
Magistrate subjects her to a series of questions during the first 
interview, during which "she stands before [him] propped on her 
sticks" (26), and his scrutiny is concentrated on her sight. He 
recognises her as "the same girl, the same black hair cut in a fringe 
across her forehead, the same broad mouth, the black eyes that look 
through and past me", a detailed description of her as she appears 
before him, an image which he will later lose and struggle to recover. 
His inquiry is met with a willed silence which unsettles him. Her 
first words "I can see" (26) -- is a revelation for the Magistrate, 
since it is the first moment she participates in the linguistic 
framework of Empire. The assertion implies both subjectivity, an "I" 
that can speak, and agency, the ability to see (when it has been 
assumed that it was absent). As Benveniste (1971:225) argues, the 
"speaker sets himself (sic) up as a subject by referring to himself as 
I in his discourse". What remains crucial though, is that "[t]he 
pronoun 'I' stands in for the ever-elusive subject" (Eagleton 
1996:147). But Irigaray (1985a:25-26) holds that 
the predominance of the visual is particularly foreign to 
female eroticism ••• and her entry into a dominant scopic 
economy signifies, again, her· consignment to passivity: 
she is to be the ••• object of contemplation. 
However, the Magistrate is still not convinced, and describes how 
"[h]er eyes move from [his] face and settle somewhere behind [him] to 
57 
Waiting for the Barbarians 
[his) right" (26). This act evokes a response in him, so that 
"[w)ithout thinking [he) cast[s] a glance over [his] shoulder" and 
realises, almost outraged, that "she is staring at nothing but blank 
wall" (26). Here it is evident that "[t)he man controls the ••. 
fantasy and also emerges as the representative of power ••• as the 
bearer of the look of the spectator" (Mulvey 1975:437). This 
reiterates the Magistrate's earlier position in relation to the 
fisherfolk, and in relation to his inability and reluctance to 
distinguish between the barbarian prisoners. What Irigaray 
(1985a:175) argues of women can be extended to explain the 
Magistrate's vision (but not individualisation) of the barbarians: 
"each one looks exactly like every other. They all have the same 
phantom-like reality". And this phantom- like presence is something 
which is illustrated in an exemplary manner by the ways in which the 
Magistrate is unable to recall the barbarian woman's image from the 
moment he realises that he is going to return her to the other 
barbarians to the north of the settlement. Again, this echoes the 
argument proposed by Bhabha (1994:112) on the surveillance of the 
oppressed and how their difference is overlooked, in both senses of 
the word. 
Significantly, it is through the Magistrate as narrator alone 
that we have access to the barbarian woman's presence, and he 
therefore always subsumes and circumscribes any agency or subjectivity 
that she may possess. Castillo (1986) discusses at length how the 
Magistrate constitutes himself through his narrative, but I would 
submit that because of the complexity and ambivalence of the text, 
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there are also moments when the subjectivity of others are implied. 
Thus the Magistrate's pronouncement that the barbarian woman's "gaze 
has grown rigid" (26) is an important moment in the fragile balance of 
power between the two. It prefigures perhaps the pivotal moment in 
their relationship, when she makes an almost defiant, challenging 
statement to assert her/self. Most of the Magistrate's questions 
"[s]he meets ••• with silence ••• staring eerily ahead of her" (26). 
Because of this enigmatic silence, it is the strange gaze of the woman 
that then becomes the focus of his curiosity and his questions. When 
he commands her to " [ l] ook at [him] " (26), she responds with a 
statement that suggests traces of her denied subjective identity 
which is always, and necessarily, only alluded to by and in the text, 
which is after all a document of Empire, narrated by "a responsible 
official in the service of the Empire" (8), the Magistrate who has 
therefore by definition no access to that symbolic system in which the 
barbarian woman's subjectivity and identity can and may be expressed 
- - even though it does not establish it. Thus, Coetzee's text, and 
the Magistrate's narrative, could be approached as a text 
to reread ••• not univocally but contrapuntally, with a 
simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan history 
that is narrated and of those other histories against 
which (and together with which) the dominating discourse 
acts (Said 1993:59). 
'As the Magistrate admit::s, "[n]one of u::s could speak their language" 
(18), and "[i]n the make::shift language we ::share there are no nuances" 
(40), the very nuances which would be crucial for the barbarian woman 
to expre::ss her ::subjectivity. (Later he i::s to regret this willed 
ignorance of the barbarian language, and the function it could have 
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served had he learned it from her.) As Belsey (1985:47) states, "it 
is language itself which, by differentiating between concepts, offers 
the possibility of meaning". When the barbarian women declares, "I am 
looking. This is how I look" (26), the reader is only offered a 
glimpse, a hint of the subjectivity which is inaccessible and 
inexpressible in the text at hand. As Eagleton (1996:116) argues, 
"[a] text may 'show' us something about the nature of meaning and 
signification which it is not able to formulate as a proposition". 
The ambiguous meaning of her statement, or its duality of meaning, is 
also significant, for not only does it imply agency and activity "I 
am looking" (emphasis added) -- but also passivity, the denial of 
agency, and the perception of oneself as an object -- "This is how I 
look". This illustrates another point of Hegel's master/slave 
dialectic, which is that the Magistrate as master possesses "the 
independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself" 
while the barbarian woman as slave is "the other [who] is the 
dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or be 
for another" (1977:115). Brink (1983:72) applies this to South Africa 
when he argues that "violence denies not only the humanity of the 
person against which it is directed but also that of the person who 
practises it". Coetzee (1992:96) himself states in an interview that 
[i]n a society of masters and slaves, no one is free. The 
slave is not free, because he is not his own master; the 
master is not free, because he cannot do without the 
slave. 
This concurs with Michael Marais's (1996:72) argument that "the 
colonising subject is no more master of the discourse that he/she 
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imposes on the colonised than is the colonised him/herself. Just as 
the colonised is subject to and constituted by this discourse, so too 
is the coloniser". And as hooks (1992:116) argues, "[e)ven in the 
worst circumstances of domination, the ability to manipulate one's 
gaze in the face of structures of domination that would contain it, 
opens up the possibility of agency". It is perhaps this pO'wler, the 
ability to control one's gaze, that Joll's torture attempts to deny 
the barbarian woman. Hl::Ywever, it is precisely because of this new way 
of looking -- ironically given to her by Joll's torture instruments - -
that the barbarian woman causes such unease in the Magistrate. Thus 
the barbarian woman becomes aware that she i s a spectacle f or the 
Magistrate to look: at, which concurs with Berger's argument that 
"[m)en look: at women [whereas w]omen watch themselves being looked at" 
(1972:47). And when the Magistrate doubts her declaration that she 
can indeed see, he 
wave[s) a hand in front of her eyes ..• [s)he blinks. 
(He] bring[s his] face closer and stare into her eyes. 
She wheels her gaze from the wall on to [him] • The black 
irises are set off by milky whites clear as a child's 
(26) . 
At the close of the first interview the Magistrate, hOW'ever, still 
insists that "she cannot see" (27). And, as Mulvey (1975:437) argues, 
it is evident here that "[a]n active/pass i ve heterosexual division of 
labour has ... controlled [the] narrative structure" in the 
Magistrate's text. In "the split betvJeen spectacle and narrative 
[which] supports the man's role as the active one of advancing the 
story, [of] maki ng thi ngs happen" (ibid.:437), t he barbarian woman 
emerges as an icon, a spectacle, an object on display for the curious, 
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imperial gaze of the Magistrate. In Berger's argument, "a woman's 
presence ••• defines what can and cannot be done to her" (46), and in 
the case of the barbarian woman, she can be looked at or not, at the 
whim of the Magistrate, but the reciprocal act is not allowed her. 
At the end of their first interview, the Magistrate imagines 
that the barbarian woman "understands what [he is] offering" (27), so 
that, upon her return, he feels obliged to justify himself, saying 
that " [ t] his is not what you think it is" (27), while at the same time 
being aware of how "[he] prowl[s] around her ••• sick at [him.]self" 
(27). The Magistrate realises that "[t]he distance between [him)self 
and her torturers ••• is negligible" (27), not only because as a 
citizen and official of Empire, he is 'on the same side' as Jell; but 
his questioning and pursuit of her mystery differs only in methodology 
from that of Joll and his lackeys. This similarity between the 
Magistrate and Jell has been commented on by several critics, among 
them Penner (1989), Dovey (1988b) and Castillo (1986), and the 
Magistrate's perception of his resemblance to Jell in his relationship 
with the barbarian woman will be elaborated upon later. 
However, the Magistrate insists "that she cannot see" (27), and 
on her return to his quarters, he asks (or commands) her to "[s]how me 
your feet .•. Show me what they have done to your feet" (28). What 
follows is a moment in which the barbarian woman is reduced to nothing 
but physicality, mere corporeal presence. Any hint of agency she 
possessed before is now stripped from her as the Magistrate ''work[s] 
at the thongs and eyelets of the coat, throw[s] it open, pull[s) the 
boots off" to reveal "her feet ••. swaddled, shapeless" (28). All the 
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while 11 [s] he neither helps nor hinders [him]". As Irigaray (1985a :25) 
states, 11 [w]oman, in this sexual imaginary, is only a more or less 
obliging prop for the enactment of man's fantasies". Upon an 
instruction from the Magistrate to 11 [ l] et [him) see" (28), the 
barbarian woman begins to unwrap the dirty bandages. What follows is 
an eroticized description of the Magistrate's ablution of the 
barbarian woman's broken feet, in which her feet, as fetishised 
objects in his gaze, become satisfying in themselves. As Mulvey 
(1975:438) states, "fetishistic scopophilia builds up the physical 
beauty of the object, transforming it into something satisfying in 
itself". Hence, significantly, at this point, no sexual intercourse 
occurs between the Magistrate and the barbarian woman. 
The unsettling, uncanny gaze of the barbarian woman has already 
been established, as has the anxiety that it evokes in the Magistrate. 
According to Mulvey (lee.cit.), 
[t]he male unconscious has two avenues of escape from this 
castration anxiety: preoccupation with the re-enactment of 
the original trauma (investigating the woman, demystifying 
her mystery), counterbalanced by the devaluation, 
punishment or saving of the guilty object •.. or else 
complete disavowal of castration by the substitution of a 
fetish object or turning the represented figure itself 
into a fetish object so that it becomes reassuring rather 
than dangerous . 
The Magistrate's choice of escape, it can be argued, is a mixture of a 
"preoccupation with the re-enactment of the original trauma" his 
obsession with how she became scarred and with the specifics of her 
torture -- and the "disavowal of castration by the substitution of a 
fetish object" -- his fetishised ritual of was hing her feet in a 
gesture that has mythical associations in the figure of Christ washing 
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the feet of his apostles. Also, it is significant to note Bhabha's 
(1994:101) argument that "[i)t is an anxiety which will not abate 
because the empty third space, the other space of symbolic 
representation, at once bar and bearer of difference, is closed to the 
paranoid position of power". And "that space of the other is always 
occupied by an id~e fixe: despot, heathen, barbarian" (loc.cit.). The 
barbarian woman, and the barbarians on the whole, do function as 
bearers of meaning, for Empire, but especially for Joll and the 
Magistrate, as the representatives of Empire in the borderlands -- as 
the Magistrate states, "the settlers' litany of prejudice [holds] that 
barbarians are lazy, immoral, filthy, stupid" (38), which the Empire, 
by implication, is not; significantly, he does not at first distance 
himself from this system of beliefs. 
The night after that first evening of his ritual, the Magistrate 
reports ''watch[ing) her eat ••• like a blind person, gazing into the 
distance, working by touch" (29). Again, he reiterates his disbelief 
in her ability to see -- "I don't believe you can see" (lee.cit.) 
which elicits an assertion from her that "I can see. When I look 
straight there is nothing". This demonstrates both her ability to 
communicate in the language of Empire -- the implication here seems to 
be that her silence is at times a wilful act, which implies agency, 
rather than inability -- and the impossibility of her communicating 
entirely effectively in language altogether when she takes recourse in 
gesture -- "she rubs the air in front of her like someone cleaning a 
window" (lee.cit.). It seems therefore that the barbarian woman 
exists beyond the language of Empire, and sometimes the meanings she 
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attempts to express are themselves beyond language itself. When the 
Magistrate asks about the aetiology of the blurred vision, "[s]he 
shrugs and is silent" (lac.cit.). Again, there is an indication that 
in her silence the barbarian woman is most powerful, in that her 
silence belies her ability to decide when and what to speak, and what 
to withhold from the Magistrate's probing questions (if not from the 
scrutiny of his probing and curious, not to say questioning, gaze). 
This would illustrate Foucault's argument that "the examination is at 
the centre of the procedures that constitute the individual as effect 
and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge" (1977:192). 
Though, as Bhabha (1994:123) argues, hers is a "more ominous silence 
that utters an archaic colonial 'otherness'". As such, her moments of 
silence become "inscriptions ••• that mock[] the social performance of 
language with their non-sense; that baffle[] the communicable verities 
of culture with their refusal to translate" (ibid.:124). This 
prefigures the moment when he has delivered her to the barbarian men 
in the mountains, and she offers him a mocking and inscrutable smile 
in parting. And as Bhabha (1994:166) goes on to argue, 
[t]he silent Other of gesture and failed speech becomes 
what Freud calls that 'haphazard member of the herd', the 
Stranger, whose languageless presence evokes an archaic 
anxiety and aggressivity by impeding the search for 
narcissistic love- objects in which the subject can 
rediscover himself. 
As such, this moment also reveals the first instance when the 
Magistrate consciously realises that he too is an object in the 
woman's gaze, for, he imagines, "[w]hen she looks at [him he is) a 
blur, a voice, a smell, a centre of energy ••. she does not kncrw" 
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(29). Row'ever, "[w]hen she does not look at [him he is] a grey form 
moving about unpredictable on the periphery of her vision" (lac.cit.). 
He realises that the barbarian woman lives in limbo, in ignorance of 
what her fate is, of what he, the Magistrate, intends to do with or to 
her. Like the other barbarians and the fisherfolk waiting in the 
courtyard shortly after their capture, she too is ''waiting for 
whatever was to happen next" (33). In other words, the barbarian 
woman's existence is very much in a liminal space, between action and 
inaction, between knowledge and ignorance 
and silence, between language and gesture 
as between articulation 
just as the outpost is a 
liminal space, between Empire and the barbarian territory. This 
analogy between the barbarian woman (and more pointedly, her body) and 
the territory will be examined further at a later stage. What 
unsettles the Magistrate supremely is his inability to recover an 
image of the barbarian woman before her torture by Joll, and this 
anxiety obsesses him to the end of the novel . In his attempts to 
recover these images, he also attempts to read the signs on her body, 
as he attempts to read the sign of her body, and her presence in his 
life. In order to explore this, I now wish to examine the 
Magistrate's ciphering and deciphering of the barbarian woman as sign. 
II. Reading the Sign(s) of the Subaltern 
The relationship between the Magistrate and the barbarian woman 
changes, and moves from the visual to the tactile. Whereas before she 
simply appeared before him, and his interest in and construction of 
her remained focused on the visual, the scopic, it now enters the 
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overtly erotic, if not sexual, and tactile. Therefore, according to 
Berger's argument, whereas before the Magistrate has looked at the 
barbarian woman, he now intends to act upon her (1972:46). 
The meal is followed by a repetition of the ritual in which he 
washes her feet, but he explores her body further this time, venturing 
"up and down her legs from ankle to knee, back and forth, squeezing, 
stroking, moulding" (29-30). The Magistrate "[t]hen, fully clothed, 
.•• lay[s him]self down head to foot beside her. [He] fold[s] her 
legs together in [his] arms, cradle[s his] head on them, and in an 
instant [is] asleep" (30). The feet and legs of the barbarian woman, 
therefore,·have for the moment become sufficiently comforting for the 
Magistrate not to pursue any more explicitly sexual encounters with 
her, even though he has realised from the beginning that that was 
probably one of the reasons for his initial interest her. 
On successive nights, for "the ritual of the washing .•• she is 
now naked" (30). At first the Magistrate's "soapy hand travels 
between her thighs, incuriously", but he "feel[s] no desire to enter 
[her] stocky little body" (30) • He is content to "use her body, if 
that is what [he is] doing, in this foreign way", but "a week [after] 
words have passed between [them]", the barbarian woman's "body yields 
••• [s] he yields to everything" (30) . This illustrates Irigaray' s 
point that "woman is traditionally a use-value for man, an exchange 
value among men: in other words, a commodity" (1985a:31). It also 
concurs with Angela Davis's argument that "[o]ne of racism's 
historical features has always been the assumption that white men --
especially those who wield economic power -- possess an incontestable 
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right of access to Black women's bodies" (1981:175). The Magistrate 
feels that he has tamed her sufficiently so that "under her blind gaze 
[he] can undress without embarrassment" (30), and he reports how, 
"in the very act of caressing her I am overcome with sleep ••• like 
death ••. or enchantment, blank, outside time" (31). After all, he 
"lose[s him]self in the rhythm of what [he is] doing lose[s] 
awareness of the girl herself. There is a space of time which is 
blank to [him]" as a result of the ritualistic washing ceremony. The 
barbarian woman's body therefore becomes the Magistrate's medium for 
escaping the need to "strain[] [his] ears to hear or not to hear the 
sounds of violence" (22), or the echoes of these sounds which he later 
explains to Mandel are in the air. 
The Magistrate's close examination of the barbarian woman's 
physical body leads him to a series of discoveries which to him, as 
the narrator of the text and the reader of the signs of his world, are 
particularly significant for his own sense of self, and important in 
any reading of the novel: the Magistrate's reading of the scars left 
on the barbarian woman's body by Joll's torture, and the link between 
this act of reading and the act of reading the signs in his 
environment. 
The Magistrate describes how, "(o]ne evening [he] notice[s] 
in the corner of one eye a greyish puckering as though a caterpillar 
lay there with its head under her eyelid, grazing" (31). He enquires 
from the barbarian woman what the "caterpillar" is, "tracing [it] with 
[his] fingernail" and she ·explains that "[t]hat is where they touched 
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(her]", and "pushes (his] hand away" (lac.cit.). In this moment he 
realises that "{i]t has been growing more and more clear to [him] that 
until the marks on this girl's body are deciphered and understood [he] 
cannot let go of her" (lac.cit.), and it is also the moment that he 
first resembles, in his own description, Joll, who "prob[es] for the 
truth, in which [he has] to exert pressure" (5). But Jell uses 
torture to exact the truth, to "escape from [the] castration anxiety" 
(Mulvey 1975:438) of being confronted with the barbarian gaze in the 
eyes of his torture victims, under the guise of discovering the truth 
and in the Magistrate's words, for Joll "[p]ain is truth; all else 
is subject to doubt" (5) -- which involves "investigating ••• 
demystifying ••• counterbalanced by the ••• punishment ••• of the 
guilty object" (Mulvey 1975:438) -- the Magistrate himself tells us 
that Joll, "[i]n his quest for the truth ••• is tireless" (22). And, 
as the text demonstrates, for Jell "pleasure lies in ascertaining 
guilt ••• asserting control and subjugating the guilty person through 
punishment" (Mulvey 1975:438), for, as he details his method of 
interrogation to the Magistrate, he describes how 
I have to exert pressure to find (the truth]. First I get 
lies, ••• this is what happens -- first lies, then 
pressure, then more lies, then more pressure, then the 
break, then more pressure, then the truth. That is haw I 
get the truth (5). 
Here we see that "[i]n the practice of torture, pain, confrontation 
and truth were bound together: they worked together on the 
[prisoner's] body" (Foucault 1977:41). The Magistrate, of course, 
finds Joll's violent methods -- the results of which are displayed by 
the corpse of the old man, the scarred bodies of the boy and the 
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barbarian woman, and later, on the bodies of the captured barbarian 
prisoners who have their cheeks pierced with wire and are beaten in 
the public square -- anathema, but he too is in search of truth, of 
the origin of the scars -- the Magistrate himself wonders whether he 
too may feel "how her torturers felt hunting their secret" (43). As 
Penner (1989:79) states, "the magistrate probes her with questions as 
her torturers had probed her with their implements". Consequently, 
the magistrate constitutes the barbarian woman as "the object of 
information, [not] as a subject in communication" (Foucault 1977:200). 
More significantly, he is in search of that "truth" which is signified 
by the signs of the scars on the barbarian woman's body; the 
Magistrate wants the narrative which underscores the mysterious scars. 
Hence his attempts to read the barbarian woman are also his attempts 
to understand Empire. And significantly, the author of those scars is 
Joll, just as he is the one who marks the captured barbarian prisoners 
with the word "enemy" and then has the word flogged from their backs. 
As Foucault (1977:34) states, what is enacted here "is a 
differentiated production of pain, an organised ritual for the marking 
of victims and the expression of the power that punishes". 
As Mulvey (1975:438) states, 
[t]his sadistic side [of scopophilia] fits in well with 
narrative. Sadism demands a story, depends on making 
something happen, forcing a change in another person, a 
battle of will and strength, victory/defeat, all occuring 
in a linear time with a beginning and an end. 
For Joll, marking the barbarian woman was part of the "set procedures 
[they] go through" (4) to get at the truth. However, it is important 
to note that while Joll perceives his quest for narrative truth to be 
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a linear process -- with a clear beginning, a middle, and a 
satisfactory, though illusionary, ending, a neat sense of closure when 
"[a] certain tone enters the voice of a man who is telling the truth" 
(5) -- the Magistrate's entire narrative is an illustration of the 
impossibility of finding narrative truth, of recovering origins, and 
of the viability of linear conceptions of narrative and history, even 
as he compulsively searches for them. Hawever, a more detailed 
analysis of the relation between history and narrative in the text 
will follow later. 
Olsen (1985:51) suggests that "[e]ach of the characters in 
Coetzee's project is a kind of reader, decoder, interpreter". The 
Magistrate certainly begins, at the moment of seeing the scars on the 
eyes of the barbarian woman, a conscious process of 'reading' and 
interpreting the signs left by Joll's torture on her body. After all, 
as Foucault (1977:34) posits, 
torture forms part of a ritual ••• It must mark the 
victim: it is intended either by the scar it leaves on the 
body, or by the spectacle that accompanies it, to brand 
the victim with infamy. 
This is illustrated by Joll's torture of the old man and the boy, the 
barbarian woman, and later, the prisoners whom he whips in the square. 
Consequently, as Penner (1989:78) argues, the barbarian woman "is an 
enigma to him [the Magistrate] and to the reader". He "part[s] her 
eyelids [to see t]he caterpillar come[] to an end, decapitated, at the 
pink inner rim of the eyelid. There is no other mark. The eye is 
whole" (31). He is incredulous that "gazing back at me she sees 
nothing ••• a hazy circle of light" (lee.cit.), revealing his fear of 
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not being constituted as presence, of not having his physical self 
affirmed by that uncanny, strange gaze -- of literally being 
invisible, overlooked, unseen, especially when she is looking at him. 
Here, it could be argued, the incident becomes an allegory of centre 
and margin. The Magistrate cannot conceive of sight in which "at the 
centre, where [he is, there is] only a blur, a blank" (lac.cit.), so 
he proceeds to test the veracity of her claim against the sign of her 
blindness which he has read and her explanation of her strange vision, 
by "pass[ing his] hand slowly in front of her face, watching her 
pupils [but he] cannot discern any movement" (lac.cit.). His gentle 
proddings for information about the torture, paired with his discovery 
of other signs written on her body by Joll -- "[o]n the edge of 
oblivion it comes back to [him] that [his] fingers, running over her 
buttocks, have felt the phantom criss-cross of ridges under the skin" 
(lac.cit.) -- leads the Magistrate into a moment when language fails 
him, when "[he] want[s] to say, 'don't make a mystery of it, pain is 
only pain'; but words elude [him] .•. [He] struggle[s] to speak" (32). 
The Magistrate then tries "to recover an image of her as she was 
before • • • [when] she was still unmarked" (33) . Irigaray (1985a :31-
32) argues that "[w]omen are marked phallicly (sic) by their fathers, 
husbands, procurers. And this branding determines their value in 
sexual commerce", and the Magistrate illustrates this when he thinks 
of the barbarian woman as "marked for life as the property of a 
stranger" (135) • He wonders (wistfully) who "that other girl with the 
blind face [will] remember: me •.. or that cold man with the mask over 
his eyes who gave the orders and pondered the sounds of her intimate 
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pain" (lee.cit.), and then whether "I was not in my heart of hearts 
regretting that I could not engrave myself on her as deeply" 
(lee.cit.). He concedes, though, that "I must believe she was once 
unmarked as I must believe she was once a child" (lee.cit.), as in the 
series of dreams already given detailed critical attention by Penner 
(1989:81- 86), who links the "dream visions" to the Magistrate's quest 
for an "ethical vision". In other words, as Bhabha (1994:51) states, 
the image -- as point of identification -- marks the site 
of an ambivalence. Its representation is always spatially 
split -- it makes present something that is absent -- and 
temporally deferred: it is the representation of a time 
that is always elsewhere. 
And the Magistrate is seemingly aware of this split, for he discloses 
that 
[he] must believe that [he] saw her on the day she was 
brought in ••• roped neck to neck with the other barbarian 
prisoners ••• [his] gaze must have passed over her when, 
together with the others, she sat in the barracks waiting 
for whatever was to happen next (33). 
The entire narrative, and especially from the moment the Magistrate 
has handed the barbarian woman back to the men in the mountains, is an 
attempt to recover an image of her as she was, and also as she was 
before Joll tortured her. The Magistrate concedes that "[his] eye 
passed over her; but [he has] no memory of that passage. On that day 
she was still unmarked" (lac.cit.). This recognition of what triggers 
his interest in the barbarian woman -- what sets her apart, literally 
and figuratively, from the other barbarians, are the "points of 
irremediable damage, the eyes, the feet" (lac.cit.) -- is a crucial 
moment for the Magistrate, though he still cannot fathom his 
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fascination with her, since "with this woman it is as if there is no 
interior, only a surface across which I hunt back and forth seeking 
entry" (43). This description is almost metaphorical for the process 
of reading and decoding, and mirrors the conundrum which the wooden 
slips in the ruins present to the Magistrate, and later to Joll. At 
this point in the narrative he has still "not entered her ••• {his] 
desire has not taken on that direction, that directedness" (34). 
Still, his interest in the markings on the barbarian woman's body is 
sustained, and as he later admits, 
if (he] had understood her, if (he] had been in a position 
to understand her, if [he] had believed her, if (he] had 
been in a position to believe her, (he] might have saved 
[himJself from a year of confused gestures of expiation 
(135) • 
This is paired with his existential doubts about his own role as 
object in the gaze of another, for he wonders ''what ••• they see in 
[him], if they ever see [him]" (125), which echoes his earlier 
question about his visibility to the barbarian woman -- her reply, 
"Yes, we all saw you" (48) is quite telling, since it illustrates 
Bhabha's ealier argument about the subaltern's evasion of 
surveillance. Also, while the Magistrate has thought himself 
invisible, or more pointedly, has not even conceived of the 
possibility of himself as object for another subject, he muses that 
"she cannot but feel my gaze pressing in upon her with the weight of a 
body" (56). The construction of the male gaze is overtly sexual here. 
In many respects it could be argued that the barbarian woman, 
Jell and the Magistrate form a triangle of desire: Jell and the 
Magistrate both desire a form of truth from the barbarian woman 
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Joll desires his truth about the barbarian army about to attack the 
Empire; the Magistrate wants to know the details of the "set 
procedures [they] go througp" (4) -- but the real tension, as the 
events of the novel show, is played out between the two men, and the 
barbarian woman, though crucial, is merely functional. As Spivak 
(1987:217) states, "notions of kinship are anchored and consolidated 
by the exchange of women". The barbarian woman is exchanged between 
Jell and the Magistrate -- the latter "acquires" her through the 
actions of the former -- and later between the Magistrate and the men 
in the mountains to whom he delivers her. When the Magistrate invents 
the fantastic secret narratives in his meeting with Joll, he is again 
exchanging the sign of the barbarian woman with Jell. After all, he 
has been the one to link the script on the wooden slips with the marks 
on her body (31). 
At first the Magistrate believes that "[n]othing is worse than 
what we can imagine" (31), and thinks that he "ought to be filling her 
with the truth" (41). It is the barbarian woman, however, who imparts 
hard truths to the Magistrate, truths which he had been told by Joll 
he "would find tedious" (4), and into which he "never wished to be 
drawn", in which he "did not mean to get embroiled" ( 8) . She informs 
him that "[i]t was a fork, a kind of fork with only two teeth. There 
were little knobs on the teeth to make them blunt. They put it in the 
coals till it was hot, then they touched you with it, to burn you" 
(41). However, "[i]n the makeshift language [they] share there are no 
nuances" ( 40) , and as a result, " [ i] t is difficult to explain" ( 41) . 
Again, this mirrors the manner in which he "wait[s] for a sign that 
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what lay around [him], what lay beneath [his] feet was not only sand", 
"wait[s] for the spirits from the byways of history to speak", and of 
course "[t]he sign did not come" (16). This does not deter him 
though, and he wonders whether the wooden slips from the ruins with 
their "painted characters" (15) will reveal the mystery of the ruins, 
and the barbarians. He muses whether 
what I had taken to be characters in a syllabary might 
in fact be elements of a picture whose outline would leap 
at me if I struck on the right arrangement: a map of 
the land of the barbarians in olden times, or a 
representation of a lost pantheon. I have even found 
myself reading the slips in a mirror, or tracing one on 
top of another, or conflating half of one with half of 
another (16). 
In several senses the barbarian woman becomes yet another wooden slip, 
scripted with characters, and the Magistrate does conflate half of her 
with half a wooden slip when he inserts her into the fictional 
translation of the wooden slips to Joll (110-111). This reflects his 
power, "[his] freedom to make of the girl whatever [he] felt like, 
wife or concubine or daughter or slave, or all at once or more, at 
whim, because [he] had no duty to her save what it occurred to [him] 
to feel from moment to moment" (?8). ~hen he adds, wistfully, that 
"from the oppression of such freedom [he] would welcome the 
liberation of confinement" (lee.cit.), he makes the realisation 
outlined in Hegel (1977:116), that in annihilating the self of the 
other he is also annihilating the humanity of his own self. 
This leads into a discussion of how the Magistrate, in the wake 
of Joll, circumscribes the barbarian woman's corporeal presence in his 
life, and attempts to come to terms with her as "the only key [he has] 
to the labyrinth" (8?). 
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III. Policing Other Political Bodies 
The Magistrate, as subject to and of his narrative, in relation to the 
barbarian woman, as object in his field of vision and of his spoken 
discourse, is caught up in an interesting interrogation of the 
Hegelian master/slave dialectic. While much critical attention has 
been given to this aspect of the novel (Attwell 1993; Dovey 1988b; 
Haluska 1987), few critics have examined to any great extent the 
manner in which the Magistrate, through his narrative act, and in his 
narrative act, polices the body of the barbarian woman, and perhaps 
most significantly in the "dream visions" which Penner (1989) links 
with his "ethical vision". I now propose to examine the import of the 
Magistrate's attempt to (re)capture in image what he was unable to 
capture in his phenomenological reality. 
The Magistrate is constantly confounded by his interest in the 
barbarian woman, and especially his interest in her body. After all, 
he "cannot imagine what ever drew [him] to that alien body" (42), and 
he admits that they "are an ill-matched couple" (40). His inability 
to take his interest in her to a fully sexual level, beyond the proto-
sexual, erotic interest of the ritual washing, is a source of 
frustration to the Magistrate, and illustrative of the power politics 
which inform and circumscribe their relationship. After all, since 
"[i]t seems appropriate that a man who does not know what to do with 
the woman in his bed should not know what to write" (58), it becomes 
apparent that the barbarian woman's body is a means for the Magistrate 
to "merit three lines of small print in the Imperial gazette" (8), and 
also paradoxically, "[he] ought to ••. stop [his] ears to the noise of 
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patriotic bloodlust and close [his] lips and never speak again'' (104). 
Yet, he speaks, and his narrative exists. 
This contrasts interestingly with his overtly sexual performance with 
the young prostitute (42), and emphasizes the difference of the 
barbarian woman for the Magistrate. 
While "her body yields •.• yields to everything" (30) fairly 
early on in their relationship, because of his inability to engage in 
a complete sexual act with her, the Magistrate declares that "[t]hese 
bodies of hers and [his] are diffuse, gaseous, centreless •.• flat, 
blank" (34). Despite his various attempts to understand her, he 
confesses that when "I take her face between my hands and stare into 
the dead centres of her eyes, ••• twin reflections of myself stare 
solemnly back" (41). Seemingly, therefore, "[t]he body of the other 
[remains] closed, ponderous ••• beyond comprehension" (42), so that he 
begins to "suffer fits of resentment against [his] bondage to the 
ritual" (41). Ber body becomes little more than "the form to which 
[he is] in a measure enslaved" (42). The Magistrate's vision of 
the barbarian woman's body echoes hooks's assertion that 
[t]hey claim the body of the colonized Other 
instrumentally, as unexplored terrain, a symbolic frontier 
that will be fertile ground for their reconstruction of 
the masculine norm, for asserting themselves as 
transgressive desiring subjects. They call upon the Other 
to be both witness and participant in this transformation 
(1992 :24) • 
His inverted vision of the power relations between them -- he becomes 
enslaved to her -- occurs at a crucial point after he has offered to 
take her back to the barbarians if she so desires, and it echoes the 
consummation of the Hegelian master/slave dialectic (Begel 1977:117-
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119). However, it is also at this point that he realises that 
"something has fallen in upon me from the sky, at random, from 
nowhere: this body in my bed, for which I am responsible" (43). 
Again, the patronising, paternalistic relationship which he constructs 
between himself and the barbarian woman -- and here, specifically, 
with her body -- reveals the true nature of power between them. As 
Berger (1972:46) posits, "[t]o be born a woman has been to be born 
into the keeping of men" (46), and the barbarian woman passes from . an 
insubstantial and unexplored relationship with her father, through a 
relationship of subjection and control with Jell as victim-torturer, 
and then she becomes "a woman, a left-over barbarian prisoner, a 
person of no account, the Magistrate's slut" (73). Ironically, of 
course, she is of the utmost importance, being the key to both Joll'a 
and the Magistrate's labyrinths. She constitutes an enigma for the 
Magistrate -- he admits that "[w]hat this woman beside me is doing in 
my life I cannot comprehend" (47) -- but paradoxically and 
simultaneously, "something which is all surface" (49), which implies 
simplicity. This simplicity, which he also calls "a state of nature" 
(9), is one of his own fantastical construction, for when he "ask[s] 
her about other men", she affirms that "there were other men. [She) 
did not have a choice. That was how it had to be" (54). Her 
assertion is highly ironic, for it implies less freedom, more 
restriction and compulsion in accounting for her presence in the 
Magistrate's bed, if not in his life. This point is echoed when he 
hands her over to the barbarian men, and "ask[s] her very clearly to 
return to the town with [him]. Of [her] own choice" (71). 
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Paradoxically, while offering her her "own choice", he states that 
"[t]hat is what [he] want[s]". She, however, is firm, and turns his 
(demanding, commanding) offer down, asserting that "[she] do[es] not 
want to go back to that place" (71). 
Once he has offered to return her to the barbari ans the power 
balance shifts between them. He admits that "[s]he is as much a 
prisoner now as ever before" (55), and fancies that "she submits 
because of her barbarian upbringing", but also has to concede that 
"what [he] call[s] submission may be nothing but indifference" (56). 
He is also aware that "[he] might equally well tie her to a chair and 
beat her, it would be no less intimate" than either the strange way in 
which he is using her body, or the torture Joll has practised on her 
body. The positions of power do not only work themselves out in the 
configurations of visibility and invisibility, of who has the power to 
look, and who does not. There is also an important discourse on 
speech, and the power of speech. At various points the barbarian 
woman "shrugs and is silent" (29), "she makes no sign" (31) of having 
heard him, "[h]er lips close•• (35), "she gives no sign" (42) of bei ng 
awake; generally, she has the ability to will inscrutability. Her 
"dead eyes" betray nothing, so that the Magistrate is forced to admit 
that "of this one there is nothing I can say with certainty" (43). 
But as hooks argues, 
[t)he direct objective was not simply to sexually possess 
the Other; it was to be changed in some way by the 
encounter (1992:24). 
Of course, the Magistrate "is unable to "possess the Othe r" (lac.cit. ), 
is unable to "enter[] her" (34) or "feels no desire to enter" (30) 
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her, so that "her incomplete body fills [him] with revulsion" (47). 
It is only possible for him to engage in a successful, penetrative 
sexual encounter with the barbarian woman once he is "taking her back 
to the barbarians" (61), when he realises that "[they] have crossed 
the limits of Empire a moment not to be taken lightly" (70). 
Then, in competition with the men he has brought along, he can finally 
acknowledge "the pleasure [he] take[s] in her" (64), for he now sees 
that "she is not just an old man's slut, she is a witty, attractive 
young woman" (63). Still, even in this formulation, she is passive, 
and it is he who "takes" the pleasure: "[s]he is passive, 
accommodating herself to [him]" (66), especially in his vision of her. 
However, as a close reading of their sexual copulation in the 
wilderness shows, much of it is initiated and actively engaged in by 
the barbarian woman. As hooks suggests, "the presence of the Other, 
the body of the Other, was seen as existing to serve the ends of white 
male desires" (1992:24). In his own vision of order, the Magistrate 
admits that the barbarian woman's body becomes the medium through 
which "I can reinsert myself into time and space" (64). Also, he is 
not certain whether it is "she [he] want[s] or the traces of a history 
her body bears" (64). 
Fanon argues that "to speak is to exist absolutely for the 
other'' (1967:17), elaborating that it 
means to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to 
grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it 
means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight 
of a civilization (ibid. :17-18). 
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The entire text is narrated by the Magistrate, and as I have asserted 
before, the text is therefore a narrative of Empire, in the language 
of Empire. Paradoxically, it is also a text against Empire. Still, 
the Magistrate does not speak the language of the barbarians, and only 
realises once the barbarian woman is no longer under his control that 
"she could have spent those long empty evenings teaching me her 
tongue" (72), for as Fanon points out, "[one] who has a language 
consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that 
language", and "[m]astery of language affords remarkable power" 
(1967:18). This reiterates my earlier argument about the status of 
the text as a result of its narration in the language of the 
Magistrate, which is also the language of Empire. This also implies 
that the Magistrate could have possessed the barbarian world if 
only for himself, and within his own mind -- if he had bothered to 
learn the language of the barbarian woman. Instead, he has maintained 
their relationship in "the patois of the frontier" (3), an 
interstitial language that mirrors the interstitial nature of their 
relationship, and of both the barbarian woman and himself -- she is 
after all a prisoner of Empire, while he admits that "they will 
outlast us" (51). And as such, "[l]anguage is a meeting place, a 
point of confrontation, between the individual and the social" (Brink 
1983:231-232). Thus, as Irigaray (1985a:179) shows, "commodities [by 
which she means also women in patriarchy] speak ••• mostly dialects 
and patois, languages hard for 'subjects' to understand". 
But as Cixous (1976:250) posits, "[c]ensor the body and you 
censor breath and speech at the same time". And the Magistrate does 
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not only censor the speech of the barbarian woman by forcing her to 
reveal the truth of the torture, and in that way circumscribing what 
it is she is allowed to speak, but he also censors her body, 
reimagining it at various points as a blank, and then proposing that 
"in the dark the marks her torturers have left upon her, the twisted 
feet, the half-blind eyes, are easily forgotten" (64), if only by him. 
And as Foucault (1977:34) argues, 
torture forms part of a ritual .•. 1t must mark the 
victim: it is intended, either by the scar it leaves on 
the body, or by the spectacle that accompanies it, to 
brand the victim with infamy ••• torture does not 
reconcile; it traces around or, rather, on the 
very body of the condemned ••• signs that must not be 
effaced. 
For the Magistrate's "pleasure in her is spoiled until these marks on 
her are erased and she is restored to herself" (64), a process which 
he attempts through various acts: acquiring the narrative of her 
torture, demystifying the motivations for her presence in his life , 
both his and hers, and returning her to the men in the mountains whom 
he assumes to be her people. 
The ways in which he reimagines he r body are cruci al in 
establishing the hierarchies of power in which both of them engage in 
the discipl ining of her body. At the moment that he hands her over t o 
the men in the mountains, he muses that ''[s]he i s going, she is almos t 
gone. This i s the last t i me t o look on her c l early face t o face , ... 
hereafter, I know, I will begin to re-form her out of my repertoire of 
memories according to my questionable desires" (73). Therefore he is 
able to reconstruct he r, i n his r e-vision of he r, as "a s t range r; a 
visitor from strange parts now on her way home afte r a less than happy 
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visit". As Cixous (1986:68) states, "(n]ot only is she the position 
of strangeness -- inside his universe where she revives his 
restlessness and desire. Within his economy, she is the strangeness 
he likes to appropriate". His qualification of her as a "visitor" 
implies some volition on her part to account for her presence at the 
settlement, when she is so clearly nothing more than a prisoner of a 
war neither of them wants to engage in, Joll's war. And from the 
moment of parting, the Magistrate "find(s] her face hardening over in 
(his] memory, becoming opaque, impermeable, as though secreting a 
shell over itself" (75). In the light of Joll's torture, which became 
her entry into the symbolic of Empire, "she was no longer fully human, 
sister to all of us" (81). This results in the Magistrate's vision of 
her as "the irreducible figure of the girl" (81), and he "cannot 
remember exactly what she looks like. From her empty eyes there 
always seemed to be a haze spreading, a blankness that overtook all of 
her. (He] stare(s] into the darkness waiting for an image to form" 
(86). According to Jolly (1989:72) "he treats her body as a surface, 
a map of a surface, a text ••• finding the explorations of her 
features an ecstasy", and as the Magistrate himself concedes of his 
maps of the barbarian territory, "(t]hose maps are based on little but 
hearsay [he has] patched them together from travellers' accounts" 
(12). In relation to the barbarian woman's body, the Magistrate is 
reconstructing (patching together) a map of her self using the signs 
left by Jell, and when he realises the futility of the enterprise, the 
quest, he begins to "forget[] her ••• deliberately" (86). Despite 
this, he remains "enslaved" to her, even more it seems in her absence 
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than in her presence. As such, it seems, for the Magistrate, "[t]he 
territory no longer precedes the map .•• it is the map that precedes 
the territory ••• it is the map that engenders the territory" 
(Baudrillard 1996:76). The Magistrate, at this point, seems to have 
come to the (ir)resolution of his relationship with the barbarian 
woman, realising that "it confounds [him], has confounded [him] from 
the beginning'' (71), "from the moment when [he] stopped before her at 
the barracks gate and elected her" (86). In response, · he finds 
himself "steadily engaged in burying her in oblivion" (86), just as he 
has earlier expressed that "[i]t would be best if this obscure chapter 
in the history of the world were terminated at once, if these ugly 
people were obliterated from the face of the earth" (24). In his 
case, he is attempting to obliterate, to erase the face of the 
barbarian woman, and in so doing, the signs on her body, and the sign 
and value of her body in the narrative of Empire. Again, her body, 
and the scars that it bears, also become signs of Empire, and 
consequently the Magistrate is also attempting to obliterate the signs 
of Empire. Like the protagonist of David Malouf's An I maginary Life 
(1978:27), the barbarian woman is "relegated to the region of silence. 
All [she] can do is shout". A.s Catherine Cl~ment (Cixous and Cl~ment 
1986:28) argues, "wome n are both s i gn and value, sign and producer of 
sign .•. it happens that when wome n talk, that they ste p out of their 
function as sign". Therefore the barbarian woman is relegated to the 
domain of silence in the Magistrate's narrative , the domain of visual 
blankness. He r physical presence is policed s o that she i s nothing 
more than "one of the many wrong turnings on a road that look[ed] true 
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but has delivered [him] into the heart of a labyrinth'' (136). Like 
the poplar: slips, the signs on the barbarian woman's body "form an 
allegory. They can be read in many orders. Further, each ••• can be 
read in many ways" (112); therefore, what Jell says to the Magistrate 
of the slips, can also be applied to the reader's decoding of the 
Magistrate's narrative: "it remains for you to explain what the 
messages say" ( 110) • 
N. A.tifOther (Im)Possible Text 
Given that Coetzee interrogates subaltern subject representation, 
especially by an other: of a mastering self, several critics have read 
the "criticism-as-fiction" (Dovey 1988b:11) project as an allegory of 
"questions regarding colonialism and the relationships of mastery and 
servitude between cultures and individuals" (Penner 1989:xiii), among 
them JanMohamed (1986), Jan Charles Haluska (1987), and Dovey (1988a 
and 1988b). And as Cixous (Cixous and Clement 1986:92-93) argues, 
"[t]he logic of communication requires an economy both of signs of 
signifiers -- and of subjectivity"; so that while the barbarian woman 
functions as sign, signifying difference and subjection in the 
discourse of Empire, she is denied subjectivity in that text, which in 
the novel is the Magistrate's narrative. As Attwell (in Coetzee 
1992:17) states, Coetzee's ·~or:k enjoins us .•• to examine the 
authenticity and authority of the speaking subject". 
Therefore, '~here the girl should be, there is a space, a 
blankness" (47), as the Magistrate himself concedes. She is nothing 
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more than a reconstruction of his own imaginary, and hence constitutes 
a text which remains inaccessible, such that he realises that "[t]here 
has been something staring me in the face and still I do not see it" 
(155). Therefore it is interesting that during his own .torture the 
Magistrate comes to resemble the barbarian woman most, since he also 
becomes marked, and also becomes a sign in the language of Empire. 
Significantly, he is also feminized, dressed in a shift, "[i]n a 
woman's clothes " (120). While before the torture he declares that "I 
will not disappear into the earth without leaving my mark" (112), his 
torturers, Joll's henchmen, bring him to the point where he, like the 
barbarian woman, "can feel the weight of a resentful gaze upon me; 
[but] I do not look up" (124) • Still, "like a man who lost his way 
long ago, but presses on along a road that may lead nowhere" (156), he 
is trapped within his own particular discourse(s), and quests vainly 
to decentre himself. As he states, he ''wanted to live outside history 
••• the history that Empire imposes on its subjects, even its lost 
subjects " (154), because ''Empire has created the time of history. 
Empire has located its existence in the jagged time of rise and 
fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe" (133), whereas the 
Magistrate, in narrating his text in the eternal present, subverts 
that, and is caught in the interstitial flux of being and not being 
constituted by the defining discourse of Empire, which "dooms itself 
to live in history and plot against history. One thought alone 
occupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, hCYv.' not to die, 
hCYv.' to p r olong its era" (133). Eventually the Magistrate is forced to 
realise that ''when one day people come scratching around in the ruins, 
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they will be more interested in the relics from the desert than 
anything I may leave behind" (155), but any such speculation remains 
extra-textual, for within the limits of the novel, the Magistrate's is 
the only text which is accessible: the Other text, the text of the 
barbarian woman, can only be hinted at, intimated, glimpsed, in 
various ruptures in the text. Just as with Joll's torture of the 
barbarian woman, the Magistrate finds that the purpose was not 
to force the story out of me of what I had said to the 
barbarians and what the barbarians had said to me ••• They 
came to my cell to show me the meaning of humanity, and in 
the space of an hour they have showed me a great deal 
(115) • 
He therefore stands in relation to Empire as the barbarian woman was 
related to him: "She could not understand you. She did not know what 
you wanted from her" (152) he tells Joll. Therefore the Magistrate's 
CYwn identity, his quest for selfhood, can never constitute itself as 
presence; it remains an absence, but as Eagleton (1996:161), apropos 
of Lacan (1977), would argue: 
Once installed within the symbolic order, we cannot 
contemplate or possess any object without seeing it 
unconsciously in the light of its possible absence, 
knowing that its presence is in some way arbitrary and 
provisional. 
This would concur with Olsen (1985:47), and his reading of presence 
and (as) absence, for "Coetzee's is a writing that dissects, recharts, 
interrogates, challenges, casts into doubt .•. unfolding the 
repressed, by setting free the absence that dwells in the heart of the 
country". That absence, I would posit, is also the barbarian woman's 





Wilma Stockenstrom's The Expedition to the Baobab Tree 
Wilma Stockenstr~m's The Expedition to the Baobab Tree (1983) has 
received scant attention in South African English literary criticism, 
and the scrutiny it ha3 been subjected to in Afrikaans literary 
critici3m has not been ove.n.,helming either. Judy Gardner (1988) 
provide3 a sustained and detailed examination of the novel in the 
light of Marxist discourse on the subject's relation to the means of 
production and feminist theories' examination of the position of women 
in culture, in representation, and in language. Elsewhere, the novel 
has been compared to Coetzee's Waitinq for the Barbarians in terms of 
its import for and impact on South African literature (Olivier 
1983:12), and Michael Du Plessis (1988) examines it in relation to 
Coetzee's In the heart bf the country (1977) in term3 of bodily 
signification in French feminism. To compound this compari::ion, 
Coetzee is also responsible for the translation into English, and as 
Brink (1992:6) argues, "the choice of the 'language of the oppressor' 
featuring in Stockenstr~m'3 original Afrikaans text is [therefore] 
doubly significant". As such, the representation of subaltern 
subjectivity, in an Afrikaans literary text, which is then translated 
into English, has effects across a wider national literary 
languagescape than Coetzee's text. 
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I propose to examine the process by which Stockenstrom's novel 
attempts to go beyond Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians in its 
critical engagement with subaltern subjectivity and its representation 
in South African literature. It is my contention that Stockenstrom, 
in making the subaltern the narrator of the text goes beyond 
interrogating the exploration of the limits of the constructedness of 
alterity, to the establishment, however ambivalently at first, of 
subaltern subjectivity in representation. OOhereas in Coetzee's text 
the Magistrate narrates the barbarian woman, the master: authoi:s the 
slave, in Stockensti:om's novel it is the slave woman who illustrates 
that "[m]astery of language affords remarkable power" (Fanon 1967:18) 
in that she "tak[es] up the challenge of speech" (Cixous 1976:251). 
Howevei:, as Brink (1992:6) argues, Stockenstrom's novel is still 
implicated in the very discourses it is attempting to undermine, in 
that it participates in the sti:uctural privileges of apai:theid South 
Africa which allow white writers privileged access to represent black 
subjects, often at the expense of black subjects' abilities to 
repi:esent themselves (Di:iver 1996; Bassim and Walker 1993; Lewis 1997 
& 1993) . 
I. Other Bodies. Other Stories 
Ci:ucial to Stockenstrom's project, and therefore to the slave woman's 
nai:rative, is the manner in which her story, her history, relates to 
her: body, and the position which she inhabits because of the 
discourses of power which cii:cumscribe that body. The narrator, a 
black African slave woman, is displaced from her place of origin, and 
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delivers her story as an alternative narrative to a prescriptivist, 
linear historiographical narrative of the patriarchal imperialist 
culture of her masters which inscribes her self (which for them is 
merely her body) for (and more significantly, against) her. It would 
seem that for her "storytelling itself constitutes a significant 
resistance ritual to history" (Hitchcock 1993:xviii), in this case the 
history her masters would have to tell of a slave woman, which would 
be a "short history, as self-contained and boring as the history of 
most of the slave-girls in the city" (27) • But as Brink (1992 :5) 
states, "it is impossible ontologically to divorce [the slave woman] 
from her history. She is her story; her body is the journey of her 
life". And, furthermore, the importance of this narrative act which 
constitutes itself as the text of the novel, is its oral nature, so 
that the narrator is "taking up the challenge of speech which has been 
governed by the phallus" (Cixous 1976:251). While Coetzee's 
Magistrate attempts to write himself into the annals of the history of 
Empire, as I have shown in the previous chapter, Stockenstr~m's 
protagonist-narrator attempts to speak her way out of "a place 
which is reserved in and by the symbolic, that is ••• silence" 
(lee.cit.). This is a silence that the patriarchal imperial culture 
imposes on her and those in her position. The nameless slave woman 
seeks to establish a female history (i.e. "herstory"), her own, and to 
constitute a position of female subjectivity, again her own; both of 
these should be read as not merely reactive to the patriarchally 
defined options available to her, but perhaps also in defiance of 
these determinants. As such her act of narration allows her to "break 
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out of the snare of silence .•. a domain which is the margin or the 
harem" (lac.cit.). 
As a slave woman in the coastal city, "the city of [her] various 
owners ... the busy commercial city to which [she) was kidnapped" 
(55), she is a marginal subjectivity within an already shifting 
discourse; as hooks argues throughout Ain't I a fMoman (1981), and as 
Davis (1981:3-45) shows, a woman slave is doubly removed from the 
positions of power in the broader cultural context of a patriarchal 
society which practices slavery. This is not to say that the woman 
slave is necessarily powerless, for while the narrator herself states 
that "[n]o one grows up under such close protection as a slave girl 
•.. [and] no one grows up as ignorant as a slave girl" (9), she is the 
"shining exception" (lac.cit.). The slave-narrator also "considered 
[her]self a lucky, privileged person, without rights but not wholly 
without choice" (57). This point is examined at length by Ampie 
Coetzee (1984) in a Marxist deconstruction of the novel, in which he 
demonstrates that she is not entirely a member of the owned class, but 
sometimes paradoxically i nhabits the position and attitudes of the 
owner class. Therefore it would seem that the limitation of her power 
does not deter her from parroting the praxes of the master narrative 
to which she herself is subjected, since "[w) hatever i s 
incomprehensibly huge, [she] reduced to the ridiculous to be able t o 
assimilate it and prove [her] power over it" (lac.cit. ) . This concurs 
with ,Irigaray's argument that "[t]he powers of slaves ••. are not 
negligible powers" (1985a: 32). Quite the contrary, it is perhaps 
because of her privileged position that she realises that "[o]nly 
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those who have, have security as well. For [her] there was only 
insecurity" (20). 
Before her arrival at the baobab tree she had "the privilege of 
a slave girl [who has] everything given to her" (13). She is aware 
that she ''was radiant ••• an object to be shown off, gloriously young 
as I first was. My marklessness, my smoothness, my one-time wholeness 
of skin. I was the envied uncircumcised one. I was the desired" 
(14), and as such is aware of her own value in the sexual economy of 
the patriarchal society which she inhabits, even if she is unable to 
calculate it, to know it exactly. This is an interesting contrast 
with the barbarian woman, who becomes the focus of the Magistrate's 
attentions precisely because she is marked. But as Irigaray 
(1985a:174-175) suggests, "[w)oman's price is not determined by the 
'properties' of her body -- although her body constitutes the material 
support of that price", so that she has really "no idea what [her) 
value must have been or what it ever was" (13) as a slave in the 
economic system. She is adept enough however, to recognise "the lot 
of the lowest [as) so much more complicated than the easy existence of 
a slave-girl in a generous household" (22). She can therefore be said 
to have partially interpellated the construction of the world she 
inhabits, of herself, and of her position in tha t world, for she seems 
to have succumbed to "the process whereby a social representation is 
accepted and absorbed by an individual as her (or his) own 
representation and so becomes, for the individual, real, even though 
it is in fact imaginary" (De Lauretis 1987: 12) • She believes herself 
to be different from the ordinary slaves because the masters treat her 
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differently, but it is a belief which she later revises upon 
discovering other slaves in similar positions to her own. She was, 
after all, not quite such a "shining exception" (9). 
This recalls the moment in her narrative when, confronted with 
the slaves newly arrived "from the heart of the country" (20), she 
sees herself as 
evil and dangerous •.. dried-out ape dugs 
slippery ox-eye and peeled-off human skin 
the deadly sea-slug ~1th the sucker mouth 
hatred's mask deformed (43) 
and fresh 
and the venom of 
hatred and 
The view of herself which she articulates is of someone uncanny, 
something monstrous and grotesque, but the construction is not without 
its ambiguities, for this moment occurs at the same time that she 
identifies with the "[i]tems of everyday use of feminine and masculine 
gender" (42-43). She details how "the arrival of a fresh consignment 
of slaves •.• attracted no one's attention. Only [she] was all 
unwilling eyes" (34) • She recognizes them as "my fellows in fate 
[t]he untouched girls, my little sisters ••• no longer human beings, 
the survivors of a raid deep into the interior" (lac.cit.). She 
constructs an association of communality, while she also recognises 
the difference in their destinies , since "[she] was not c ondemned as 
these people were" (36), they being "[her] own people halfpeople may 
not be people 1 the compelled, the pitifully strong healthy products" 
(34). After all, "[she] was the head slave-girl of the richest man 
(t] here. [ She] had more power than many a wife" (3 6) • 
This emphasis on he r difference from "the damned" (lac . cit.) is 
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located in "the symbol of [her] owner's pleasure in [her)", which 
hangs "around [her] arm like a reprimand to those who would like to 
humiliate [her]" (36) • As such she is "marked phallicly (sic) •.. 
[a]nd this branding determines [her] value in sexual commerce" 
(Irigaray 198Sa:31). At first, her marklessness is what sets her 
apart, for she realises that she was "[c]aught young, not yet 
circumcised, for just that reason sought and caught" (40); later, the 
ivory band around her arm, the mark of her owner's pleasure, marks her 
as different. In this way she resembles the barbarian woman: just as 
the slave woman of Stockenstr/jm's novel is set apart by the "mark:" of 
the ivory band, so the barbarian woman is set apart from the other 
barbarian prisoners by the marks left on her body by Joll's torture, 
and also the mark which her body constitutes. Stock:enstrljm's slave 
woman also concedes that "to the man who owned [them] ••• [they] were 
all identical labour units" (39), which concurs with Irigaray's point 
that "each one looks exactly like every other. They all have the same 
phantom-like reality" (1985a:175). The slave master echoes Coetzee's 
Magistrate -- it is significant to note that 'Magistrate' derives from 
the same Latin root for 'master': magister. The position which she 
inhabits as female slave in relation to her master is later mirrored 
by the position the little people inhabit in relation to her. Still, 
she realises that while this first owner is "friendly, like a 
father" (40), there is the knowledge that "[h]e bought the very 
youngest at the market [and] cracked them as one cracks young pods" 
(40-41) • He is at best, therefore, an "incestuous father" (Brinlc 
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1992:7). This also illustrates Davis's argument that in slave 
societies 
a premium was placed on the slave woman's reproductive 
capacity ••• Black women came to be increasingly appraised 
for their fertility (or for· the lack of it) : she who was 
potentially the mother of ten ••• or more became the 
coveted treasure indeed (1981:6-7). 
She becomes aware with her second owner that to the masters, "[t]hey 
were the subordinates of the system, apparently docile ..• [they] were 
all one woman, interchangeable, exchangeable" (24). This articulates 
Irigaray's point that ''women's bodies -- through their use, 
consumption, and circulation -- provide for the condition making 
social life and culture possible" (1985a:171). As Spi vak (1987:220) 
shows, 
the figure of the woman, moving from clan to clan, and 
family to family, as daughter/sister and wife/mother, [as 
slave] syntaxes patriarchal continuity even as she is 
herself drained of proper identity. 
While the first owner only "bought the very youngest [and} broke 
the soft membrane like a blister" (41), for t he second owner the 
slaves ''were acquired second- hand, third-hand , even f ourth hand, most 
still young and healthy, [the] women fertile and rank" (23). This 
illustrates Davis's argument that 
[s]exual coercion was, rather, an essential dimension of 
the s ocial relations between slavemaster and s l ave. In 
other wo rds, the right claimed by s l aveowne r s and their 
agents over the bodies of female slaves was a direct 
expression of their presumed property rights over Black 
people (1981:175). 
A.s suc h the slave woman becomes aware that she is "an e xcha nge value 
among men; in othe r words, a commodity" (I r i ga ray 1985a: 31), and 
"[w]oman thus has value only in that s he can be exc hanged" 
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(ibid.:176). This is not a position which the slave woman either 
accepts or rejects out and out, though. She is aware of its 
advantages and disadvantages, and as Cixous (in Cixous & Clement 
1986:91) points out, "[n]o matter how submissive and docile she may be 
in relation to the masculine order, she still remains the threatening 
possibility of savagery". The slave woman insists that "I kept mY3elf 
to myself ••. kept mY3elf as I had been taught. I did not give in. I 
did not surrender" (23-24). She retained the power to "preserve his 
seed and bring it to fruition from the sap of (her] body" (24), a 
power which is solely the preserve of women in a patriarchal society, 
while at the same time it remains a power circumscribed by the 
symbolic order, the laws ?f men. After all, she realises later that 
"here in this city I would never become a grandmother. Here I 
functioned as a mother till my children were as high as my hip, then I 
lost all say over them" (55). Despite her privileged position, she 
confesses that "I could not understand why I might not keep my 
children" (58). There is an unmistakable conflict between the way in 
which the slave woman perceives herself (as subject, as human), and 
the perception her masters have of her and her relationship with her 
children (as goods to be dealt in, products to profit from). As Davis 
(1981:7) argues, 
in the eyes of slaveholders, slave wome n were not mothers 
at all [but] simply instruments guaranteeing the growth of 
the slave labor force. They were "breeders" -- animals, 
whose monetary value could be precisely calculated in 
t eems of their ability to multiply their numbers. 
This concurs with Gardner's argument tha t the slave woman ' s role as 
companion, mother and housekeeper is incidental, since she was 
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primarily a full-time worker, a slave, and as such, she may as well 
have been genderless (1988:36). 
With her third owner, a benevolent man, she describes the 
process of "becoming possessed with myself" (28), so that "[i)t was 
almost as if I were learning again to talk" (28) . It is in this 
moment that she "learned to find pleasure in how to look desirable and 
in the power it was obviously supposed I could exercise to my own 
advantage in my benefactor-owner's room" (28-29). Whereas before she 
could only conceive of her own position as object owned by another, 
she is now aware of herself, even if it is only as others would or 
could see her. As Coetzee (1984:42) argues, she becomes a partial 
member of the class of owners. But as she reports, according to the 
stranger's account, "my kind made him [the third owner) the most 
powerful person in the city •.• My benefactor was a connoisseur in a 
class of his own and seldom bought lower-grade material" (50). She is 
thus made aware that as "[c]ommodities, women, are a mirror of value 
of and for man ••. They yield to him their natural and social value as 
a locus of imprints, marks" (Irigaray 198.Sa: 177) . Interestingly, the 
slave woman is marked by the ivory bracelet as a possession, at the 
same time that it sets her apart from the other slaves as the "shining 
exception"; similarly, the barbarian woman in Coetzee's novel is 
marked by Joll's t o rture, and it is this marking which sets her apart 
from the other prisoners so that she becomes the object of fascination 
for the Magistrate. This illustrates that 
when it was profitable to exploit [slave women] as i f they 
were men, they were regarded, in effect, as genderless, 
but when they could be exploited, punished and repressed 
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in ways suited only for women, they were locked into their 
exclusively female roles (Davia 1981:6). 
In Stockenstr6m's novel, the ideology of the third owner therefore 
"led hirn to view his slaves aa a collection of art objects, 
meticulously purchased with an eye to inveatrnent and sometimes 
disposed of individually at a profit after he refined them through 
education" (50). The slave woman realises that she herself ia a 
product (quite literally) of this process. 
Here she begins to resemble "the grey parrot that [her] 
benefactor kept ••• [who] turned language inside out ao that meaning 
fell out and nothing could be said" (31). In assuming the position of 
her masters, first in relation to the slaves on the expedition into 
the interior, when "[lJike a real lady [aheJ sat and watched the 
multitude labouring" (68), and later in relation to the baboons at the 
baobab, because she senses that they "do not stay within the limits of 
their animal nature but want to address [her] on [her] level" (31), 
she turns the entire system on its head, just like the parrot. 
But this is a vanity, a folly which she could afford, since she 
existed "in perfect privilege, in the security of being preferred 
that select maid-servant of one of the leaders ••• the mistress'' (68). 
The irony of this choice of terms could not be clearer. She becomes 
aware of her "peculiar position as parasite" (79), which in Gerrit 
Olivier's argument situates her midway between the masters and the 
slaves (1983:8). In Bhabha's argument, it becomes apparent that "[a] 
repertoire of conflictual positions constitutes the subject" 
(1994: 77) • These interstitial, conflicting positions which she 
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inhabits as a privileged slave, but a slave nonetheless, leads her to 
make connections with both the masters and the slaves. 
To begin with, the sense of community, of similarity between 
herself and the other slaves, is entirely of her own construction, and 
it is a construction that is not entirely without its ambivalences. 
She explains how "{i]n my worker's language I welcomed them and 
expressed my commiseration; but it seemed that no one heard or 
understood me" (35) • Still, "I talked to them because I knew of 
nothing else, and most of all nothing more effective, to do" (35). 
She attempts to "allay[] fear and terror •• • [and] render[] harmless 
the nameless, the formless" (36) for the slaves, something she had to 
learn to do and which she would later do for herself at the baobab. 
But the reason the slaves do not understand her, is that they 
are not a homogeneous community, even though the masters see them as 
such. This is something the slave woman herself admits, and still she 
seems unable to transcend the limitations imposed on her as initiate 
into the discourses (and the language) of the coastal city, and more 
pointedly, of the masters. As Bhabha (1994:112) argues, "[t]hose 
discriminated against may be instantly recognized, but they also force 
a re-cognition of the immediacy and articulacy of authority". The 
slave woman narrator reports how the slaves came "[f)rom far and wide 
••• [and] spoke a variety of tongues" (23). However, at the coastal 
city, "[they] got along by mangling the natives' language and turning 
it into [their] idiosyncratic workers' language" (lee.cit.), the same 
language which she uses to address the slaves, to initiate them into 
the ways of the masters. As such, she therefore becomes an 
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interpreter, in the sense in which Wole Soyinka (1986) and Ngugi wa 
Thiong'o (1997!22) use the term, as a go-between, a translator between 
two culture::,, the imperial-coloni:,er, and the coloni::1ed. According to 
Coetzee (1984:43), the slave woman inhabits that interstitial position 
between the masters and the slaves, and as such becomes an 
interpreter, that go-between who travels between two classes, the 
owner class and the owned class. But as Louise Bernikow (1980:232) 
states, "[t]he traveller is the insider, carrying his (sic) insides 
with him as he journeys to foreign lands, foreign to his culture and 
to his mind". It could therefore be argued that she inhabits "a 
'separate' space, a space of separation -- less than one and double 
which has been systematically denied by [those] who have sought 
authority in the authenticity of 'origins'" (Bhabha 1994:120). This 
resembles "[t]he liminal space ... opened up by an inadequation 
between the form and the content of discourse or by an 
incommensurability between the signifier and the signified" (Derrida 
1981:18). Mangling the language of the natives of the coastal city 
speaks of a revolutionary moment in the text, for in Hitchcock's 
argument, "although all speaking subjects have heteroglossia available 
to them, their language use is conditioned and overdetermined by 
different positions within symbolic exchange" (1993:5-6). This 
situation of the slave subject -- and the impossibility of that 
concept, the very paradox which it presents, is significant -- in the 
babble of languages that define, redefine and subvert the context 
which makes such subjectivity impossible, is a crucial part of 
establishing a radical subject position which would undermine and defy 
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the rules that would circumscribe it. :As Irigaray (198Sa:179) states, 
"commodities speak ••• mostly dialects and patois, languages hard for 
'subjects' to understand". Here, it would seem, "language is seen as 
a shared body of signs, but access to language and semantic authority 
are not created equally" (Hitchcock 1993:5). In the experience of the 
slave woman, the masters have never learned the language of their 
subjects -- no mention is ever made of any of the masters, not even 
the benefactor or the stranger, learning any of the languages of the 
slaves. And as Fanon (1967:18) argues, "[t]he colonized is elevated 
above ••• jungle status in proportion to [the] adoption of the 
[master's] cultural standards". This is a position, an attitude, 
which she replicates in her relationship with the slaves during the 
expedition into the interior, and later in relation to the little 
people who surround her at the baobab. 
But in compounding her names for her "people halfpeople", she 
seems to question the suitability, perhaps even the ability, of the 
language of her masters -- and by extension also of herself, for she 
knows no other way of speaking, no other form of address except that 
adopted from the masters; the inadequacy of the workers' language is 
demonstrated by its inefficiency in her encounter with the newly 
captured slaves -- to speak her self, and the shared history of "a 
past of pitiless mistreatment or the sarcasm of gifts; [a] present 
without prospect" (24), and the marginality of slaves in the coastal 
city. After all, she has "learned to converse quite differently, with 
a metallic tone of irony at the tail end of a remark" (28), which 
method of speech she has acquired from her masters. She is reduced to 
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the banal exercise of babbling into an incomprehending void, a mass of 
ears unfamiliar with the sounds she is making, just as her own ears 
are later unfamiliar with "the little people's click language ••• a 
language for geckos and tapping beetles" (66-67). 
In her construction, the speech functions as reassurance, but 
for herself rather than the slaves, who cannot comprehend her anyway. 
And in Fanon's argument, "to speak is to exist absolutely for the 
other" (1967:17). The understanding that there is not a void, a blank 
space into which she pours the words from her tongue, but another 
world, a world populated by other listeners and speakers, who cannot 
understand her because that world has a different system of linguistic 
signification, nOIJ lost to her, evades her for the moment, and only 
comes about when she is herself subjected to an unfamiliar language. 
The little people who surround the baobab tree, speak "a language for 
geckos and tapping beetles", so that "[i]t sounds to [her] as if 
geckos have begun talking ••• hO'w could [she] learn it? .•. [she) 
listened attentively but learned nothing" (66-67). This reiterates 
Irigaray's (198Sa:179) argument about commodities and language made 
earlier in relation to the slave woman and her masters. She renders 
the little people's tongue as a non-language altogether, a non-human 
system, disconnected from anything and everything that is human. For 
even when her own voice sounds unfamiliar, she insists that it "must 
be the sound of a human being because I am a human being .•. a human 
being that talks" (65: emphasis added), not a gecko or a tapping 
beetle. She parrots, unintentionally perhaps, the attitudes of the 
masters to whom she is herself subjected. This illustrates 
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Hitchcock's point that "the inequalities of symbolic exchange always 
already prescribe a vertical axis of struggles over sign" (1993:6). 
Therefore, through her inability and/or unwillingness to learn the 
tongue of the little people, she denies them the subjectivity which 
she aims for, just as the subjectivity of her masters is founded upon 
the denial of that status for her and those others like her i n the 
coastal city. This clearly illustrates the dynamics of power in 
Hegel's master/slave dialectic in relation to language • 
.B.cYwever, the slave woman's dilemma with the click language of 
the little people is also characteristic of what Foucault (1970:57) 
describes as "the ordering of things by means of signs [which] 
constitutes all forms of knowledge as knowledge based upon identity 
and difference". For the slave woman, the notion of her difference 
from others is initially crucial to the constitution of her identity. 
As she herself states, "I did not want to be as they all regarded me, 
all of them •• • like an object in a dispensation" (51-52). She 
insists that "I was different from what they all thought, utterly 
different from what anyone might think ••• what did they know of who I 
was, what did any of them know" (52). 
The click language of the little people also becomes a trigger 
for the slave woman's memory of her childhood. But as Bhabha argues, 
"[r]emembering is never a quiet act of introspection or retrospection. 
It is a painful re-membering, a putting together of the dismembered 
past to make sense of the trauma of the present" (1994:63). This 
concurs with Fred D'Aguiar's (1994:138) characterisation of "[m]emory 
[as] pain trying to resurrect itself". An analysis of what the re-
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membering of the slave woman's past entails, and how it functions in 
the negotiation of subjectivity in her narrative, will be pursued in 
the third section of this chapter. Now, however, I wish to focus some 
attention on the slave woman's imposition of systems of order upon her 
world, and her awareness of how she is herself subjected to the 
order(s) of others. 
II. Time and Space: Re-visions 
An examination of the process through which the slave woman narrator 
negotiates her subjectivity must also give some attention to the 
manner in which she appropriates and creates systems of organisation 
in order to impose order on the world around her, just as she is 
herself subjected to such an ordering. In this respect, Hitchcock 
(1993:xviii) takes his argument about resistance rituals and history 
further by suggesting that 
the importance of oral histories of telling the woman's 
story •. • suggests that the organisation of time in space 
has different characteristics in the f ormation of women's 
community identities. 
Here he concurs with Said (1993 :xiii) who descri bes how "stories 
also become the method colonized people use to assert their own 
identity and the existence of their own history". The slave woman's 
exposi tions on time and space would therefor e seem t o be crucia l i n 
the process of establishing a subjective position from which to 
articulate her identity, her sense of self. Early on in her narrative 
she ruminates on how " [ i J n. the past time often caused trouble when I 
was obsessed with counting and uncerta in", but s he qualifie s that 
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as "the time before the beads" (7). For the slave woman, "[t]he t"ime 
after the beads can be handled more easily" (7), since "[w] ith the 
beads began [her] determined effort at dating" (8). This 
spatialisation of time, this system of dating, is of course a system 
of classification, constituting signs which mark time. It is also a 
logocentric enterprise, since the temporality is constructed in 
language, in notions of "before" and "after". The beads become her 
means of imposing some measure of control over the environment around 
the baobab, so that she "can permit [her]self the luxury of 
classification, as well as a judicious application of old and newly 
acquired knowledge" (13). Bere the old knowledge would seem to be 
that which she acquired as a slave in the coastal city, and the new 
knowledge that which she has had to scrabble for in the wilderness 
around the baobab in order to survive. Therefore she can recognise, 
retroactively, that "[r]ight at the beginning was no time, for there 
was no time to devote to sequence and ••• categories, since the 
scrabble to survive wiped these differences out" (lac.cit.). This 
organisation of time and space occurs significantly in language, which 
marks the site of difference, and which is also the symbolic order. 
As Foucault (1910:5?) points out, "the ordering of things by means of 
signs constitutes all forms of knowledge as knowledge based upon 
identity and difference". The slave woman realises that 
I can fill my thoughts with all sorts of objects, endless 
row upon row, not to be counted [since] I ••• can think of 
enough objects to obliterate everything, and ••• I can 
make up objects if the remembered ones run out (13). 
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This is an exercise of her power in and over language, as it is an 
exercise in the power of the imagination to invent and then destroy 
those inventions, and it would seem that the slave woman experiences 
"between ••• the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself 
the pure experience of order and its modes of being" (Foucault 
1970:xxi). And this state in-between the ordering codes and the 
reflections on order is analogous to the in-between state in which the 
slave woman finds herself. The movement she effects through this 
interstitial moment and space is crucial though. For the slave woman 
it involves "liv[ing] in time measured by [her]self, initially with 
three beads, later with more and more" (1S), while at the same time 
being able and intrepid enough to recognise that "[i]t was already a 
method to counter the vagueness of time hiding behind the course of 
nature" (16). In Olivier's view, this is emblematic of her awareness 
of the arbitrariness of nature, not only in relation to her as 
individual, but in relation to the human endeavour in general 
(1983:7). In her initial view 
[t]ime threatened me. It wanted to annihilate me. I 
thought I cheated it by changing my system every so 
often. Never did time know what I was going to try next 
[since] I did not know what I was going to try with time 
(lS-16) • 
The chief concern for the slave woman in dealing with time, it seems, 
is to combat the antagonistic propensity time seems to have in 
relation to her sense of identity, of being and of having a self. 
This sense she has of being threatened by time and her inability to 
control and read the signs of time in her environment, can be seen as 
indicative of the slave woman's position between "[o]n the one hand, 
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the general theory of signs, divisions, and classifications; [and) on 
the other, the problem of immediate resemblances, of the spontaneous 
movement of the imagination, of nature's repetitions" (Foucault 
1970:58). In order to assert control over her environment, she 
imposes a system on it, so that, she admits, "I can even reflect on 
what I am doing. I can let my thoughts run consecutively and 
regularly" (13). It is significant to note that the system which she 
uses derives from her exposure to the patriarchal imperial culture of 
her masters. She clearly links her ability to organise time and 
control it, to deal with it systematically, with her sense of having a 
self, and of being in control of that self. This self corresponds to 
the transcendental subject of Husserlian phenomenology (Eagleton 
1996:50), and as such it is a self defined and constructed by 
patriarchy in terms of the symbolic order. True to the dictates and 
methods of the patriarchal imperial culture of the coastal city, which 
has constructed the discourse in which she attempts to create herself, 
at first seemingly without interrogating its usefulness or 
truthfulness, she construes her/self as being within time and space, 
as constructed and viewed in the discourses of the culture of her 
masters, from which she has been separated at the baobab tree, even as 
she remains the only survivor of the expedition to represent that 
culture in the wilderness. She invents the means to deal with the 
mass of similitudes, a system in which the beads are used to 
differentiate between the days, harking back to the days before her 
arrival at the baobab when time was measured for her by others, by 
masters, so that she herself had no need to organise it for herself 
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after all, "[she] was at the t i me the stranger's property . .. (and] 
felt protected in the company of [her] stranger" (59). But having 
interpellated the masters' vision of the world (and of herself) and 
their culture -- it being the only culture she knows, consciously, at 
any rate -- she sees with an "already 'encoded' eye" (Foucault 
1970:xxi), and the baobab tree and the wilderness around it becomes 
for the slave woman 
the space inhabited by immediate resemblances [which] 
becomes like a vast open book; it bristles with written 
signs; every page is seen to be filled with strange 
figures that intertwine and in some places repeat 
themselves (ibid.:27). 
Even before she becomes the sole survivor of the expedition across the 
wilderness, she encounters "the curious drawings on the rock walls. 
They seemed to look like people, but also like stick insects, painted 
aimlessly sometimes in a bunch, sometimes singly, sometimes one on top 
of another in rust-brown and white" (87). What follows the discovery 
is the disparaging of the drawings by the eldest son and the stranger, 
which culminates in the defacement of the pictographs. They remark on 
the paintings as 
too odd ... the lack of finish and the obvious absence o f 
artistic rules in these clumBy attempts. Obviously 
backward painters from a backward society. Totally 
amateurish. The work of adult children. Yet not quite 
(lac.cit.). 
These p i ctographs i mpl y what Rol and Barthes calls "t he possibility of 
a difference, of a mutation, of the revolution in the propri ety of 
symbolic systems" (1982 : 3-4). Like the remnants on the koppi e, the 
pi c t ographs are s i gns that· "[h] e r e s omethi ng was utte rly anni hi l a t ed . 
Here was nothing but sorrow, nothing but meaninglessness and battered 
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traces of glory" (87). The stranger makes comparisons between the 
rock art and 
paintings on parchment and silk that he had seen on his 
travels in other lands ••• painted by trained artists and 
classifiable in schools and trends, and valuable 
possessions too (88). 
The pictographs therefore do not cohere with the vision of order that 
the stranger has of art, and "[w]ith the blade of his dagger he 
scratched at one of the ridiculous drawings" (lee.cit.). The slave 
woman relates how the stranger denounces the art as "[s]omeone's way 
of passing the time ••. [i]t has nothing to do with art. It records 
nothing, it does not mean to communicate anything, or to satisfy 
aesthetically. It is functionless" (loc.cit. ). This illustrates 
quite clearly the ordered system into which the rock art cannot fit, 
but it also shows the system in which the slave woman, as commodity, 
is positioned. 
This is consistent with her remarks about the views the 
stranger, the eldest son, and she herself have of the landscape that 
they travel through on the expedition. She describes 
these koppies with tremendous rocks on top. In our 
coastal regions we never saw such formations and we could 
not help remarking on them. It was almost as if we were 
discussing art-works. We praised their proportion and 
splendid balance, as it were the craftsmanship and 
sensitivity with which they were so arranged (85). 
Her choice of the first person collective pronoun "we" demonstrates 
her co-optation into the discourses of the masters, and her 
interpellation of their attitudes towards the landscape. Here she 
becomes the parrot she had described earlier, who imitates the master 
and so turns language inside-out. For them -- the collective of the 
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stranger, the eldest son, and the slave woman, which significantly 
excludes the other slaves brought along on the expedition -- the 
landscape is reduced to art-work, and while they can admire the 
authoring and craftsmanship that must have gone into the making of the 
koppies -- which author or craftsman must remain inchoate, non-human, 
an historical absence rather than a subjective presence -- they can 
only disparage the evidence of authorship and craftsmanship in the 
rock art as inferior. 
She replicates this system and its processes of interpretation 
when she admits that "all I found on a thorough investigation of the 
plateau [was] wind and the background of wind: silence" (97). This 
silence frightens her, precisely because it is an uncanny silence. 
During this exploration and discovery, she is confronted by the 
strangeness, the otherness of the landscape, where "[i]n the 
unbelievable silence one of the big stones rolled down the cliffside 
... fantastic and soundless", so that l'[t]he soundlessness gave [her] 
a fright" (98). Her interpretation of what the sign of silence means 
illustrates further the uncanniness of the landscape, and the 
uncanniness which it evokes in her self. She reports that 
I no longer heard anything ... I knew that if I were now 
to speak, something tremendous would happen. The dead 
would arise . . . they would become visible to me, and time 
would somersault, the earth would t i lt, capsi ze (lee.ci t.) 
Her fear, and it is a fear that she must overcome, is that her woman's 
utterance will result in "if not revolution ... at least harr owing 
expl osions" (Cixous 1976:250). Consequently, "possessed by fear and 
de t e rmined to get t o the baobab" she articulates her dete rmi nati on "to 
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be back in time in the time in which I belonged" (98), and in this 
flight she senses "behind my back another world growing, I felt that 
what had existed was extending its realm faster and faster, and felt 
that soon, in the very act of running, I would move in a wholly other 
time" (lee.cit.). The fear, which is rendered visceral for the slave 
woman, is of being subsumed into another time, another frame of being, 
a state of alterity in which that self which was constructed for her 
by the patriarchal imperial culture of her masters will perceive 
itself to be alienated and obliterated, in danger of being excised 
from existence. Her fear, quite literally, is of being lost in a 
strange land, an other landscape, a foreign territory which remains 
unmapped (and, therefore necessarily, unmappable) by her explorations. 
After all, she has constructed herself as someone "not from here, do 
not belong her~, do not want to be here" (109). 
As Foucault (1970:xv) posits, "the thing that is 
demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the 
limitation of our own, that stark impossibility of thinking that". 
When the slave woman realises that in her system "[t]ime becomes beads 
and thus rubbish" (110), she has come to see that her system of 
thought is just as strange and uncanny, just as arbitrary as any other 
would be. She realises that it only makes sense because she wills it 
to do so. And, it follows, her making sense of the world through a 
system which "makes sense" in itself, is as arbitrary and unrealiable 
as the syst~rn she makes up for herself in the beads. In this respect 
she comes "to conclude that [her] way of thinking did not slot in with 
that of other beings here" (10), and these beings include the humans 
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the little people and those who massacre them -- and the non-humans 
the elephants and the baboons, most significantly among the 
animals. She comes to realise, as part of the newly acquired 
knowledge, that "trees did not bud and blossom and bear fruit for 
{her] to still {her] hunger ••• not to please [her] did the greenheart 
tree drop its nectar" (11). In fact, she learns about the ability of 
the veld to feed her by imitating the animals, where like "a novice 
{she] combs the patch of veld where experts have rooted" (lac.cit.). 
It could be argued that the slave woman has come to "behave 
according to unknown laws " (95). This process of resignation to the 
a rbitrariness of organising systems, which is also reflected in what 
Olivier (1983:7) calls the arbitrariness of her environment -- both in 
its hum.an and non-hum.an incarnations -- occurs concurrently with the 
res i gnation of her desire to control her environment at all. 
Therefore, before relinquishing control, she constructed 
a table, a tabula , that enables thought to operate upon 
the entities of [the] world, to put them into classes, to 
group them according to names that designate their 
similarities and thei r differences (Foucault 1970:xvii). 
She maintains unequivocally that "a human being ••• is all [she is]" 
(100), and this is most emphatically illustrated by her encounter with 
the baboons. She "fear[s] the baboon's grimace [because] ••• He i s 





r e finement, 
( l oc . c it.) • 
recognizable self in his ugly face. I am 
my inferior position here, my lesser 
I f eel taunted by the mirroring of my moods 
in his monstrousness, and feel ridicule of my 
a demons tration t ha t it is s upe r fluous 
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She admits that she "despise[s) him, his strength, his cunning, his 
self-evident mastery of this world" (lac.cit.), for 
I know too much about them for my taste. In a cage I 
would be able to laugh at them. As for what they know 
about me, they reveal nothing in those sidelong glances. 
I suppose I am no more than a nuisance to them. An 
outsider, far outside their realm of activity (12). 
This feeling of alienation on "their terrain" (11) illustrates, if it 
does not in fact mirror, the manner in which she feels in relation to 
her masters. She is forced to live in the coastal city, just as she 
is forced to go along on the expedition into the interior -- "[she] 
had no choice but to follow him ••• [she] was one driven from 
circumstance to circumstance" (46) -- and as such she is therefore 
constantly an outsider. She is doubly outside, because she remains 
alien to the other slaves on the expedition, given her position as "a 
peculiarly elevated, untouchable, temporary spectator" (68), while to 
the masters "[she] was a damaged plaything ••• Useful, certainly" 
(42). It is also because of this realisation of her eternal exile 
that she 
wonder[s) how long a person keeps on till •.• there must 
be a boundary somewhere that becomes clearer and clearer 
to you, towards which you reach (92}. 
When in her dating system, she postulates that she "live(s] in time 
measured by myself ••• my arrangement determined by mood and 
chance" (15}, she glimpses "the table upon which, since the beginning 
of time, language intersected space" (Foucault 1970: xvii). She 
glimpses "the exotic charm of another system of thought", a system of 
organising which in this particular case is "dating", an effort at 
controlling time. But the slave woman's means for her attempt to 
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control time, the beads, "used to be accepted in exchange for things, 
just as [she] was accepted in exchange for something" (13), so that 
she becomes aware that they have a value that lies outside of her 
immediate imposition of meaning, as dictated by need. She concedes 
that they are "[h]umanware ••• [and is aware of a]n incalculable 
distance between myself and those who had left behind the beads and 
potsherds, irrecoverable time, unbridgeable estrangement" (96). Here 
she echoes Coetzee's Magistrate, and his realisation that the poplar 
slips he finds in the ruins contain meanings that are irrecoverable, 
lost in time and space. The slave woman's realisation leads her 
to discover that these orders are perhaps not the only 
possible ones or the best ones; ••• [she] finds [her]self 
faced with the stark fact that there exists, below the 
level of [her] spontaneous orders, things that are in 
themselves capable of being ordered, that belong to a 
certain unspoken order; ••• in short, that order exists 
(Foucault 1970:xx). 
There seems to be a proliferation of options available to the slave 
woman after this realisation. It seems that she "has constituted 
herself necessarily as that 'person' capable of losing a part of 
herself without losing her integrity ... without annihilating herself" 
(Cixous 1976:259). So the slave woman concedes that "I yielded to the 
powers of my environment ••• I learned to live with them" (98). 
Hawever, the powers of her environment are both human and non-
human, and it is her relationship with the non-human aspect of her 
environment that requires explication here. Her first encounter with 
the uncanniness of her environment occurs during the initial 
expedition across t he wilderness to the fabled city of the rose 
quartz. To escape from the deliberations of the stranger and the 
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eldest son on the rock art, she wanders onto a koppie, where "I felt 
as if the incomprehensible were about to choke me and I had to hurl a 
cry into the wind which would vanish in the wind" (88). The necessity 
for constituting the self in sound, is striking. She relates hCYw "I 
heard myself say something. Not say. Mumble. Stammer. I heard the 
words fall from my mouth in snatches over the cliff to be swallCYwed by 
the windfilled silence" (88). This seems to constitute "a form of 
enunciatory, intellectual uncertainty and anxiety ••• a strategy for 
articulating contradictory and coeval statements of belief" (Bhabha 
1994:132). While she realises the unmistakeable error of the ways of 
the masters -- the stranger scratches the rock art from the cave wall 
after denouncing it as ridiculous -- she cannot articulate herself 
outside of such a discourse with which she clearly does not agree, 
and, she also comes to realise, that discourse does not agree with 
her. The self which comments on the moment on the koppie is split 
from the self which experiences that moment, and thus, ''when it was 
all out of me I ••• felt as if something had been gnawing at me and I 
no longer obstructed the wind and had become without resistance" (89). 
Also, as Eagleton (1996:147) states, since "the actual speaking, 
writing human person, can never represent himself or herself fully in 
what is said", there is also a distinction between the enunciating 
subject and the self engendered by the narrative act. This 
illustrates that she has ventured into anonimity, into that space 
where "I did not give in. I did not surrender. I let it happen" 
(23). It would seem that she speaks here with her 
woman's body, with its thousand and one thresholds of 
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ardor ••• by smashing the yokes and censors, she lets it 
articulate the profusion of meanings that run through it 
in every direction ••• mak[ing] the old single-grooved 
mother tongue reverberate with more than one language 
(Cixous 1976:256). 
Shortly after the incident on the koppie she relates how "[she is] one 
whole, and divided too and present in everything and everywhere" 
(101), so that in the moment of "[s]plitting ••• [t]wo contradictory 
and independent attitudes inhabit the same space" (Bhabha 1994:132), 
and we find that what emerges is a revolutionary moment in the slave 
woman's relation to language, history and subjectivity. For in this 
"split subject" 
one takes account of reality, the other is under the 
influence of instincts which detach the ego from reality 
••• [so that] the enunciatory moment of multiple and 
contradictory belief is both a defence against the anxiety 
of difference, and itself productive of differentiations 
(lee.cit.). 
When, towards the end of her narrative, the slave woman "heard a 
groan, or imagined I heard it" (107), she proceeds to detail how she 
listened intently and heard nothing more. I concentrated, 
turned my head carefully aJJay from the direction of the 
wind to catch the sound and heard nothing. But I kne1o1 
I had to go and track down the groaning (107-108). 
One could argue that "[a]ll that remains is to decipher" (Foucault 
1970:132) these signs, and the slave woman attempts this. She 
resembles Coetzee's Magistrate in this sense, in that they both 
attempt to decipher the signs of their respective worlds. However, 
whereas the Magistrate attempts to read the signs of another in order 
to demystify his own sense of self, the slave woman is primarily 
interested in her own signs. More than merely going in quest of the 
origin of the groans, she realises that she is ·~earching for a groan, 
a groan without a body" (108). 
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III. Speaking and Writing 
Cixous (1976:245) appeals to "(w]oman [to] write her self", to "put 
herself into the text -- as into the world and into history by her 
own movement", since this process will allow "woman [to] return to the 
body which has been more than confiscated from her, which has been 
turned into the uncanny stranger on display" (ibid.:250). 
In many respects the slave woman's narrative can be read as a 
response to such an injunction, as well as an exemplum o f that "new 
insurgent writing which ... will allow her to carry out the 
indispensable ruptures and transformations in her history" (lee.cit.). 
This i s in accordance with Said (1993:xxx), who argues that 
"narratives of emancipation and enlightenment in their strongest form 
[are] also narratives of integration not separation, the stories of 
people who had been excluded from the main group but who were now 
fighting for a place in it". This notion of writing the self, 
however, of effecting a movement back into history and specifically 
textuality, is problematised in Stockenstr~m's novel. After all, 
Brink (1992:6-7) argues that 
[t]his woman herself cannot write ..• these thoughts have 
been transferred, by an invisible mediator, an implied 
narrator, to a page, translated into a language 
intelligible t o the reader ... At every moment in the 
narration, in other words (quite l i terally 'in other 
words'), there is an invisible but crucial battle between 
the language of appropriation and the language 
appropriated -- which in itself replicates another 
struggle in the text, between ... master and slave. 
From the outset of her narrative, the slave woman is intent on 
declaring her subjectivity, on claiming herself as a subject in 
discourse. She asserts that "my tongue is meant for me, my tongue, my 
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mouth, my whole self is mine" (27). The profusion of the first person 
possessive pronoun "my" is an indication that, contrary to Cixous's 
argument that "woman overturns the 'personal' ... to see more closely 
the inanity of 'propriety', the reductive stinginess of the masculine-
conjugal economy" (1976:259), the slave woman participates quite 
happily in this economy of possession, of subjectivity through 
ownership. This reiterates my earlier arguments about the discourses 
the slave woman interpellates from her masters, and as Gerardine 
Meaney argues, "[i]nternalization is precisely what makes it so easy 
to mimic and participate in the voice of our enemies" (1993:57). It 
seems that the slave woman practices an economy of self-preservation, 
and this is illustrated by the processes of self-definition and self-
appropriation that she engages in. This remains problematic though, 
since the self the slave woman asserts is constructed, initially, in 
the codes of her masters, the very codes which would make such a self 
impossible. As De Lauretis (1984:106) states, "the very work of 
narrativity is the engagement of the subject in certain 
positionalities of meaning and desire", so that the slave woman 
demonstrates her desire to establish a subject position like that of 
the masters in her narrative act, even though she realises through 
that narrative that such a solution r emains problematic. While in the 
service of her second master, she is subjected to sexual assault, when 
"[a]t night it was legs apart for the owner on his sweaty skin rug" 
(23 ). Still, she would be true to the women who intitiated her into 
"the game with men" so that outwardly she would show "the rapture and 
the torment, but inwardly remain untouched, remain whole, remain 
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myself" (15). Despite this she acknowledges her own complicity, 
recognising that "I was a coward and refused nothing" (23), while at 
the same time declaring, paradoxically, that "I did not give in. I 
did not surrender" (24). This illustrates that "it is in the 
processes of positioning that the agency of the oppressed subject can 
be defined" (Hitchcock 1993:10). In looking more closely at the 
moment of the forced sexual encounter with the master, it becomes 
evident how, as .Bhabha (1994:132) argues, "[s]plitting . . . results in 
the production of multiple and contradictory belief. The enunciatory 
moment of multiple belief is both a defence against the anxiety of 
difference, and itself productive of differentiations". Therefore, 
since physical resistance to rape is beyond the possibilities 
available to the slave woman if she wishes to survive, it is possible 
to discern a "dialogic moment[] ..• where the oppressed consciously or 
otherwise challenge their oppressors" (Hitchcock 1993:xii). In this 
act of defiance against the patriarchal imperial sexual economy the 
slave woman becomes aware of how "I struggle to make the spectacle 
cohere ... [and concede that t]here are connections that evade me" 
(9). It is also because of this split that the slave woman is able to 
view herself as slave and as master parrot -- "Like a real lady I sat 
... the select maid-servant of one of the leaders ... the mistress" 
(68) at the same t i me, and later, as neither. 
For Bhabha (1994:231), "what is at issue in the discourse of 
minorities is the creation of agency through incommensurable (not 
simply multiple) positions;'. The slave woman, with her paradoxical 
and contradictory positions of power and disempowerment in the 
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hierarchies of the coastal city, and later at the baobab, illustrates 
this argument such that, as Meaney (1993:82) states, "[t]he nature of 
the subject becomes a question of (possible) positions rather than one 
of definition or lack of it". The impossible text of her narrative 
thus becomes a speculative act which posits a possible position of 
selfhood, and a possible way of negotiating it. 
This, in conjunction with the self-reclamation of her demand for 
that status of the "I", has radical implications for the hierarchy of 
the social fabric into which she has been b(r)ought and enslaved. In 
Hitchcock's argument, "when the 'I' is the oppressed, a whole system 
of oppression is at stake •.. [for] the agency resides in the cultural 
effects of the 'I-slot', the processes of agent position that are at 
odds with the will-to-silence hegemony" (1993:17). The slave woman 
consequently becomes, apropos of Cixous (1976:249), "the woman who 
would hold out against oppression and constitute herself as a superb, 
equal, hence 'impossible' subject". Therefore she regards her 
reflection critically in a calm pool and try to determine 
how much older I have become. It is not easy, for however 
motionless both I and the water are, there is a continual 
fine wrinkling distortion of my i mage •.. I throw a pebble 
into myself. I rock grotesquely up and down and break up 
in lumps. Restless .•. I withdraw myself from my divided 
self in the water (66). 
This not only illustrates Bhabha's earlier argument on splitting, but 
also constitutes her as the woman who "break[s] the codes that negate 
her" (Cixous 1976:249). Negation, as outlined by Cixous (ibid.:247), 
is a process where "[a]s soon as they begin to speak, at the same time 
as they're taught their name, they can be taught that their territory 
is black". The slave woman certainly rejects this vision of herself 
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at the baobab tree, where she "know[s] fully who I am" (12), for she 
learns that "dreaming and waking do not damn each other, but are 
extensions of each other and flow into each other" (92). As such she 
is rejecting the binary codes which organise her world, and her self. 
So that, impossibly, she declares in an address to the baobab 
that 
[i]f I could write, I would take up a porcupine quill and 
scratch your enormous belly from top to bottom •.• Big 
letters. Small letters. In a script full of lobes and 
curls, in circumarnbient lines I write round and round you, 
for I have so much to tell of a trip to a new horizon that 
became an expedition to a tree (30). 
The baobab therefore becomes the upside-down, the impossible tree, 
"becomes the unheimlich space for the negotiation of identity and 
history" (Bhabha 1994:198). For while writing remains impossible as 
an actuality for the illiterate slave woman, it remains a possibility 
in her dream. And as Hitchcock (1993:7) proposes, the "utterance [of 
the oppressed] often upsets the status quo by challenging the logic of 
dialogue as equal linguistic exchange". 
The slave woman therefore can only speculate, offer 
possibilities, of what she would write, if she could. Addressing the 
baobab, her refuge and her prison, her point of departure and in a 
particularly significant circularity also her destination, the space 
from which she describes being "[r]eborn every time ••• full of 
myself" (14), she details how she would 
decorate you line after line with our hallucinations so 
that you can digest, outgrow, make smooth this 
ridiculousness, preserve the useless information in your 
thick skin till the day of your spontaneous combustion. 
And satisfied I put down the porcupine quill and stand 
back to regard my handiwork (30-31). 
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This act of dreaming leads her to realise the newly anthropomorphised 
baobab is "full of my scars ... I did not know I had so many" (31). 
This conflation of her own body with that of the baobab illustrates 
the point that she is no longer separate from her environment, and 
that she has "yielded to the powers of [her] environment" (98). She 
therefore learns to effect that "emancipation of the marvellous text 
of her self that she must urgently learn to speak" (Cixous 1976:250), 
initiating a process whereby the "'I' and 'not-I' merge in an identity 
which at the beginning of the quest was seen to be terrifyingly other, 
to be death itself" (Meaney 1993:47). With the slippage into the 
collective first person pronouns and possessives -- "we" and "our" in 
the original text -- the elision of the boundaries between the self of 
the narrator and the initially non-self of the baobab, we are 
confronted with "the impregnable language that will wreck partitions, 
classes, rhetorics, regulations and codes" (Cixous 1976:256). In 
transferring the codes and inscriptions from her own body onto the 
trunk of the baobab, she would be "blazing her trail in the symbolic" 
(ibid.:258). As Meaney argues, "the body of that writing is the site 
of a traversal of the in-between of language itself" (1993 :56), and 
the writing of the slave woman is therefore situated in-between being 
and non-being -- imagined in the slave woman narrator's mind, 
transferred by the invisible mediator of Brink's argument into the 




Bessie Head's A Question of Power 
Bessie Head has been characterised as "South Africa's profoundest and 
most intense woman writer" (Goddard 1990:105), and her work -- both 
the earlier fictional texts, and the later sociological works -- has 
generated a great deal of sometimes controversial critical attention. 
It is this industry of revivalist and revisionist scholarship that 
Lewis (1996:73) argues is symptomatic of and responsible for Head's 
"recently elevated status in literary studies". This scholarship 
ranges from inadequate and mediocre quality work -- that of Cecil 
Abrahams (1990) is perhaps the most obvious example -- through a 
spectrum of exceptionally perceptive and engaging analyses of Read's 
oeuvre -- Driver (1990) and Lewis (1996) being but two examples worth 
citing here . Her writing has been noted for it:3 interrogation of 
nationalist politics and gender relations (Le1 • .,ris 1996: 7 3), and A 
Question of Power, the text which marks the end of the first sequence 
in B.ead'::i oeuvre, is emblematic of this view. As Spivak (1987 :245) 
states, "innumerable subaltern examples of resistance ... [are] often 
suppressed by those very forces of nationalism which would be 
in::itrumental in changing the geopolitical conjunctions". 
The focus on Read's work in this thesis centres on the 
relationship between literary and cultural politics in Southern 
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Africa, and the representation and negotiation of subaltern 
subjectivity in her writing. While the two previous chapters examine 
the inscription and interrogation of South African liberal discourses 
on alterity and subjectivity in Stockenstr~m's The Expedition to the 
Baobab Tree (1983) and Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), 
this chapter focuses on self-representation, autobiography, and the 
association between subjectivity and textuality in Head's A Question 
of PCYwer (1974). Consequently, I argue that her importance for 
allegorical, autobiographical subaltern representation, and its impact 
on South African politics of representation, remains particularly 
significant. 
I. Origins: Autobiography as Self-Reclamation 
Head herself characterises A Question of PCYwer as "totally 
autobiographical" (1983:24), and several critics have discussed the 
text as such (Driver 1992b:114; Lewis 1996:73; Stead Eilersen 
1995:141-157). It is therefore imperative to situate Head's work, and 
especially the text under examination here, in the larger context of 
black women's writing and autobiography in Southern Africa. 
Cherry Clayton (1989:1) finds that "Black women ..• have been 
the last group within the country to find a literary platform. Of the 
more than 140 black South Africans writing in English since about 
1920, only seven have been women". This concurs with Ngcobo 
(1989:ix), who finds that a "[black] South African woman writer in the 
1980s is a rare find". In her own research i n the area o f black 
women's writing in South Africa, Driver (1996:45) suggests that 
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"[g]iven the history of racist and capitalist exploitation in South 
Africa, considerably more writing has been produced by white writers 
than by black". This also contributes to the context in which "a 
writer's worldliness expresses itself within a fragmented national 
context in which positionality is always at issue" (Attwell 1993:3). 
Significantly, the previous two novels examined in the thesis both 
contain representations of black subjectivity by white writers: 
Stockenstr6m's text is narrated by a black slave woman, who is the 
product of the imagination of a white writer, and Coetzee's novel 
offers an interrogation of such practices in South African literature, 
and a discursive analysis of the impossibility of inscribing alterity 
without circumscribing that otherness in the discourses of the 
representing subject. In an article that examines the literary 
history of black women's writing at length -- such writing as was done 
and published in English, that is -- Driver (1992a:46) concludes that 
"[t]he novelistic tradition has ••• been less hospitable to black 
women than to white". 
The close textual analyses in the previous two chapters show, in 
concordance with Driver's (1992b:114) argument, how ''white scribes 
take up the pen on behalf of black women, and put into writing the 
stories these women tell about their lives". This, in conjunction 
with her point about the inhospitability of the novel as genre for 
black women writers quoted above, means that "autobiography provides a 
hospitable genre .•• for those who need to assert a voice or claim an 
identity hitherto suppressed in South African literature" (lee.cit.). 
Autobiography, therefore, in the field of writing, addresses what 
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Steve Biko (1978:8) demands of and for black people in a white 
supremacist context: that "[w]hat we want is not black visibility but 
real black participation". It therefore becomes crucial for black 
women to inscribe their selves and their own stories in writing, in 
the light of their (mis)representation by others in the white 
supremacist imperial patriarchy of apartheid South Africa. As Head 
states in her autobiographical writing, "I've just got to tell a 
story" (1990:8). This concurs with Gilmore (1994:xvi), who argues 
that "[f]or many women, access to autobiography means access to the 
identity it constructs". Ht::rwever, an autobiographical text is not 
only such because a writer has encoded her text as such; it is 
important to emphasize that the constitution of the text as 
autobiographical is also the result of an act of reading, a 
construction in and through the processes of literary criticism. 
Therefore, I would agree with Driver (1992b:114-115), that 
the advantage of continuing to look at much black women's 
writing in terms of autobiography is that it draws 
attention to the metaphors of "self" and "community" 
established under the various ideologies of class, race 
and gender, allowing the critic to attend closely to the 
gestures whereby "identity" is produced. 
As Lejeune (1989:45) states, "[o]ne could not write an autobiography 
without elaborating and communicating a point of view of the self". 
In this regard, Boyce Davies (1994:21) argues that 
[t)he autobiographical subjectivity of Black women is one 
of the ways in which speech is articulated and geography 
redefined. Issues of home and exile are addressed. Home 
is often portrayed as a place of alienation and 
displacement in autobiographical writing. 
For Head, this is multiply significant, since she experiences the 
displacement of national exile and its consequent rendering of her as 
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a stateless person, a refugee, as well as the dissonance of parental 
rejection because of racial discrimination, and the resulting 
transposition from sanity. The first of these, exile, is 
characterised by Rushdie (1992:210) as the loss of "language and home, 
to be defined by others , to become • • • a target" • As Berni kcr.., 
(1980:259) states, "exile, in the woman, results ••• in profound 
alienation and victimization". This alienation is impacted upon in 
Head's writing by the second and third of these processes -- the 
combination of rejection, racism and designation of insanity -- and 
results in the "migratory subjectivity" (Boyce Davies: 46-47) 
constituted in black women's writing because of the boundary crossing 
the establishment of such subject positions involves, as well as the 
cross-cultural contexts in which black women are often situated. As 
Isabella Matsikidze (1996:142) states, 
A Question of Pcr..,er focuses on multiple tensions generated 
by ethnic, gender, as well as class differences when the 
protagonist finds herself categorized under multiple 
layers of marginalizing forces. 
While the focus in the previous two chapters has been on the 
analysis of representations of black women by others, this chapter 
shifts its focus to the analysis of a black woman's quest for self-
representation and selfhood. In this regard, Lewis (1996:73) points 
out that Head constitutes a singular voice in the South African 
literary landscape because of her disavO'wal of realism and protest, 
her fusion of autobiography and fiction, and her exploitation of 
circuitous narrative strategies. This echoes Alice Walker's 
(1984:259) characterisation of Head as a writer whose ''work deepens 
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one's comprehension of life by going beyond the bounds of realism". 
But it is not only the boundaries of form that Head breaks down. Rob 
Nixon (1993:61) also praises Head for breaking the conventions of her 
social order, claiming that her writing "convey[s] her keen enjoyment 
of the freedom -- so rare runong South African writers -- to engage 
with social issues that by-pass binary forms of racial conflict". 
In this regard, Lewis (1996:73), in an article that focuses on 
the posthumously published The Cardinals (1993), reads Head's work as 
"allegories of self", so that the allegorical project in A Question of 
Power can be said to intersect with the autobiographical project. As 
a result, Head destabilises the relationship between the writer of and 
the represented subject in the autobiographical text, as Susan Gardner 
(1989:232) points out. Lejeune (1989:37-38) argues that in 
homodiegetic autobiography, the identity between the protagonist and 
the author of the text is imposed by the context, and this foregrounds 
the figurative enunciation of the text. Therefore, 
identity, no longer being established within the text by 
the use of "I", is established indirectly, but without any 
ambiguity, by the double equation: author = narrator, and 
author= character, from which it is deduced that 
narrator= character even if the narrator remains implicit 
(ibid.:6). 
This is elaborated upon by Gilmore in her reading of women's 
autobiographical practices, when she states that 
nonfictional narrative offers voice to historically 
silenced and marginalized persons, who penetrate the 
labyrinths of history and language to possess, often by 
stealth, theft, or what they perceive as trespass, the 
engendering matrix of textual s e lfhood (1994:63; emphasis 
added). 
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Horace I. Goddard (1990:105), for example, points out that the novel 
"reflects the fears and struggles of 'self' in a world that denies the 
outcast a personal identity". This echoes Gilmore's position that 
"autobiographical writing [is] a site of resistance" (1994:xv). 
Elizabeth herself finds that "[s]he had no time to examine her 
own hell", for "an examination of inner hells was meant to end all 
hells forever" (12). It could be argued that Head's novel constitutes 
the "emancipation of the marvellous text of her self that she must 
urgently learn to speak" (Cixous 1976:250). This concurs with Head's 
own characterisation of the motivation for writing the novel as 
follows: 
I then decided, this is it, I'm finished with this. I'll 
write the book and I'll throw [the breakdown] over my 
shoulder and I'll get through with thern. That was really 
the motivation and drive for writing A Question of Power 
(MacKenzie & Clayton 1989:25-26). 
As such, the text can be read as an attempt to "write her self" 
(Cixous 1976:250). Head states in an interview that "I thought by 
writing it out, I'd throw the persecutor over my shoulder" (MacKenzie 
& Clayton 1989:25). The novel would therefore constitute an attempt 
on Head's part to exorcise her past, which is the site of the 
definition of her/self by others as 'mad', and to negotiate a subject 
position beyond victimhood, to (re)appropriate and re-invent 
'madness'. Ramphele (1995:ii) argues that "[s]torytelling is part of 
the struggle to transcend loss", and for black women it is often a 
struggle to reclaim the loss of agency, and the denial of discursively 
engendered subjectivity by the oppressive contextual politics. In the 
discussion on the new subjectivities proposed by Head in a later 
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section of this chapter, I examine the positions of victimhood and the 
negotiation of subjectivity beyond them in greater detail. 
Elizabeth's past is rooted in South Africa, which is described 
as "a country where people were not people" (17). This problematic 
relationship between the politics of location and the possibilities of 
locution are central to the concerns of the novel, for Elizabeth 
hated the country ••• she had also lived the back-breaking 
life of all black people in South Afica. It was like 
living with permanent nervous tension, because you did not 
kn01ro1 why white people had to go out of their way to hate 
you or loathe you (19). 
In this sense Elizabeth's experience of South Africa corresponds with 
Head's, since she describes it as a place where "we were discounted as 
a people having anything of value, as though our lives were a blanket 
of darkness or nothingness" (1990:51). This has interesting 
resonances in Cixous's (1976:247) characterization of patriarchy's 
oppression of women as a system in which women "can be taught that 
their territory is black: because you are Africa, you are black. Your 
continent i s dark . Dark is dangerous". Furthermore, here "[d]ark is 
uncivilized, disrespectful of the laws and manners of the light 
civilization" (Bernikow 1980:228), and this view echoes that of Joseph 
Conrad's MarlOW'e in Heart of Darkness, who characterizes Africa as 
"the biggest, the most blank [space]" and as "a place of darkness" 
(1902:33), "the heart of darkness" (ibid. :68). But as Head (1981:ix) 
asserts , "[f]or us Africa was never dark". Despite this assertion, 
she contends that to be "born in South Africa ... is synonymous with 
saying that one is born into a very br utal world -- if one is black" 
(ibid . :66). Head's characterisation of the country as a place where 
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we find ourselves born into a situation where people are 
separated into sharp racial groups ••• [so that] one is 
irked by the artificial barriers. It is as though, with 
all those divisions and signs, you end up with no people 
at all (ibid.:62), 
aptly describes Elizabeth's experience of it in A Question of Power. 
This echoes Nat Nakasa's statement that "legislation for the 
separation of people according to racial or colour groups makes life 
nearly impossible" (1995: 12) • Elizabeth finds that "a black man or 
woman was just born to be hated. There wasn't any kind of social 
evolution beyond that" (19). Here she concurs with Emma Mashinini's 
declaration in her autobiography, Strikes Have Followed Me All My 
Life, that "[t]he assumptions and arrogance of white South Africans 
never ceases to amaze me" (1989:21). 
But Botswana does not offer the utopian refuge from racism and 
oppression which Elizabeth at first assumed it would. Like "[s]o many 
people [she] ran away from South Africa to forget it or throw it off" 
(41), and instead, like Margaret Cadmore, the Masarwa in Maru (1911), 
Elizabeth finds that ''wherever mankind had gathered itself together in 
a social order, the same things were happening" (1911:68). 
We are informed that 
[i]n South Africa {Elizabeth] had been rigidly classified 
as Coloured. There was no escape from it to the simple 
joy of being a human being with a personality. There 
wasn't any escape like that for anyone in South Africa. 
They were races, not people (44). 
This echoes Head's statement in a later interview that "[i]n South 
Africa they put you into slots. They would say in South Africa: 
'Coloured'. And I would find the box too small for me. So I tended 
to be outside any box" (MacKenzie & Clayton 1989:17). But in Botswana 
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Elizabeth finds that "as far as Batswana society was concerned, she 
was an out-and-out outsider and would never be in on their things" 
(26). She discovers, like Margaret Cadmore in Maru, that "another 
variant of the word 'Bushman' ••• was also a name they gave to the 
children of marriage between white and African" (1971:19-20). And in 
a world obsessed with racial purity, with exclusiveness, where 
individuals were seen as "races, not people", Elizabeth discovers the 
Southern African vision of social order Head outlines and critiques in 
Maru as follaws: 
Before the white man became universally disliked for his 
mental outlook, it was there. The white man found only 
too many people who looked different. That was all that 
outraged the receivers of his discrimination, that he 
applied the technique of the wild jiggling dance and the 
rattling tin cans to anyone who was not a white man. And 
if the white man thought that Asians were a low, filthy 
nation , Asians could still smile with relief -- at least 
they were not Africans. And if the white man thought 
Africans were a low, filthy nation, Africans in Southern 
Africa could still smile -- at least, they were not 
Bushmen. They all have their monster. You just have to 
look different from them ••• then seemingly anything can 
be said or done to you as your outer appearance reduces 
you to the status of a non-human being (1971:11). 
This correspondence between the status of those designated as 
''Masarwa" and "Coloured" in Maru and A Question of Pawer is echoed by 
Elizabeth's torture at the hands of her persecutors, and consequently, 
shaws up the resemblance between the view of black people by the white 
supremacist discourse of apartheid South Africa, and the view of the 
'mad' subject by the Rational discourse of sanity outlined by Foucault 
(1965:72-75). It is Medusa who points out to Elizabeth that she is 
considered "[d]og filth" (46), that "[t]hat's your people, not African 
people" (45). This has interesting echoes in Stockenstr~m's slave 
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woman narrator, who describes the newly arrived slaves she encounters 
on the beach as "my own people half-people may not be people" (34). 
Head elaborates on this dehumanising impulse of racist imperialism by 
describing how 
[t]he stronger man caught hold of the weaker man and made 
a circus animal out of him, reducing him to the state of 
misery and subjection and non-humanity. The combinations 
were the same, first conquest, then abhorrence at the 
looks of the conquered and, from then onwards, all forms 
of horror and evil practices (1971:109). 
This seems to concur with Conrad's description of the colonial 
enterprise as "[t]he conquest of the earth [by] taking it away from 
those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than 
ourselves" (1902:31-32). This also echoes the description of the 
eighteenth century asylum in which the 'mad' are displayed as a 
spectacle for public consumption and regulation (Foucault 1965:246-
249). The description Head offers of racist imperialism could be 
considered an apt description for Elizabeth's breakdown, her "clear 
sensation of living right inside a stinking toilet; she was so broken, 
so shattered" (14). In the autobiographical pieces published later, 
Head states that "[w]e, as black people, could make no appraisal of 
our own worth; we did not kncrw who or what we were, apart from objects 
of abuse and exploitation" (1990:66). This concurs with Mashinini's 
account of her encounter with the South African police, when she finds 
that "it seemed everyone had an insult for me, that everyone who 
walked past had a word of insult to say to me. I was just in the 
centre of a mess" (1989:54). Once again, almost perversely, this 
illustrates the structural privilege apartheid discourse grants the 
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white speaker to address and characterise the black subject, as 
outlined by Driver (1996), Hassim and Walker (1993 ), and Lewis (1993) 
-- the black subject (objectified) is open to (ab)use by the white 
speaker, just as black subjectivity is defined by white discourse. 
It also supports what Foucault (1965:274) describes as 
that delicate structure which would become the essential 
nucleus of madness -- a structure that ... symbolized the 
massive structures of bourgeois society and its values: 
Family-Child relations, centered on the theme of paternal 
authority; Transgression-Punishment relations, centered on 
the theme of immediate justice; Madness-Disorder 
relations, centered on the theme of social and moral order 
Daniel Gover (1990:119) argues that "Elizabeth suffers from the 
absence of control over her own destiny", and the back and forth 
shuffling the child-Elizabeth experiences illustrates this: the 
missionary at the orphanage informs her that "you were returned 
because you did not look white" (17). This signals part of 
Elizabeth's crisis in South Africa, because "[t]he details of life and 
oppression in South Africa had hardly taken form in her mind. The 
information was almost meaningless to her" (16). It also signals that 
her rejection by her biological mother was mediated to her as the 
result of her being black, rather than of her being illegitimate. But 
when her 'origins' are explained to her - - "Your mother was insane. 
If you're not careful you'll get insane just like your mother" (16) 
she realises that she is caught in "this vehement, vicious struggle 
between two sets of people with different looks" (19). Elizabeth is 
rejected as a child for not being thought white, and later, in 
Botswana, for not being thought black. It is also because of this 
that she finds herself in danger of being labelled 'mad' -- a category 
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that is eventually applied to her, and she finds herself like the mad 
subject of classicism, "between two countries that cannot belong to 
[her]" (Foucault 1965:11) -- because her mother was designated 'mad', 
for being a white woman who had sexual relations with a black man. 
Crucially here, as Foucault (ibid.:58) would have it, "madness .•• 
crosses the frontiers of bourgeois order", in this case, the white 
supremacist order which proscribes inter-racial sex. The obsession 
with racial purity in South Africa -- which is reflected in some South 
African literature, and this discursive manifestation of ethnic and 
racial purity is discussed in depth by Coetzee in White Writing 
(1988:136-162) -- and the problems it presents for those like 
Elizabeth stem from their inability to fit into either of the two 
categories. Elsewhere, Coetzee (1992:97) describes the Immorality Act 
as a la'W 
making sexual relations between masters and slaves a crime 
••• to block forms of horizontal intercourse between white 
and black [so that] the only sanctioned intercourse was 
henceforth to be vertical. 
As L.G. Ngcobo (1991:343) argues, Elizabeth's biological parents would 
have conceived her before the establishment of official apartheid laws 
and the Immorality Act, so that sexual intercourse across the colour 
bar "might not have been illegal according to the statutes of 
South Africa in 1937, but the social attitudes which made [it] 
impossible existed then". Elizabeth, the product of the impossible 
and the unthinkable, the child of a union across the barriers 
separating these two categories and those that are placed into them, 
finds herself in 
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a 'separate' space, a space of separation -- less than one 
and double -- which has been systematically denied by 
(those] who have sought authority in the authenticity of 
origins (Bhabha 1994:120). 
This "'separate' space" is also the space reserved for the mad, which 
Foucault (1965:11) describes as "the madman's (sic) liminal position". 
This discussion will be elaborated on in the second and third sections 
of this chapter, when Head's examination of 'madness' and sanity, and 
her proposition of different and new subject positions, are examined. 
Head's project in A Question of Power can therefore be said to 
be an attempt to reclaim her sanity -- and by extension also establish 
a subject position from which to articulate that sanity, and the 
'madness' that preceded it -- through the act of writing, because for 
Elizabeth, her breakdown means that "mentally, the normal and the 
abnormal blended completely in [her] mind" (15). Consequently, 
"[m]adness is here ••. an ironic sign that misplaces the guideposts 
between the real and the chimerical" (Foucault 1965:37), as between 
the 'mad' and the 'sane'. This concurs with Gilmore's argument that 
even in the narrowest and most ambivalent sense, writing 
an autobiography can be a political act because it asserts 
a right to speak rather than to be spoken for (1994:40). 
II. 'Madness' and Power Politics 
Much of the criticism generated by A Question of Power has focused on 
the representation of madness in the text (Rose 1994) -- Gardner, 
Patricia Sandler and Head herself (in MacKenzie and Clayton 1989:23-
27) all point this out in an interview -- and the relation this has to 
the autobiographical nature of the work acknowledged by Head and 
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several of her critics. In a particularly perceptive engagement with 
the text, Davison (1990:19) argues that 
madness may be described as the most potentially 
aubveraive subject in women's fiction, for the 
reassessment of female insanity necessitates its corollary 
-- the reappraisal of patriarchal sanity. 
This would concur with Gardner (in MacKenzie & Clayton 1989:26), who 
situates the novel in the context of the representation of madness in 
women's writing in the twentieth century more generally • . As Rooney 
(1991:107) argues, ''what is dramatised is ••• the invasion of the 
would-be other subject, an invasion by foreign or inexplicable 
powers". 
Gardner (1989:232) describes A Question of Power as "the most 
difficult of Bead's books", while Rose (1994:404) qualifies the text 
as ''writing by battery assault". Perhaps this results from its 
attempt to record madness, and to inscribe a self designated 'mad' in 
the language which constructs it as such. Thia convoluted process may 
also explain the mediocre quality of much of the criticism generated 
by the text, and the ways in which many critics flounder in their 
attempts to fix in the text any one meaning of their choice. 
Clement (in Cixous & Clement 1986:S) argues that 
[t]he hysteric, whose body is transformed into a theatre 
for forgotten scenes, relives the past, bearing witness to 
a lost childhood that survives in suffering. 
This feminine role, the role of sorceress, of hysteric, 
is ambiguous, antiestablishment, and conservative at the 
same time. 
Here she seems to augment Foucault's assertion that "[m]eaningless 
disorder as madness is, it reveals, when we examine it, only ordered 
classifications ••• language articulated according to a visible logic" 
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(1965:107). This offers interesting insights into Head's novel. so 
much of Elizabeth's breakdown is centred on physical torture -- sleep 
deprivation, the endless mental anguish which eventually takes its 
toll on her body -- so that her body does indeed become the theatre on 
which Sella and Medusa, and later Dan, play out their power games. 
And much of Elizabeth's suffering through her breakdO'wn is related to 
South Africa, for she concedes that "[s]omething was going drastically 
wrong with her own life •• • the evils overwhelming her were beginning 
to sound like South Africa from which she had fled" (57). For Davison 
(1990:21) then, Head's "Elizabeth embark[s] upon the critical and 
almost impossible quest for self-definition and self-actualization 
and [she] can not (sic) escape madness because [she has] been socially 
defined as madness embodied". Consequently, as Foucault (1965:182) 
shO'wS, "the problematics of madness shifts to an interrogation of the 
subject responsible". This relates to the earlier arguments about 
Elizabeth as the child of a sexual union across the racial barriers. 
For Boyce Davies (1994:77), the novel "asserts the link between pC1wer 
and dominance and 'madness' in the context of the oppressiveness of 
South Africa[]". As Driver (1990:168) suggests, it is the "particular 
forms taken by the 'madness' of the narrative self .•. [which] 
dramatise the artificial divisions or splits at war in the racist, 
sexist social order". But as Foucault (1965:193) describes the 
Rational discursive position, 
madness, even if it is provoked or sustained by what is 
most artificial i n society, appears, in its violent f orms , 
as the savage expression o f the most primitive human 
desires. 
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The desire for selfhood, for subjectivity, I would posit, in agreement 
with Lacan (1977), is such. 
As the narrator informs us, for Elizabeth "[i]t was like living 
with permanent nervous tension, because you did not know why white 
people there had to go out of their way to hate you or loathe you" 
(19). Therefore, one can argue that there is a direct link between 
location and locution, as there is between place and madness it can 
be argued that Fanon's (1967) declaration that the condition of the 
native is a nervous condition is explored at length in Head's novel, 
and Berger (1990) does attempt a critical reading of Head's novel in 
the light of Fanon's critical insights, with uncertain success. Rose 
(1994:405) proposes that "[p]aranoia -- voices in the head -- is of 
course the perfect metaphor for colonisation -- the takeover of body 
and mind". It is Head herself who states, "I too would care for a 
brief escape from the permanent madness of reality" (1990:17): later 
she explains that her life in South Africa was such that "I have 
continually lived with a shattering sense of anxiety" (ibid.:27). 
This anxiety is linked overtly to place, to context, and more 
specifically with the south African sociopolitical reality which drove 
her to Botswana. 
Similarly, Elizabeth's descent into "a state below animal, belcrw 
living and so dark and forlorn no loneliness and misery could be its 
equivalent" (14), is characterised as a state where "the barriers of 
normal, conventional and sane [had] all broken down" (15). Foucault 
(1965:73-74) shows how, in classicism, 
[t]he animal in man (sic) no longer has any value as the 
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sign of a Beyond; it has become his madness, without 
relation to anything but itself: his rnadness in the state 
of nature. 
As a result, "Elizabeth had put tentative questions to many people, 
testing her sanity against theirs" (14-15). However, she realises 
that "[i]t was harder to disclose the subtle balances of power between 
people -- how easy it was for people with soft shuffling, loosely-knit 
personalities [like herself] to be preyed upon by the dominant, 
powerful persons" (12). With the breaking down of the barriers 
between the normal and the abnormal, between the sane and the insane, 
Elizabeth also experiences "a strange feeling of things being right 
inside her and yet projected at the same time at a distance away from 
her" (22). The chaos which results from this means that "the dividing 
line between dream perceptions and waking reality was ••• confused" 
(22). This echoes Read's description of her breakdown in her letters 
to Randolph Vigne as "the extreme state where the ego has been 
violently destroyed. No one can live without an ego. So what I 
really lived through was death in life" (Read 1991:160). This also 
illustrates the impact of prejudice in the external environment --
both in South Africa, and Botswana -- on the internal environment, so 
that the 'mad' subject can no longer differentiate between them. 
After all, Elizabeth finds that "[h]er exterior life had a painful way 
of coinciding with her inner torment" (66). Foucault posits that in 
Rational discourse, 
joining vision and blindness, image and judgment, 
hallucination and language, sleep and waking, day and 
night, madness is ultimately nothing, for it unites in 
them all that is negative. But the paradox of this 
nothing is to manifest itself, to explode in signs, in 
words, in gestures (1965: 107) . 
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Elizabeth's initial torturers, Selle and Medusa, as well as the later 
one, Dan, then, can be seen as projections of her cr.m crises, arising 
from the difficulties she has attempting to negotiate an identity, a 
subject position, in an environment hostile to this. It is hooks 
(1992:65) who argues that 
[f]acing herself, the black {woman] realizes all that she 
must struggle against to achieve self-actualization. She 
must counter the representation of herself, her body, her 
being as expendable. 
Elizabeth certainly confronts this in her relationship with Sella and 
Medusa, finding that "[s]he had to struggle to live, move, and 
breathe" (36). She also finds that ''when they address me I just burst 
out with the right lines on cue as though I am living with a strange 
'other self' I don't know so well" (58). This alienation of the 
subject from her self mirrors what Cixous (1976:247) argues is woman's 
construction by racist patriarchy as "black: because you are Africa, 
you are black. Your continent is dark. Dark is dangerous". As such, 
Elizabeth becomes estranged from herself, she literally becomes the 
"uncanny stranger on display" (ibid. :250) • It is Medusa who makes her 
look "in the mirror. She flinched and looked away. There was an 
unnamable horror there. She could not endure to look at it" (46). 
Here Elizabeth seems to resemble Stockenstrom's slave woman narrator, 
and her confrontation with the horror of self. Also, as Cixous (in 
Cixous & Clement 1986:68) states, "[w]omen haven't had eyes for 
themselves ••• their bodies ••• have been colonized". The connection 
between horror and Africa has also been a trope in literature more 
generally since Conrad's Heart of Darkness (1902), in which Kurtz's 
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fateful encounter and engagement with the African continent, and his 
participation in the "unspeakable rites" resemble that of Sello, 
Medusa and Dan so closely. This construction of her self by others, 
of her world -- both private and public, interior and exterior --
resembles what Foucault (1965:249) describes as 
the organization around the madman (sic) of a world where 
everything would be like and near him, but in which he 
himself would remain a stranger, the Stranger par 
excellence who is judged not only by appearances but by 
all that they may betray and reveal in spite of 
themselves. 
But Elizabeth's 'madness' is not only symptomatic of her 
victimisation at the hands of a hostile, patriarchal, racist, imperial 
social order. It also inscribes her in what Clement (Cixous and 
Clement 1986:28) characterises as "[t]he place of origins, of feasts, 
[which] is also the place of exchange. Madman, child, and woman have 
the word there. Especially, they have the mastery that they do not 
have in ordinary reality". This view of 'madness' in the novel would 
hold that, apropos of Foucault (1965), it is one of those 
constructions, inventions, labels which society elects to 
impose on some of its members under specific 
circumstances, probably as a tool of 'social control' 
which can be used to justify excluding, locking up and 
'operating upon' people (Parr & Philo 1995:208). 
If, as Read and her critics propose, A Question of Power is 
autobiographical, there is a significant split, an important division 
between the enunciating subject -- Read herself, as author -- and the 
enunciated subject -- the protagonist, Elizabeth of the text. This 
split between the subject speaking the discourse, and the subject 
constituted discursively by it and in, mirrors the split experienced 
by Elizabeth within herself during her breakdown. Elizabeth is 
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confronted by Sello with "a projection of herself ••• [as] a minute 
image of a small girl with pitch-black hair" (34). Here, it would 
seem, "[m]adness had become a thing to look at" (Foucault 1965:70). 
This follows her realisation that "[s]he had seen from the beginning 
that she had no distinct personality, apart from Sello" (32). This 
construction of herself as inseparable from her tormentor is crucial 
to an understanding of her self. It also compares interestingly with 
the Magistrate's inability to conceive of the barbarian woman outside 
of her relationship with Jell, in terms other than that of victim-
torturer, in Coetzee's novel. But Elizabeth realises that "[m]aybe 
she made too close an identification with Selle for her own comfort 
and safety" (25). She attributes her inability or unwillingness to 
separate her self from Sello to the kind of person that she is. Upon 
self-analysis, she finds that "[t] here was just this loosely-knit, 
shuffling ambiguous mass which was her personality" (62), and we are 
informed from the outset "how easy it was for people with soft 
shuffling, loosely-knit personalities to be preyed upon by dominant, 
powerful persons" (12). Selle masquerades, at first, as someone 
Elizabeth can identify with. She finds that he addresses her in "the 
kind of language she understood, that no-one was the be-all and end-
all of creation, that non-one had the power of assertion and dominance 
to the exclusion of other life" (35). Despite this, he wields immense 
power over Elizabeth, principally through Medusa, "a monstrous woman, 
looming so large that Elizabeth had to strain back to see her face. 
She looked hideous, with teeth six inches long" (33). It is through 
this witch-figure that Sella plunges Elizabeth into the depths of her 
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"pain-torn consciousness" (13) • But Elizabeth realises that " [ s] he 
seemed to have no distinct face of her own, her face was always turned 
towards Sella, whom she adored" (25). She finds that "[s] he was 
entirely dependent on Sella for direction and equally helpless, like a 
patient on his (sic) doctor for survival, assuming that the doctor 
knew his job" (35). This total dependence, Elizabeth realises, is 
unhealthy, principally because of the true nature of Sella, but also 
because it denies Elizabeth herself any agency and responsibility in 
her own fate. 
It is important to note that both Sella and Medusa are 
projections of Elizabeth's consciousness, and any evils they are 
responsible for, she is in a measure generating herself. As Rose 
(1994:403) states, "the issue of projection is one of the central 
themes of Head's book". At the beginning of the novel Elizabeth still 
"possesse[s] the arrogance of innocence" (12). This would correspond 
with Margaret Atwood's (1972:36) first position of victimhood, which 
is "[t]o deny the fact that you are a victim". But this situation is 
too simplistic, since it represents Elizabeth as a passive victim. 
After all, "no one had come to terms with their own powers and at the 
same time made allowance for the powers of others" (35). And 
Elizabeth is at times presented as someone "Dan had set ... up as the 
queen of passive observation of hell" (148). It is then that she is 
made to realise that "[t]here wasn't any detail of her contacts with 
people left innocent and normal, everything was high, sexual hysteria" 
(160) • As a result, she admits to Tom that "she was stark, raving 
mad" (162). This in a sense is her first acknowledgement to herself, 
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as well as to someone else, that Dan "had brought [her] to a state of 
breakdown" (169). It is during this second major breakdown, as a 
result of her experiences with Dan, that "she struck an abyss of utter 
darkness, where all appeals for mercy, relief, help were simply a 
mockery" (173). In this state of seemingly utter helplessness and 
despair Elizabeth comes to the realisation that "[s]o fe'w shreds of my 
sanity remain" (175). As Foucault (1965:107) argues, for classicism, 
"madness, if it is nothing, can manifest itself only by departing from 
itself, by assuming an appearance in the order of reason and thus 
becoming the contrary of itself". 
Her first vision of herself in relation to Sella and Medusa is 
that of a victim. The two nightmare figures 
just asserted something and directed it at a victim, 
regardless of whether it made sense or not: 'You are 
inferior. You are filth.' Their power of assertion was 
so tremendous the whole flow and interchange of life 
stopped before it (47). 
But to accept Sella's and Medusa's construction of her as inferior, as 
"[d]og filth" (46), is to accept "South Africa ••• [where] they said 
the black man was naturally dull, stupid, inferior" (57). This 
Elizabeth refuses to do. She is designated inferior because, Medusa 
points out to her in the vision of the dying "homosexual Coloured men" 
(47), "that's what you are like .•. That's your people, not African 
people" (45). But Elizabeth counters this vision with her belief that 
When someone says 'my people' with a specific stress on 
the blackness of those people, they are after kingdoms and 
permanently child-like slaves. 'The people' are never 
going to rise above the status of 'the people'. They are 
going to be told what is good for them by the 'mother' and 
'father' (63) • 
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In this way, the vision of ethnic purity, of racial exclusivism 
proposed by Sella and Medusa, replicates the racism of South Africa 
Elizabeth fled from, as well as the colonialism to which the Batswana 
had been subjected themselves. But Elizabeth counters this bleak 
vision with the realisation that "[t]oo many people the world over 
were becoming mixed breeds and shading themselves down to browns and 
yellows and creams" (63) • 
Also, Dan's relationship with Elizabeth resembles that of Sella 
and Medusa, and Elizabeth's relationship with these two, since he too 
insists on telling her that "you are inferior. You cannot make it up 
to my level because we are not made the same way" (147). He preys on 
Elizabeth's feelings of sexual inadequacy by torturing her with images 
of himself "standing in front of her, his pants down, as usual, 
flaying his petwerful penis in the air and saying: ' ..• You haven't 
got a vagina'" (12-13). As Boyce Davies states, "the politics of 
conquest and domination are so fundamentally linked to naming" 
(1994:10), and Dan does not hesitate to name Elizabeth a victim, a 
sexual freak, "dog filth". This echoes Derrida's position that 
(t)o name, to give names that it will on occasion be 
forbidden to pronounce, such is the originary violence of 
language which consists in inscribing within a difference 
(1976: 112) • 
Elizabeth's torment, the inability to negotiate and establish 
subjectivity which manifests itself as 'madness', centres on her 
racial and sexual identities in the Batswana social order. However, 
Elizabeth does not capitulate into silence, but questions their power 
over her, asking "[w]hy must they choke the life out of me?" (175). 
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This becomes the first moment of the long process which results in the 
narrative of the text, the first step Elizabeth takes away from mere 
victimhood into the challenge offered by speech. As Davison argues, 
"Elizabeth unweaves the complex web of the victim-victimizer 
relationship and comes to understand ••• the victimizer's various 
methods for retaining control" (1990:24). As Rose (1994:404) states, 
"[g)oing mad as a refugee in Botswana -- and then transforming that 
madness into writing -- Bessie Head violates more than one colonial 
stereotype and breaks a few rules". As Foucault (1965:288) states, 
through the mediation of madness, it is the world that 
becomes culpable ••• in relation to the work of art; it is 
now arraigned by the work of art, obliged to order itself 
by its language, compelled by it to a task of recognition 
[and re-cognition], of reparation, to the task of 
restoring reason from that unreason and to that unreason. 
The madness in which the work of art is engulfed is the 
space of our enterprise. 
I would argue that Head's text, A Question of Power, is such a work of 
art, is engaged in the process of not only writing 'madness', of 
representing insanity, but is also engaged in the renegotiation of 
what 'madness' is in relation to sanity, and vice versa. 
III. Powers of Speech 
Driver (1996:52), in an impressive analysis of Zoe Wicomb's You Can't 
Get Lost in Cape Town (1987), argues that both Head and Wicomb engage 
in "a new mode in South African writing, steadfastly insisting on 
creating more complex subject positions than those of the past, with 
new subjectivities continually emerging at the critical point between 
stereotype and representations, and between one discursive subject 
position and another". This echoes Bhabha's (1994:170) argument that 
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"it is by living on the borderline of history and language, on the 
limits of race and gender, that we are in a position to translate the 
differences between them into a kind of solidarity". 
Brink (1983:231-232) argues that "[l]anguage is a meeting place, 
a point of confrontation, between the individual and the social", and 
Read's narrative inscribes Elizabeth's subjectivity in language, it 
articulates the quest for this subjectivity through the agency implied 
by the narrative act. In this regard Fanon (1967:18) suggests that · 
one "who has a language consequently possesse[s] the world expressed 
and implied by that language ... Mastery of language affords 
remarkable power". Elizabeth's narrative, then, is both an 
inscription of her self into what Lacan (1977) would call the symbolic 
order, which for Eagleton (1996:163) "is in reality the patriarchal 
sexual and social order of the modern class society", and since that 
self is relegated to the imaginary of 'madness', and speaks itself 
(and its self) in the language of madness it constitutes an attempt to 
inscribe the imaginary in the symbolic. Sarah Nuttall (1993:10) 
points out that the reader's inability to tell fantasy from reality in 
the text corresponds with Elizabeth's own inability to do so in the 
world of the text. The text would therefore be engaged in what De 
Lauretis (1987:25) describes as "a movement from that space 
represented by/in a representation, by/in a discourse, by/in a sex-
gender system, to the space not represented yet implied (unseen) in 
them". This concurs with Irigaray's argument that "social justice 
cannot be achieved without changing the laws of language and the 
conceptions of truths and values structuring the social order" 
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(1993:22). This process constitutes part of the impossible project of 
A Question of Power. Elizabeth finds that "[s]he seemed to have no 
distinct face of her own, her face was always turned towards Sello, 
whom she adored" (25). She also realises that "[sJhe had seen from 
the beginning that she had no distinct personality, apart from Sello" 
(32). This inability to conceive of herself outside of the victim-
persecutor dyad echoes Atwood's first position of victimhood as quoted 
earlier (1972:36). Elizabeth, when confronted with "a projection of 
herself [sees] a minute image of a small girl with pitch-black hair" 
(34). But as hooks (1995a:58) points out, "[t]o name oneself a victim 
is to deny agency", and Elizabeth ultimately refuses this. In 
accordance with Hegel's (1977:111-119) analysis of the master-slave 
dialectic, Elizabeth postulates that "[t]he victim is really the most 
flexible, the most free person on earth" (84), arguing that she does 
not have to bear the burden of having continually to invent new chains 
and new forms of torture. This corresponds with Atwood's (1972:37) 
outline of the third position of victimhood, which allows one "[t]o 
acknowledge the fact that you are a victim but to refuse to accept the 
assumption that the role is inevitable". It is from this position 
that Elizabeth realises that 
She knew what was happening to her. She knew her 
murderer. She knew he was viciously, savagely, wildly, 
dangerously evil, but he was top dog. He was revelling in 
the power of life and death he had over her, something 
like the way the cat bashes the mouse around, slowly, 
patiently (181). 
While Elizabeth's characterisation of the victim as the truly free 
subject in the victim-victimiser dyad would be contested by Spivak 
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(1988:287) and Coetzee (1992), it nonetheless offers some insight into 
the possibility of Ab.lood's fourth position of victimhood, that of the 
"creative non-victim" (1972:38). If, as Ab.lood posits, "[i]n Position 
Four, creative activity of all kinds becomes possible" (lee.cit.), 
then perhaps Elizabeth's deeply problematic assertion regarding the 
freedom of victims relative to their oppressors is a fictional, 
creative construct that results from an attempt to negotiate herself 
to a position where "Victor/Victim games are obsolete ••• the role is 
no longer a temptation for you" (ibid. :39). 
Elizabeth dissents (and is decentred) quite significantly from 
the major power politics of the social linguistic symbolic framework 
which she inhabits and which constructs (and constricts) her self, in 
that she realises that "[i]f the things of the soul are really a 
question of power, then anyone in possession of power of the spirit 
could be Lucifer" (199). After all, "[o]rdinary people never mucked 
up the universe. They don't have that kind of power" (190), and 
Elizabeth's desire is to "be the same as others in heart; just [to] be 
a person" (26). This disavCYws hooks's (1981:104) argument that "[i]n 
an imperialist racist patriarchal society that supports and condones 
oppression, it is not surprising that men and women judge their worth, 
their personal power, by their ability to oppress others". 
Elizabeth's refusal to engage in this kind of pCYwer politics stems 
from her life in South Africa, since "she was essentially a product of 
the slums and hovels of South Africa. People there had an unwritten 
law. They hated any black person among them who was 'important'" 
(26). Because of this, Elizabeth is also drawn to Selle, at first, 
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for he spoke "the kind of language that she understood, that no-one 
was the be-all and end-all of creation, that no-one had the power of 
assertion and dominance to the exclusion of other life" (35). 
Ironically, it is this insight which is later to save her from 
capitulating entirely into a position of passive victimhood in 
relation to Dan. 
Elizabeth, in her refusal to capitulate to the annihilation of 
her self initiated by Sello, Medusa and Dan, engages in a "direct push 
against those rigid, false social systems of class and caste" (206) • 
And as hooks (1992:45) points out, "[t)o speak against the grain [is) 
to risk punishment". The crucial point is reached when she realises 
"the shock of being thought of as a comrade racialist" (184) by the 
psychiatrist at the clinic. The incident "abruptly restored a portion 
of her sanity" (lac.cit.), so that "[h)er soul death was really over 
in that instant, though she did not realize it" (188). Her return to 
sanity, her reclamation of control over her destiny and her self, 
begins significantly in language use. Its first moments occur during 
a conversation with Tom, who 
seemed to have, in an intangible way, seen her sitting 
inside that coffin, reached down and pulled her out. The 
rest she did herself. She was poised from that moment to 
make the great leap out of hell (188). 
During this encounter between Elizabeth and Tom, the meeting that 
marks the beginning of the process whereby she "pull[s) her mind out 
of the chaos" (147), "[i]t seemed hours went by with her broken, 
disjointed talk" (190). The subject therefore seems to speak her way 
out of insanity, "she blazes her trail in the symbolic ••. make[s] of 
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it the chaosmos of the 'personal'" (Cixous 1976:258). If, as Foucault 
(1965:175) argues, in Rational discourse "madness ... is the moment of 
pure subjectivity", and the cure for it lies in the fact that "the 
subject must be restored to his (sic) initial purity, and must be 
wrested from his pure subjectivity in order to be intitiated into the 
world (ibid.:176), then Elizabeth attempts to engage in this process 
of self-reclamation, and the restitution of herself to the world of 
order and to the order of the world, herself. However, in the 
process, she is redefining not only her self, but also her world, and 
the boundaries by which that world defines her self, madness and 
sanity. She is quite literally constituting herself as subject in 
language in this moment, as Lacan (1977), De Lauretis (1987) and 
Benveniste (1971) would argue, but as Eagleton (1996:147) shows, 
"[t]he pronoun 'I' stands in for the ever-elusive subject". Nuttall 
(1993:9-10) suggests that it is through reading and writing that 
control over subjectivity and its recovery is established in the 
novel, showing how Elizabeth is able to read a book for the first time 
at the end of the novel. This concurs with the earlier argument about 
Read's motivation for writing the novel. It is also significant that 
the reading and writing processes are shown to constitute one another, 
that the affilliation of the two processes foregrounds their 
inextricably and mutually dialectical dependence. 
The conversation with Tom at the end of the novel also indicated 
a change within Elizabeth's role as agent in her own destiny. Whereas 
before, in relation to Mrs Jones, "Elizabeth was forced into the 
position of silent listener to the old woman's rambles" (170), and in 
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relation to Kenosi -- the "one relationship [which] escaped a head-on 
verbal explosion" (160) -- she finds herself "[making] every effort to 
avoid turning around and snapping ... until she was forced into total 
silence" (lee.cit.), with Torn she breaks out into speech, and refuses 
silence. Elizabeth therefore defies what Foucault (1965:251) 
describes as "the old asylurn('s] structure of non-reciprocal 
observation ... balanc[ed] •.. in a non-symmetrical reciprocity, by 
the new structure of language without response". 
Davison (1990:25) argues that "Elizabeth's madness ••. acts as a 
metaphoric period of gestation out of which she emerges reborn". This 
process occurs because Elizabeth is able, in retrospect, to "disclose 
the subtle balances of power between people -- how easy it was for 
people with soft shuffling, loosely-knit personalities to be preyed 
upon by dominant, powerful persons" (12). She comes to an 
understanding of how the oppressor-victimiser's mind works, for 
(o]nce you stared the power-maniac in the face you saw 
that he (sic) never saw people, humanity, compassion, 
tenderness. It was as though he had a total blank spot 
and only saw his own power, his influence, his self (19; 
emphasis added). 
Here, it is significant to note, the victim does not only speak back, 
but also looks back. This seems to describe Selle and Dan, and more 
specifically Medusa, who 
express[ed] the surface reality of African society. It 
was shut-in and exclusive. It had a strong theme of 
power-worship running through it, and power people needed 
small, narrow, shut-in worlds. They never felt secure in 
the big, wide, flexible universe where there were many 
cross-currents of opposing thought (38). 
This relates back to the categories which Elizabeth finds so 
oppressive, since they exclude her. For it is in her encounter with 
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Medusa that Elizabeth finds herself "identify[ ing] with the weak, 
homosexual Coloured men who were dying before her eyes" (47). She 
realises that 
the title God, in its all-powerful form, is a disaster to 
its holder, the all-seeing eye is the greatest temptation. 
It turns a man into a wild debaucher, a maddened and 
wilful persecutor of his fellow men (36-37). 
It is because of this insight, and her history in the black slums of 
South Africa, that Elizabeth counters the vision of the poor given to 
her by Selle and Medusa, realising that 
[t]he faces of oppressed people are not ugly. They are 
scarred with suffering. But the torturers become more 
hideous day by day. There are no limits to the excesses 
of evil they indulge in. There's no end to the darkness 
and death of the soul (84). 
This echoes Hitchcock (1993:8), who states that "[t]he oppressed are 
victims of social injustice; their significance, however, does not 
reside in the fact of their victimisation but in the possibility that 
their agency will transform their lived relations". It is in her 
choice to be ordinary, to disavow "the possession of power of the 
spirit" (199), while at the same time realising that she is not 
powerless, that Elizabeth negotiates new ground on which to articulate 
her subjectivity. After all, "an awakening of her own powers" was 
required to facilitate "an awakening love of mankind" (35). 
As Head points out, 
exploitation and evil is dependent on a lack of 
communication between the oppressor and the people he 
oppresses. It would horrify an oppressor to know that his 
victim has the same longings, feelings, and sensitivities 
as he has (1990: 69) . 
Head's novel the refore becomes the project whereby the victim refuses 
to capitulate into silence, and speaks her way out of victimhood, 
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asserting her humanity, her dignity, and her refusal to be oppressed 
any longer. In this she resembles Mashinini (1989:24), who declares 
that 
I have always resented being dominated. I resent being 
dominated by a man, and I resent being dominated by white 
people, be they man or woman. I don't know if it is being 
politicized. It is just trying to say, 'I am human. I 
exist. I am a complete (sic) person.' 
This disavowal of silence, this coming to speech as a repudiation of 
victimhood, is a complex task, since, as hooks (1995a:58) points out 
[aJll marginal groups ... who suffer grave injustices, who 
are victimised by institutionalized systems of domination 
(race, class, gender, etc.), are faced with the peculiar 
dilemma of developing strategies that draw attention to 
one's plight in such a way that will merit regard and 
consideration without reinscribing the paradigm of 
victimisation. 
The task of self-reclamation, therefore, coupled as it is with the 
processes of decolonising the mind and asserting subjectivity and 
agency, is made even more difficult by the relegation of the victim 
into the marginal space of 'madness'. 'AB such, new subject positions 
must necessarily be negotiated, and these positions would necessarily 
"pull down the old structures and create the new" (Head 1971:68). 'AB 
Hitchcock (1993:8) argues, "[sJtrategies of language use, conscious or 
otherwise, are not in themselves the means to transform society, yet 
there is no reason to suspect that they cannot facilitate such 
change". 
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IV. Breaking Boundaries, Finding New Ground 
Boyce Davies (1994:4) suggests that "Black women's writing ... should 
be read as a series of boundary crossings". In Said's analysis 
[g]one are the binary oppositions dear to the nationalist 
and imperialist enterprise. Instead we begin to sense 
that old authority cannot simply be replaced by new 
authority, but that new alignments made across borders, 
types, nations and e::isences are rapidly coming into view, 
and it is those new alignments that now provoke and 
challenge the fundamentally static notion of identity that 
has been the core of cultural thought during the era of 
imperialism (1993:xxviii). 
Similarly, Head's writing seems to propose that the negotiation of 
identity necessarily involves the breaking down of barriers and 
boundaries, both of form and of context, and as such, the allegorical 
mode offers excellent space within which to articulate the processes 
of negotiating identity and subjectivity in ways that are not 
generally allowed for in the conventional categories. Rushdie 
(1992:124-125) proposes that 
[t]he effect of mass migrations has been the creation of 
radically new types of human being: people who root 
themselves in ideas rather than places, in memories as 
much as in material things; people who have been obliged 
to define themselves -- because they are so defined by 
others -- by their otherness; people in whose deepest 
selves strange fusions occur, unprecedented unions between 
what they were and where they find themselves. The 
migrant suspects reality: having experienced several ways 
of being, he (sic) understands their illusory nature. To 
see things plainly, you have to cross a frontier. 
It can be argued that "contemporary black women writers link the 
struggle to become subject with a concern with emotional and spiritual 
well-being" (hooks 1992:50). 
Elizabeth finds herself caught in "this vehement, vicious 
struggle between two sets of people with different looks" (19), both 
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in South Africa and in Botswana. This complicates the desire to "be 
the same as others •.• just be a person" (26), for clearly, Dan and 
Medusa point out to her repeatedly, she is "inferior". But as 
Elizabeth declares, "people who have suffered from the wanton cruelty 
of others prefer the truth at all times, no matter what it might cost 
them" (38). The truth, for Elizabeth, costs her at first her sanity, 
but ultimately she reclaims this, and articulates a new, different 
subjectivity, "between stereotype and representation, and between one 
discursive subject position and another" (Driver 1996:52). This 
realisation of her understanding that "[a]ny assumption of greatness 
leads to a dog-eat-dog fight and incurs massive suffering" (39), is 
linked to her breaking down of the victim-victimiser dyad in which 
Selle, Medusa and Dan seem to trap her. She comes to believe that 
"[t]he victim is really the most flexible, the most free person on 
earth", for "[ t ]he victim of the racial attitude .•. isn't the origin 
of the poison" (84). 
The description of the Danish aid worker who 
takes the inferiority of the black man so much for granted 
that she thinks nothing of telling us straight to our 
faces we are stupid and don't know anything. There's 
[sic] so many like her. They don't see the shades and 
ghadowg of life on black people's .faces (83), 
illustrates Eli zabeth's digavowal of the binary thinking of racism. 
The "shadeg and shadowg of life on black people's face3" remain 
invisible to the racist, "their proliferating difference evades that 
eye, escapes that 3urveillance" (Bhabha 1994:112). 
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Elizabeth also discovers, through her harsh, hellish breakdown 
and torture at the hands of Selle, Medusa and Dan, that 
[t]oo often the feelings of the victim are not taken into 
account. He (sic) is so disregarded by the torturer or 
oppressor that for centuries evils are perpetrated with no 
one being aghast or put to shame (98). 
But since "[t]he dividing line between good and evil is very narrow" 
(161), Elizabeth cannot merely disclaim her own implication in the 
processes of her victimisation. mhile her breakdc,,.,n is related quite 
intricately and intimately with the chaos of her social order -- the 
racism of South Africa, the ethnic chauvinism of Botswana, the sexism 
of patriarchy -- Sella, Medusa and Dan, the torturers who torment her 
"in a tumultuous roar of mental confusion" (160), are all figures of 
her own imagination. They are "there right inside her and yet 
projected at the same time at a distance away from her" (22). 
Her sanity is reclaimed through her relationships with others, 
especially Tom and Kenosi, and the work that she does in the garden 
with Kenosi. Davison (1990:24) argues that Elizabeth's "successful 
vegetable garden is the external symbol of her creative act of 
regaining a foothold on life". But it is through her friendship with 
Tom that she is able to negotiate a subject position for herself in 
the social order. She realises that 
[n]o other friendship she'd ever had had been so clearly 
defined. She'd never noticed until then their exactly 
half and half contribution to it. It was as though he had 
half the pattern of her mental responses. They used to 
meet each other half way, throwing ideas to and fro (195). 
This is in sharp contrast to the vicious power games played by her 
torturers, who "operated the affairs of the universe in secret behind 
the scenes" (169), so that she ''was like the rabbit trapped in 
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helpless fascination by the powerful downward swoop of the hawk. It 
knows its death is near and awaits it, helplessly" (160). Again, here 
she seems to be moving towards Atwood's fourth position of victimhood, 
that of the creative non-victim (1972:38-39). 
Thus, Elizabeth becomes one of those "[p]eople who think of 
others before themselves .•• freaks" as Birgette, another Danish 
volunteer, calls them. At the end of the novel, which marks the end 
of the 'madness', since the novel also marks the madness in the 
symbolic, Elizabeth disavows the status of a god, and assumes what 
would be regarded as the lesser function of a prophet. This refusal 
of control over others comes from her insight that "the source of 
human suffering was God itself, personalities in possession of powers 
or energies of the soul" (190). As Head points out in the 
autobiographical writing published posthumously, since "those of us 
who have suffered much do not relish the endless wail of human 
suffering ••. [w)e may be at a turning point and need new names for 
hum.an dignity" (1990:61). This new subject position, then, is 
"something new and universal, a type of personality that would be 
unable to fit into the definition of something as narrow as tribe or 
race or nation" (Head 1971:16). As Boyce Davies (1994:8-9 ) argues, 
the category Black woman ... exists as multiple 
performances of gender and race and sexuality based on the 
particular cultural, historical, geopolitical, class 
communities in which Black women exist. 
Her ambivalence towards power, which encompasses the recognition 
of her power of speech, her power to resist victimisation, to refuse a 
soul death, is coupled at the end of the novel with her negotation of 
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a space within which to establish an identity. When "she placed one 
soft hand over her land ••• [as] a gesture of belonging" (206), the 
statement is deliberately ambivalent. It indicates that it is 
Elizabeth who finally belongs to the land, despite Dan and Medusa's 
insistence during her breakdown that she was not African, just as the 
land also belongs to her in such a way that it allows her to "pull her 
mind out of the chaos" (147) • 
For Head then, A Question of Power becomes what Cixous argues 
books are ••• a place ••• not obliged to reproduce the 
system. That is writing. If there is a somewhere else 
that can escape the infernal repetition, it lies in that 
direction, where it writes itself, where it dreams, where 
it invents new worlds (Cixous & Clement 1986:72). 
This concurs with hooks (1995b:3), who argues that "[r]epresentation 
is a crucial location of struggle for any exploited and oppressed 
people asserting subjectivity and decolonization of the mind". 
Therefore, in accordance with Foucault (1965:289), 
the work [of art] endlessly drives madness to its limits; 
where there is a work of art, there is no madness; and yet 
madness is contemporary with the work of art, since it 
inaugurates the time of its truth. The moment when, 
together, the work of art and madness are born and 
fulfilled is the beginning of the time when the world 
finds itself arraigned by that work of art and responsible 
before it for what it is. 
Head herself says of her own mother's sexual union with a man across 
the racial divides, "there is no world as yet for what she has done" 
(1991:65); this world, one could argue, and the possibilities for 
subjectivity and human dignity opened up by and in it, is created in 
Head's work, and is described as "a world apart from petty human 
hatreds and petty human social codes and values where the human soul 
roamed free in all its splendour and glory. No barriers of race or 
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creed or tribe hindered its activity" (Head 1971:67). Whereas before, 
Head states, "I never felt I could write about people in South Africa 
because they were all torn up and un-representative of any definite 
kind of wholeness" (1991:27), with A Question of Power she attempts to 
establish that subject position denied by the sociopolitical realities 
of her country of origin. That the novel is autobiographical makes it 
all the more effective. 
162 
Chapter 5 
Order out of Chaos 
Mike Nicol's The Powers That Be 
Mike Nicol is one of the more interesting writers· emerging in the 
later years of apartheid South Africa, and could be argued to be a 
literary descendant of Coetzee, with whom he has been compared 
(Finnegan 1989:9). Throughout his oeuvre, Nicol is concerned with the 
relationship between historiography, and forgotten, misremembered 
narratives of oppressed, suppressed, often forgotten people in South 
Africa. These concerns are reflected in his revisitation of the 1921 
Israelite revolt in the Eastern Cape, and the genocidal suppression of 
a black uprising in the northern Cape and southern Namibia in 1922 in 
This Day and Age (1992), Horseman (1994), and The Waiting Country 
(1995). The latter of these episodes also figures significantly in 
The Powers That Be (1989), his first novel. In this novel, the text 
under examination here, I argue that the paradoxical and postmodern 
inscription and simultaneous interrogation of stereotype, as well as 
the allegorical mode in which the novel operates, offers interesti ng 
possibilities for the representation of subaltern subjectivity, as 
well as the i mpractical project of engaging in such an act of 
representation. 
Nicol reiterates many of the tropes engaged in and critiqued by 
the three writers previously examined in this dissertation, and 
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interrogates not only the stereotypes themselves, but also the 
processes and modes through which these are represented. 
I. Law and Order 
The world of Nicol's novel, "a place that doesn't even have a name, 
that isn't even officially there. Not even a spot on the map'' (163), 
is ruled by "Captain Nunes, policeman, upholder of law and order, 
defender of Christian ways" (167), as he describes himself. In this 
way he becomes an allegorical representation of apartheid officialdom, 
much like Joll in Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians. It is his 
belief that "[o]nly with laws do they behave right. Otherwi se there's 
(sic) no morals" (165), after all, "without laws what chance is there 
of order" (3). These laws constitute, as Foucault (1970:xvii) states, 
a table ... that enables thought to operate upon the 
entities of our world, to put them in order, to divide 
them into classes, to group them according to names that 
designate their similarities and their differences -- the 
table upon which, since the beginning of time, language 
has intersected space. 
And the language of Nunes' regulations, of his order, in its 
r esemblance to the language o f apartheid discourse, does organise 
space as it intersects with it. Not only is the physical space of the 
village itself affected by his regulatory ordinances, but as a direct 
result also o f the physical re-ordering of the village, the 
ideological space in which subjectivity is negotiated is also altered. 
But his relationship with the village is a peculiarity of his 
own construction; after all, "he represented law and order and he knew 
that in this stinking port a great crime was being committed" (3). 
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Therefore, if a3 Foucault (1977:194) argues, "power produces; it 
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth", then the crime Nunes imagines and projects onto the villagers 
is constructed by the very laws he creates in order to prevent such a 
crime from being perpetrated. As a result, 
the captain brought his boot down on the village's neck. 
And as he'd done to so many helpless victims before, he 
kept it there while they choked in the heat and dust. It 
was one way, he'd always found, of getting to the little 
secrets of a person's life (3). 
In this way, again, he resembles Joll in Coetzee's Waiting for the 
Barbarians, though because he declares that "I am the judge" (86), he 
can also be said to assume the role of Coetzee's magistrate. He 
represents, therefore, effectively both law and order as "he watched 
for signs of rebellion in the streets" (1; emphasis added). And as 
Foucault (1977 : 167) argues, 
discipline creates out of the bodies it controls four 
types of individuality that is endowed with four 
characteristics: it is cellular (by the play of spatial 
distribution), it is organic (by the coding of 
activities), it is genetic (by the accumulation of time), 
it is combinatory (by the composition of forces). And in 
doing so, it operates four great techniques: it draws up 
tables: it prescribes movements; it imposes exercises: •.• 
it arranges 'tactics'. 
This description is particularly apt for Nunes's activities in the 
village. 
Nunes's arrival in the village means that "something had been 
taken away (from the inhabitants] and imprisoned, they were no longer 
free" (3). The various regulations that Nunes implements are chiefly 
responsible for this. His first act is to classify everyone in the 
village according to his b.To-class schema. Thus, once 
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Nunes had divided the village into first- and second-class 
citizens, [he] prepared a list of laws by which each group 
was r·uled (5) • 
Like the laws of apartheid South Africa -- Nunes's two-class divisions 
are reminiscent of the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 --
Nunes's regulations stipulate that "people in the second class 
could visit those in the first class provided they went in the back 
door" (5). He stipulates that 
Fagmie Jabaar was to build a wall down the centre of his 
shop and to serve people in the first class from one side, 
and people in the second class from the other (5). 
This is perversely like the Separate Amenities Act of apartheid South 
Africa. His ordinance that "no one from the second class could order 
a drink at Fagmie Jabaar's tables" (5), is resonant of the liquor laws 
that prevented black people from buying alcoholic beverages in 
apartheid South Africa, which is reported by Bloke Modisane in his 
autobiography, Blame me on History (1986), among others. Most 
pernicious of all his regulations though, is his version of the Mixed 
Marriages Act and Immorality Act. He decrees that 
[i]n families where marriage had paired a 
first class with another from the second, 
classified according to the lower status. 
such marriages would not be allowed (5). 
person from the 
they would be 
And in future 
Like petty apartheid, his regulations pervade every aspect of social 
life, so that "in church, all first-class citizens were to sit on the 
right-hand side, all second-class citizens on the left" (5). And 
then, additionally, in echo of apartheid South Africa's Group Areas 
Act, 
[n]or could the classes live among one another. The hill 
was reserved for those in the first class, the shores of 
the lagoon for those in the second (S). 
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As Nunes declares emphatic·ally, "the law says ... that people must be 
classified and live acco rdin,;i l y" ( 6) . Co ns equently, when " he had now 
finished classifying evet:ybody accor:ding t o the law . . . [Mr:s . \/•/9ie 
Bond discovers] that she, and her: family, being o f mixed blood, fell 
in the seco nd class" (4 ) . ·rhis illus"tr-ates, Fcucault's at' i;rument that 
the ocde cing of things by means o f s igns ccnst~tutes a~i 
forms ,:, f knotvl edgo:= as kn,.J~,.;led,Je based up,Jn 1,.:entit:,~ ond 
difference ... [where ] we shall finds the si;ns that have 
beccime the tool:3 of anal~:/Sis, ma.cks of i dentity .. and 
diffet:ence, pr:inciples whereby things c an be reduc ed to 
order:, k,::1':.l for: a t axonomy (1 9 70 :S7-S8 ) . 
f.Jhen Augustin Shoote pcotests that " [w] hat you a t:e do i ng is 
inhuman. They may be the la·,,s but that does no t make them c i ght " 
(16) l Nunes is incredulous and angr~/-, since nhe ~1Jould no t t .:,ler:ate any .. 
interference in his affai rs, even fr: om the Church. What he decreed 
was law and not to be challenged" ( 4) . 
But the legal cestr:ictians ace only one step o f Nunes's larger 
plan to get at the villager:s' seccet, s i nce ''[t ]o Nunes they were all 
,;:ui~t~{, conspi:cators in -:1 great plot against la~,.1 .:1nd ,:,r:dertt (9) . A·;:j 
such thev seem t0 inhabit the position ass igned to women in 
+- ' ..... . L ··ma RI r 1._, : _. -"if ', ,_ d ·· 11-_ .. ,r i" -_-·m.~_-".m.·, r-,., __ ,_."-'_. d :'I"_ ,_._- 'M. ,-_,. _r i ,....;.i_· .:.: I ,'_! ~, _.; l_ t .... r OE so ~na~ c~ey ace u -u , _ - u _ , - ~ · · - - ~ ~ - - -· 1 
"occup[:/l the place r:2::: ecved f ')( ti:e ·JUiL y (1.;; uil ty ,.Jf evecyth ing, 
9uilty at every tut:nr' .. 3ut, 1r [ t }:1e i:1ter:rc)ga tion3 we'Ce on l~/ pact ·:·f 
Captain Nunes's ,:,ppres :3i'fr= reg i me. He :1ac: an almost mi::: sionary :-:::al 
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t<.) reform" (lU) . The inten:ogdtions dt:e al.so accompanio2d by t.octur:e, 
which , as Foucault (1977 : 3 4) sta tes, 
is a differentiated pt:oduction of pain, an ot:ganised 
c itudl far the marking of victims and the expression of 
the pcwer that punishes . 
This idea of reformation was crucial to the early apactheid plann,2t:s 
and thinkers, as Brian Lapping (1988) shows, but is was pait'ed with a 
dt2sire to demonstrate the power of the apartheid state, 
appaL'atus. 
and 1., + ~· ~ .... 
One of Nunes's strategies to uncover the secret conspiracy ~hich 
conceals th,2 great crime in t!1e settlement 1.s his use of his daughter·, 
sacrificing her and what she means to him in his quest for the truth . 
In this ·,Jay she becomes the obJect of value which Nunes exchanges (or 
at least, is willing to exchange) for the truth, in accordance with 
Irigaray (198Sa : 31). As we are told from the beginning of Montague 
Pla nke's narrative, " te]ve ry morning for the tht:ee yeat:s that he 
terrorized the village, Captain Sylvester Nunes had his daughter, 
Fr ieda, shave him on t he v-s:randah" (1 ) . In this activity Frieda tdkes 
the r-ole : if her mr:.:t her.:·, since H[t1 he men o f t h is family have alr..,Jay~ 
be~n 3haved by- their ~.,Jr:;rnenu (1) . The r·elation~hip of owne:cship i::: 
r:·ei ter·ated thr-ou1.;;hcut the text b,i Nun.•23, and even F r· ieda. 0 thour.;;ht: 1. 
rnother·, ~Iu:-11~s 1 ::.: 1\IJ1f~ 1 died in inyster·ious c 1r·c ums t ances, though i t i s 
hinted that he may have ki l led her in the shaving ritual, as Nunes 
himself tells Frieda the storv o f the man who ki lled his wi fe for 
want ing to kill h i m du r i ng s u c h a s having ritual . Therefore , du ring 
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the moment of vulnerability, Nunes indicates to Frieda that it is she 
who is at risk and subject to his power. 
All the while "he was still watching, still planning to di3cover: 
their secr:et'' (12). And in this project, this missionary zeal with 
which he searches f or: the eni,;ma at the centr:e of the settlement's 
existence, "if he 1wa nted to see someone, he had Fr:ieda summon them 
with a cur:t, 'You must come immedia t2ly, the captain wants you'" (13). 
In this scheme, the villagers are made available to the c a ptain, and 
more specifically, their bodies are at his disposal in much the same 
way black bodies are available to the apartheid state machiner:y, and 
female bodies ace available to masculinist discourses. Therefore, 
Frieda becomes the tool by which Nunes effects his investigation of 
the village. At first she is merely his messenger. After all, it is 
his belief that ''[ s]he was his. And if she couldn't be his, then she 
would be nobody's" (15). But it is with Lady Sarah's insistence that 
Frieda is integrated into village life, that Nunes sees the 
opportunity to use her in other ways to get at the village secret . At 
first he is firm that "(n]o father c an have a spoiled girl for a 
daughter'' (15), so that, in accordance with the regulations he had 
pinned up at Fagmie Jabaac's upon acrival, the idea of Frieda and 
Stevie, "a mece fisherboy from the second class" (17), fills him ·,nth 
revulsion. After all, a sexual union across the legal barriers ''is 
the greatest filth, condemned by God and man, worse even than fucking 
a goat'' (15) . This characterisation of sexual relations across the 
boundaries established by his ordinances relegates the citizens o f the 
second class to what Head calls a "state below animal, below living" 
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(1 4) . In this way Nunes embodies the dictates of the apartheid state 
apparatus of South Africa that deemed the sexual union of black and 
white criminal -- Head's A Question of Power and the discussion on the 
Immorality Act and Elizabeth's "origins" in the previous chapter ace 
illuminating het:e. But what redeems Nunes's plan is his view that 
"Stevie ... could possibly be reclassified by virtue of a doubtful 
father and gcandmother" (15 -16) . It is also then that he admits that 
"what else are women for, if not to secve men Especially their 
fathers" (23). Here, women are designated to second-class status, so 
that they ace open to use and abuse by men like Nunes and Mondling. 
But even when 
Nunes had let almost all his regulations slip, ... he 
1,;ould not tolerate women di::ink:in9 at Fa9mie Jabaar's 
tables. It was the first step to prostitution, he 
maintained (22-23). 
He has no qualms, though, about prostituting Frieda in order to get at 
the truth he is convinced the villa9ecs are hidirn;r from him. But the 
obsession with classification, the distinction between the first and 
second class citizens resembles more and more the blood and purity 
obsessions outlined by Coetzee (1988:136-162) in his discussion of 
Sarah Gertrude Millin's novels. Afcec all, Nunes wonders, ·~ould 
chese insects lie to me when I could have squashed them beneath my 
thumb ••. these mixed-bloods'' (51). And as he declaces to Lady Sarah, 
"what I care about is what they are doing. flJhat law they are 
breakinq" (72) • Here the world created by Nunes and his regulations 
resemble Biko's description of South Africa as a place where 
[n]o average black man (sic) can ever at any moment be 
absolutely 3ure that he i3 not breaking a law. There ace 
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so many laws governing the lives and behaviour of black 
people that sometimes one feels that the police only need 
to page at random through their statute book to be able to 
get a law under which to charge a victim (1996:75) . 
Nunes sees the villagers as "people who cannot live without doing 
wrong. They are anarchists. Subversives. Everything they do is to 
destroy law and order" (72) • It is in the light of these views that 
Nunes sets out to assert that 
(e]ven when he was at hi3 most vulnerable, he still held 
the power of life and death, he was in charge ... One-= 
more he was in control, once again he could bring law and 
order to this miserable place ••. Now, no matter what i t 
took, he would learn their secret, he would have them tell 
him, each one of them, he would have them all confess the 
dark sin they kept close to their hearts (70). 
This echoes Mashinini's description of her imprisonment and 
interrogation by the South African police: 
Always they wanted the tr:uth, when I had no more truth to 
tell. I don't think they ever really understood that in 
fact there was nothing to give away. But they always 
tried to find it, this nothing (1989:75). 
When Nunes declares, in a moment of anger and paranoia, that 
"[m]eetings are forbidden. You must disperse. You must disperse" 
(74) , he resembles various police officials during the later years of 
the apartheid era and the stat,2 of emergency. In this regard Lady 
Sar:ah's moral indictment of Nunes -- "Like all your type, you imagine 
a conspiracy ... It is you who ace the criminal, captain, you who 
betray and terrify" (72-73 ) becomes allegorical of the liberal 
indictment of the apartheid South African state and its apparatus. 
This also echoes the Magistrate's epiphany in Wi:1itinq for the 
Earbarians, that the true barbarians are not the prisoners captured by 
Joll, but those figures like Jell within Empire itself who later 
subject the Magistrate himself to their methods of establi3hin9 the 
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truth. But like the apartheid state, the crisis and Nunes's paranoia 
only drive him to declare that "[t]here will be new regulations ••• 
Anyone breaking this decree will be shot on sight. By order" (77). 
What results is that, as Fletcher (1964:214) states, "the contagion 
may be walled in, instead of walled out". It is also at this moment 
that he admits that "justice was only for the powerful", and the 
villagers ''were sewn and criminals, drunkards and half-breeds, fit for 
nothing other than scrounge-life" (lac.cit.). Thus the villagers --
especially the fisherfolk of Nunes's second class -- begin to resemble 
the Khoi and San of the white imaginary described by Coetzee (1988:12-
35). This view clashes directly with Augustin Shoote's assertion that 
"[t]his is an ordinary village with ordinary people. They deserve to 
be left alone to live out a life ,that is hard enough" (78). This 
concurs with Bead's Elizabeth in A Question of Power, who desires to 
"be the same as others in heart; just [to] be a person" (26). But 
even shoote's view of the second class citizens is condescending, like 
the liberal view of black people in South Africa. As he states, 
I look at them, these fisherfolk, and I see faith, the 
simplicity of belief which I cannot share. How can they 
accept these things without screaming at the sky, without 
shaking their fists, without crying with rage? Why is it 
so easy for them (78-79). 
Here Shoote seems to reflect Biko's view that "[t]he liberals view the 
oppression of blacks as a problem that has to be solved, an eye sore 
spoiling an otherwise beautiful view" (1996:22). 
But his is a less harsh, though perhaps not less oppressive, 
view of the fisherfolk than Nunes's. It is the captain who accuses 
his daughter of having "slept with a mixed-blood. You have shamed me, 
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bitch, I shall be the laughing stock of this miserable hole'' (79) . 
This seems a revision of what had happened: F rieda is charged with 
sole responsibility for her relationship with Stevie, when captain 
Nunes was the one who introduced them and encouraged her to pui:sue a 
relationship with the fisherman. But it is this very relationship 
which leads him to exclaim, with disdain, 
&Jhat right had this daughter, a violated woman cai:rying 
the child of a mixed-blood, to lie b<>twe,=.n his she<>ts, 
what right had she, now little better than a common 
fishertype (81; emphasis added). 
The incestuous implication here, that Frieda has truly become her 
mother, her father's wife, is so significant that her relationship 
with Stevie, even though it is at Nunes's own initiation 1 becomes an 
affront to his honour. Thus it would seem that marriage to, sexual 
relations with, and worst of all , being impregnated by, a man of the 
second class, results in the woman of the first class being demoted to 
the lower status. This is how Mad Minnaar becomes what she is, and it 
is also why Nunes spurns his daughter so utterly. This echoes a more 
general trope in colonialist discourse, that manifests itself in an 
exaggerated fear of the sexuality of the colonised; this is als o a 
trope in racist discourse, in which black sexuality becomes an aff ront 
to white male sexuality and a threat to white femininity. In 
disavowing their blood relation, Munes is attempting to 2nforce his 
desire that "there would be law and order again, a prope r time and a 
proper place for everything" (8 1). Here he seems to be doing the 
opposite of the protagonists in the previous three novels examined in 
this thesis. Each of them -- the Magistrate in Waitinq for the 
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Barbarians, the slave woman in The Expedition to the Baobab Tree, and 
Elizabeth in A Question of Power -- attempted to shcrw hcrw improper 
their time and place had been, and to deconstruct, to interrogate and 
turn inside out the very notions of a proper time and place. Again, 
Nunes reiterates a longstanding view of the Khoi and San when he 
describes how there would be 
[n]o more loitering, as they were ncrw [doing], outside the 
coolie store, no more of their treasonable meetings in the 
streets; because wasn't it true that whenever more than 
two were gathered together subversion and anarchy would 
only spread and fester (81; emphases added). 
This emphases above illustrate the medical structure of Nunes's view, 
which concurs with the implications of contagion in political 
dissidence outlined by Fletcher (1964:214). It also echoes the 
description Coetzee (1988:25-35) gives of the colonialist discourse 
and its construction of the Khoi and San at the Cape through the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nunes constructs himself as 
their "saviour from this mire of indolence" (lac.cit.), but this 
indolence, or "idleness" (Coetzee 1988:16), may be read as one of 
"innumerable subaltern examples of resistance" (Spivak 1987:245). But 
this is not the only connection between the Khoi and San, and the 
people of the settlement. When the history of the settlement is 
recounted in the second section of the novel, we are told of "two 
brothers and a young girl thought to be the ancestors of the goatherds 
who lived down the lagoon" (95), and of "[t]he people ••• especially 
the females, [who] looked more beautiful than the women they [the 
white sailors] had left behind" (94). These ancestors are also 
described as "the two brothers and their common wife" (95), so that 
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later Nunes can describe the villagers as "a bunch of fiaherpeople so 
interscrewed not one of them has a hand of five fingers let alone a 
straight eye" (164). Thia does indeed reflect the fear of "taint, 
flaw, degeneration" that Coetzee (1988:136) discusses in relation to 
miscegenation and its representation and construction in South African 
apartheid discourse. It is also because the child conceived by Frieda 
and Stevie will be what Nunes considers a "mixed-breed", "that evil 
tadpole" (159), that he forces her to have an abortion. But as he 
constructs the abortion, it is also a renewal, a rebirth for Frieda 
and his relationship with his daughter -- he sends her to Mad Minnaar 
to be "[c] leaned out. Virginal ••• Tell her I want to feel a new 
hymen" (82). Thia moment reveals precisely how "he had forced Frieda 
into his bed" (80), because "I went further than other fathers, but 
all fathers think what I did" (159). And here it seems that as 
Irigaray (1985a:31-32) states, ''women are marked phallicly (sic) by 
their fathers, husbands, procurers. And this branding determines 
their value in sexual commerce". As Nunes declares, "[s]he was~ 
girl. Always ~ girl. 
(159; emphasis added). 
Those were~ eyes,~ flesh and blood, mine" 
What is also significant here is the duality 
of the possessive pronouns: they refer to both the genetic links 
between Nunes and Frieda, as father and daughter, and the sexual 
ownership of their incestuous relationship. 
In this respect he resembles Mondling, the SUdwester, and his 
relationship with the creature with whom he arrives at the settlement. 
The villagers ponder whether "[i]f cages were used to capture bad 
animals then maybe they were also used to capture poor souls" (57), 
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and the cage on Mondling's ship is suspected of having contained such 
a c reature. It is significant that both Nunes and Mondling 
characterise those whom they consider their inferiors, as animals 
in this way they resemble the Magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians 
who compares the barbarian woman to a fox; the slave woman in 
Stockenstrdm's novel who compares herself, uncomfortably, to the 
animals of the wilderness where she finds herself; and also Sella, 
Medusa and Dan in Head's A Question of Power, who consider Elizabeth 
"dog-filth" (46 ) . 
But the origins of the creature whic h Mondling brings to the 
settlement, "the damned one" (60), are far mo re sinister than the 
villagers at first suspect. They imagine "a naked body tormented by 
demons with red-hot knives and forks, descriptions which nevertheless 
became the stuff of nightmares" (lee.cit.) when Mondling denies them 
access to his secret. But later they are confronted with 
a naked girl covered in hair, her gums snarling over wolf-
teeth, four nipples on her chest, claws for nails, who 
moved like an animal and stank worse than jackals ... she 
was emerging on an all-fours lope from the cellar, 
manacled to a length of chain (lee.cit. ) . 
Like the "devil (Nunes imagines Stevie] was ... breeding in my gii:::l" 
(159) , Mondling's creature, which turns out to be the daughter of hi3 
wife Meisie and their gardener, is "a strange ;~pecimen, neither one 
thing nor the other ... a girlwolf large as life chained t o a stake" 
(60 ; emphasis added ) Here she inhabits what Foucaul t (1965:11) 
de3cribes as "the madman's liminal po::: i tion". Even Mondling describes 
her as "an animal, the devil's practical joke" (61) . Her:e, in 
Foucault's (1965:72 ) argument 
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[m]adness borrowed its face from the mask o f the beast ... 
as if madness, at its extreme point, freed from that moral 
unreason in which its most attenuated forms are enclosed, 
managed to rejoin, by a paroxysm of strength, the 
immediate violence of animality. 
The history of the unfortunate Meisie Koekemoer Mondling and the 
gardener, "the man of Meisie's dream . . . the whitest kaffir he'd 
(Mondling] evet' come across" (62), resembles closely the relationship 
between Nunes, Ste•,ie and Frieda. It i:3 also 3ignificant that 
Mondl i nr,J reveals this story to Nunes, with whom he presumes, perhaps 
rightly, to share several beliefs and attitudes . Thus, it is in a 
measure Mondling who inspires Nunes's horrible suspicions of the child 
Frieda is preqnant with. It is Mondling who 
got it into his head that his daughter didn't look 
anything like him, looked only vaguely like her mother but 
had the unmistakably generous nose and mouth of his 
gardener. This cute child, he realised, was no throwback 
from some distant union of contrastinq skins, no surprise 
from a genetic stew, this was the product of illicit, 
adulterous, wicked, totally unforgivable whoremonge.ring 
(64; emphasis added) . 
The emphases above reflect the language of the obsession with racial 
purity outlined by Coetzee (1988: 152-156) in Sarah Gertrude Millin' s 
oeuvre. And i n this way "the creature, fear in its eyes, trapped in 
the middle of the yard" (61) resembles Head's Elizabeth ,Jho is 
returned t o the orphanage because she did not look white enough . The 
rejection Head's Elizabeth suffers because of a white ::::upremacist, 
racist system is similar to the rejection of the g ir l child of Meisie 
and the gardener, except that while Elizabeth does grow up t o claim 
subjectivity, 
until she died the child . . . ne ver learnt to tal k, f o rgot 
how to cry, became an animal dependent on the :::craps 
thrown to her from the back door or: over: the fence and the 
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bowl of water, filled every second day (64). 
Of course, as true patriarchs, both Nunes and Mondling blame these 
events and their significance on "the cunning of women. Those wily, 
loveless bitches out for nothing but their own pleasure, fickle-
hearted sluts" (66). This indictment of women as prostitutes, as 
conniving and calculating, and as animals, embodies the stereotypes 
black women have always been identified with and by in racist imperial 
patriarchies. However, there remains the possibility, hinted at by 
Montague Planke, that Mondling's daughter, crossing boundaries from 
beyond the grave, may have been involved in his mysterious death. He 
tells Fagmie Jabaar that "however Mondling died, it wasn't at the hand 
of another man" (87; emphasis added), even when Jong Jan tells them 
that "he'd seen a strange man in the village the previous morning 
[i.e. the morning before Mondling's death]" (86). The emphasis above 
indicates the ambiguity of "man": it remains unclear whether he is 
referring to a male human being, or a more generalized reference to a 
human being. 
II. Stereotypes and Other Monsters 
Nicol's novel, though, seems to be engaged in a two-edged enterprise 
of inscribing stereotypical representations of women at the same time 
as it interrogates these stereotypes as constructions, as inventions, 
and as mechanisms of control. In the previous section I have examined 
at length the ways in which the laws, the regulations instituted and 
enforced by Nunes, rely heavily on stereotypical views of women and 
blacks, and also of black women, for their own internal logic. It is 
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the arbitrariness of this logic that Nicol seems to be foregrounding 
in his analytical critique of apartheid South Africa's power politics 
and social relations. 
However, paradoxically perhaps, Nicol also inscribes black women 
and this category will be elaborated upon shortly -- in 
stereotypical roles. Perhaps this is a result of his allegorical 
project, with its emblematic and symbolic characters, each 
demonstrating some function or value in a secondary order. 
The first stereotypical figure is the white black woman, Mad 
Minnaar, who is considered second class -- which to all intents and 
purposes corresponds with the position inhabited by black South 
Africans in the novel -- by the logic of Nunes's regulations. Through 
her marriage tao the drunken sot, she becomes "Mad Minnaar, the crone 
this strange prophet of doom" (7). The oracular function of women 
is a trope in western literature that dates back to antiquity, and has 
its most powerful manifestations in the figure of the witch (for 
example, in Shakespeare's Macbeth, the three sisters prophesy 
Macbeth's rise to and fall from power). Most of what Mad Minnaar has 
to say is "the apocrypha of a soothsayer •.. a vast mumbo-jumbo" (7), 
so that we are provided here with " [ h] er association with sorcery ... 
the lady of dark powers" (Bernikow 1980:228). But she becomes the 
focus of Nunes's first interrogation session. As Montague Planke 
informs us in his narrative, 
Nunes had deliberately chosen his victim. He must have 
seen her as all that was bad in the village: a woman 
enslaved by superstition, who saw signs and omens 
everywhere, who had committed, to the captain, the 
unforgivable sin of taking up with a man of the second 
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class (lee.cit.). 
In this way his view of Mad Minnaar and her liaison with her drunken 
sot corresponds with Mondling's view of Meisie's liaison with the 
gardener. It is significant that in neither case is the black man 
named. This too has echoes of Elizabeth's parents in Head's~ 
Question of Power -- Elizabeth is named for her mother, but her father 
remains nameless throughout her narrative, as the name of Head's own 
father, in fact his identity, is lost to history. 
And it is because of this "unforgivable sin" that Mad Minnaar 
loses the dubious privilege of being excepted from the torture to 
which the fisherfolk of the second class are subjected during Nunes's 
first interrogation sessions. It is only later, when Nunes becomes 
desperate, that not even citizens of the first class such as Lady 
Sarah -- who, it could be argued, has forfeited the privilege of first 
class status because of her undefined relationship with Samuel, the 
son of Joseph, the "hotnot kaffir" (58) as Mondling calls him --
escape his hideous, tortu(r)ous interrogations and violent abuse. 
Thus Nunes could dismiss "the crone's fantastic rumblings ••• She was 
raving now, the way she sometimes did when she'd had too much dagga" 
(7) • But as he himself admits, he no longer sought only answers, "all 
he wanted was their fear" (10). Still, it is Mad Minnaar's prophecy, 
that "only people with troubled pasts end up here" (31), that becomes 
the double-edged sword by which Nunes judges the community, and by 
which they judge him. 
But the histories with which Montague Planke provides us derive 
mostly from the writing of citizens of the first class. Firstly there 
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is Mrs. Hansen's diary, the journal of a white woman, and there is 
also Captain .Hansen's ship's log, an o fficial document in which 
various entries record some of the legal and public life o f the 
settlement. We are informed how, f o r example, 
the lives of people like Samuel's parents never f o und 
their way into the official history books. After all, 
they are just ordinary people and what historian i s 
concerned with ordinary people (32). 
Unlike Head's Elizabeth, though, Montague Planke offers very little by 
way of history for the ordinary people. Most of the narrative is 
taken up by Lady Sarah's account of her own arrival and that of Mad 
Minnaar and her sister Dorothea, three white women delivered to the 
settlement after a shipwreck on their way to the Cape from the 
northern hemisphere, presumably Europe. It is Mondling who describes 
"the wars of independence •.. [as ] nothing more than an excuse for 
mayhem and plunder" (32-33). Here his account reveals the imperial 
nature of the history of conquest on the subcontinent, and echoes 
Conrad's characterisation of the colonial enterprise in Heart o f 
Darkness as 
just robbery with violence, agg r avated murder on a greac 
scale, and men going at it blind -- as is very proper for 
those who tackle a darkness. The conquest of the ea rth, 
which mostly means the taking it away fr om those who have 
a different comple~io n o r slightly flatter noses than 
ourselves, is not a pretty thing ·,;hen you l oo k into it t oo 
much. What redeems it is the idea o nly. An idea at the 
back of it; not a sentimental pretense but an idea; and an 
unselfish belief in the idea -- something you can set up, 
and bow down before, and of fer gacrifice to (1902 : 3 1- 32) . 
Nunes and Mondling resemble both one another and Conrad'3 coloni3ers, 
in that they believe in the right of whi te civilisatio n and the need 
to conquer the "kaffirg" (53) through extreme violence. And it is 
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Nunes who, during Mondling's confessional narrative of his own dubious 
and troubled past, longs "to have lived in those times when the 
divides were simple, when there were Europeans, kaffirs and a savage 
land ••• How much easier" (S6). Be is in agreement with Mondling, who 
states that "if they won't learn then we will exterminate the rubbish" 
(54). This echoes Kurtz's statement in his report in Heart of 
Darkness that they should "Exterminate all the brutes!" (1902:8?). 
After all, they collude, Mondling and Nunes, and the latter agrees 
with the former that "the history books do not have it the way it was. 
Always they have a bias, the bias of someone with a point to make; but 
I have no point to make, I simply tell you about the things I saw and 
felt" (53). But, as Coetzee's narrator shows, the very act of telling 
is a construction and an interpretation, and it is Lady Sarah who 
declares that "[a]ll stories are real stories once they're told" (28). 
It is important to note that it is a woman, Lady Sarah, who provides 
an alternative value system to Nunes's regime of "law and order", and 
principally through the creative act of story-telling. These are 
significant oppositions in a text where the women of the second class, 
the women who allegorically represent the black women in South Africa, 
are the singular exceptions to the telling and corroboration of 
stories. And Lady Sarah's defiance of Nunes's interrogations and 
their failure to uncover the truth he is seeking, is crucial in this 
regard. She impels him to listen to her, for, she states, 
You've been told many things, captain, but in truth, you 
know very little. Even with all your interrogations 
you've not scratched the surface of this place (29). 
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Thus the story of Samuel's presence in the t own and the arr ival of his 
parents, is not told by either of them -- they are signifi cantly dead, 
along with several of the native inhabitants of the settlement; t hi s 
is perhaps allegorical of the absence in South African di scourse o f 
Khoi and San histories given the decimation of these people throughout 
the period of colonial settlement -- but by Lady Sarah. What we know 
of Mary and Joseph -- and their names are allegC?rically r epresentative 
of the functi ons they serve: to bring i nto being t he prophet Samuel , 
significantly named, as they all are, who keeps a watch out f o r the 
arrival of Nunes -- is told to Nunes by Lady Sarah. That "Mar y 
found work charring for the Beg-rips and the Hansens" (35), and "gave 
birth as if she'd had a string of children to ease this one's passage 
into the world" (lac.cit.) are both indications of her stereotypical 
status in the novel. She is comparable in her blankness to Fagmie 
Jabaar's wife, Sheemina, and they are both reminiscent of the 
blankness which the barbarian girl constitutes for the Magistrate in 
Waiting f o r the Barbarians. We are i n formed at various points how 
"Sheemina served them t ea . . . Sheemi na c leared away t he cups" (7 5) , 
and "what else has Sheemina to do, but dusting" (67j. That Sheemina 
is not really Indian, not really a c i t i ze n o f the second class, only 
ma kes the poi nt about the stereotypica l , s i l ent and bl ank 
r epresenta tion o f black women mor e power f ully . It is because of her 
status as a white woman disguised as a black one, a first-cl ass 
ci tizen masquerading as a second-class one , t hat she is as blank as 
she i s. Thus, when Nunes declares t o Frieda that "[w]omen should stay 
in the house. You have no business in t he world" (69) , he s eems not 
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to be speaking of Lady Sarah, or any of the women of the first class, 
but more pointedly of the black women, and the white women who have 
the status of their second-class counterparts, such as Mad Minnaar and 
Frieda, who are such because of their relationships with the second-
class men. He also seems to echo Marlow's sentiments in Conrad's 
Heart of Darkness, that "[t)hey -- the women I mean -- are out of it 
-- should be out of it. We must help them to stay in that beautiful 
world of their own" (1902:84) . Nunes, unlike Marlow, does not 
disguise his misogyny, founded as it may be on fear, though. He 
states outright that "I hate women. They spurn me. My mother, even 
my own daughter, spurns me" (160). Frieda does not speculate about 
her mother's early death, but the story Nunes tells his daughter 
before she starts to fill her mother's role in shaving him hints at 
the possibility that he killed her. In this respect he resembles 
Mondling who kills his wife, Meisie, then goes about "divorcing father 
from daughter" (65), the result of which action is the creature he 
keeps on a chain in his yard. The incestuous relationships between 
white fathers and their daughters are juxtaposed with the non-
monogamous relationships among the second-class citizens. Notable 
among these are "the two brothers and their common wife" (95) who ar·e 
the ancestors of the goatherds. We are told how "[a] little bartering 
must have taken place, as Captain Hansen mentions securing the 9irl's 
favours in exchange for some knives" (96). Here the black woman is 
not only the economic unit which is exchanged for commodity gain, but 
also the one who engages in what Nunes -- and patriarchal society more 
generally -- would consider immoral behaviour. She fulfils further 
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the black woman as nurse, as healer, as 
when we are told that during the difficult 
birth of Mrs. Hansen's first child "the wife of the goatherds ••• put 
the medicines on the steep, and went off to squat on the dune in a 
vigil of solidarity" (101) • Mrs. Hansen calls her a ''witch" 
(lac.cit.), which label later also incorporates Mad Minnaar, the white 
woman who has been classed a second-class citizen, as she performs the 
abortion Nunes forces Frieda to undergo. 
The other white woman masquerading as a black woman, the 
stereotypically blank Sheemina, is defined by her relationship with 
Fagmie Jabaar, as good wife and mother. But since she is not truly 
Indian, the Jabaars -- or as they are kncr.m in the novel, the Fagmie 
Jabaars, so that her identity is inextricable from her husband's --
are subjected to 
the police, waking them up at all hours of the morning, 
flashing torches into their bedroom, arrests, court cases, 
nights in jail. Their crime was that Sheemina wasn't 
Indian. She was Christian white, and before she met 
Fagmie her name was Rosalind Mills (116). 
The details of her life as a black woman remain obscure, except for 
the limited, functional roles quoted earlier. And her crime, again, 
recalls the discussion about miscegenation and the Immorality Act 
engaged in by Coetzee (1992) and Ngcobo (1991), which is dealt with in 
detail in the previous chapter on Head's novel and Elizabeth's 
origins. 
It is perhaps Mad Minnaar herself who best encapsulates the 
crisis faced by and represented in the novel, when she declares ''who 
gives a damn about women" (124). It seems, as Nicol's novel 
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illustrates, that white women are cared about a little more than black 
women, even if this does not amount to much. 
Finella, who is acquired in a transaction fcom her grandmother 
for Boatswain Baleen by Montague Planke and Fagmie Jabaar, fulfils the 
demands of a good woman. As Planke says to Fagmie Jabaar, 
what you're looking for [is a ]n untouched woman, pure in 
body, mind and soul who will be wife, companion, mother to 
his children; devotee until his dying day. And, most 
importantly, a woman young enough to train in his ways 
(131) • 
Not only does this function as an apt description foe Finella -- whose 
only outstanding features are her tambourine playing, and her fetish 
for jigsaw puzzles which lead:::: her to reconstruct the shredded paper 
containing Nunes's name on the beach -- but it also doubles as a 
description of the function Sheemina serves in her relationship with 
Fagmie Jabaar. The white women, the women of the first class, such as 
Mrs • .Hansen and Lady Sarah, are keepers of stories that we are told . 
The former keeps a journal, the latter is given the responsibility of 
telling the story of the settlement to Nunes. The notable exception, 
Mad Minnaar, the white woman who has been transformed into a black 
one, a first class citizen reduced to second class status, is 
pr:eci:::ely that: mad. Hece 1 again, like Mondling's creature, Mad 
Minnaar inhabits what Foucault (1965 :11) characterises as the mad 
subject's lim ina l position in Rational discourse. Like Head's 
Elizabeth, she embodies all that is bad, and she "remains the 
threatening possibility of savagery, the unknown quantity" (Cixous in 
Cixous & Cl~ment 1986 :91), like the barbarian woman in Coetzee's 
novel. She also offers an interrogation of the patriarchal conception 
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(category) of sanity, as Elizabeth does, for as Foucault (1965 :58) 
states, "madness .•• crosses the frontiers of bourgeo is order" . 
III. The Politics of Control 
Nicol's entire novel could be said to be an exploration of the 
politics of control: control over narrative, truth, subjectivity and 
agency. Just as Nunes controls Frieda, his daughter, and as he once 
controlled his wife, so he attempts to control the activities of the 
villagers. The shaving ritual is an exploration of his power t o 
control others, his wife and then Frieda, for it illustrates that 
"[e]ven when he was at his most vulnerable, he still held the powet.: of 
life and death, he was in charge" (70) . Thus, when "[l]eft and right 
I pinned regulations on them: don't do this, don't do that, don't go 
here, don't go there ... People got to have regulations, laws" (165), 
he is merely extending his wish for control in the domestic sphere as 
husband and father (illustrated by his characterisation of the shaving 
ritual), into the public sphere in his capacity as a police officer. 
Also, like Joll and the Magistcate in Coetzee's riJaiting foe the 
Bacbarians, Nunes play"S with visibility and invisibility to effect his 
power: games . Augustin Shoote "tried t o find beneath the sunglasses 
that merely reflected his face" (13 ) a trace o f humanity, but fails. 
It is Nunes himself who ·~as still watching ... to discover: their: 
secret" (12). Re is the one who plays games of control, constituting 
himself as the viewing subJect, and the villagers as the viewed 
objects. This echoes Joll and the Magistrate in Coetzee's novel, and 
Mulvey's (1975:465) argument on the male gaze as the controlling agent 
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in the subject-object relations between the male and female in 
narrative. In his encounter with Lady Sarah we are told how "Nunes 
watched her the way scientists watched insects: closely, piercingly" 
(30). This is both a repetition and an inversion of how the 
Magistrate characterises Joll's hiding behind sunglasses. The 
Magistrate describes Joll's eyes as insect eyes, yet Montague Planke 
tells how it is the object of Nunes's gaze that is reduced to the 
status of an insect. Nunes himself describes the villagers as 
"insects [who would] lie to me when I could have squashed them beneath 
my thumb" (51). And later, when he is being interrogated by Nunes, 
"Augustin Shoote found himself searching for signs of humanity behind 
the dark glasses. But all he saw was his own reflection" (86). In 
this respect he mirrors Coetzee's Magistrate and his encounter with 
Jell: in attempting to mediate between the torturer and the tortured, 
in attempting to establish a neutral, interested but non-polemical 
position, the mediator becomes the tortured. After all, Nunes can 
only think in terms of "[p]risoners ••• Or victims ••• Or political 
prisoners" (133), in the language of apartheid South Africa's Bureau 
of State Security and police force. 
But Nunes's power wavers, and is lost when he realises that he 
too is an object in the gaze of the villagers. His realisation echoes 
that of Coetzee's Magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians, who 
becomes aware that he does not kncrw, and cannot kncrw, how the 
fisherfolk and the barbarian prisoners see him; the Magistrate also 
becomes aware that while he had overlooked them, their individuality, 
he had been exposed to them in his own singularity. Similarly, we are 
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told how "[e)very eye in the village followed Captain Nunes 
inscrutable behind dark glasses" (50). The obverse of this vie'w of 
Nunes, narrated by Montague Planke, is Nunes's own realisation that as 
he "stood there for some minutes watching the deserted streets, (he 
became) aware that behind many windows others, with loathing, were 
watching him" (77). It echoes Lady Sarah's earlier judgement on 
Nunes, when she tells him that 
your perversities ••. your power-mongering ..• destroy 
people, Captain Nunes. You squash them like ants ••• 
because you ar·e weak and afraid (73) • 
Here she echoes Head's Elizabeth, who deconstructs the power 
r·elationship between victim and victimiser, between the torturer and 
the victim, to the extent that she can judge the torturer weak. Thus, 
as in Coetzee's text where the Empire as represented by Joll 
constitutes the true barbarians, as the masters in Stockenstr~m's 
novel are shown to be the true slaves to their social trappings, and 
the torturers in Head's novel come off as the truly disempowered, so 
in Nicol's text it is Nunes, as the r·epresentative of "the powers that 
be", who is truly reduced to "nothing" (159) in the end, as he self-
combusts because of his own hatred. Whereas he sets out stating that 
"I shall give them discipline .•. I shall teach you, miserable half-
breeds" (81), it is the settlement that survives the catastrophe of 
Nunes's terror. When he declares, in his raving, final explosive 
interrogation of Montague Planke, that "[t]he conspiracy is broken. 
There are no more secrets" (167), it is a hollO'w victory, for he is 
said by Montague Planke to s e lf-combust shortly afterwards, and "the 
Brothers Kreef ••. cleaned him up" (175). The only evidence left 
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after this cleansing act -- Planke relates how the village rids itself 
of any reminders of Nunes's presence and his reign of terror -- is 
ironically Planke's own story, his narrative. 
However, it is Augustin Shoote who points to a more sinister and 
less fantastic end to Captain Nunes, when he "asked the question that 
was on everyone's lips": 
'It was Frieda, wasn't it? Did she throw a lamp at him, 
is that how the fire started? It must have been, we all 
saw her come eunning out of the house like a woman 
possessed.' (174). 
The implication here is that Frieda might have killed her father, and 
exacted her revenge in a murderous act of self-reclamation, which 
concurs with Cixous (in Cixous & Clement 1986:140), who states that 
"[t]he only way to bar [the master's execution of the powers at his 
disposal] is to execute the master, kill him, eliminate him". 
Therefore, the possibility that Nunes was killed by his own daughter, 
just as Mondling's creature, in Frankensteinian manner, murders him, 
is hinted at in the text, so that Frieda's subjectivity remains 
uncontained in Montague Planke's text, since its implications are 
perhaps too horrific for him to deal with. Instead, his narrative 
elides Frieda from the moment of Nunes's death and ascribes it to 
self-combustion. And it is also only in his narrative that the 
settlement survives, for as Fagrnie Jabaar declares, "[t] his place has 
hadit"(175). 
The apocalyptic ending of the novel, the blank space which the 
settlement is reduced to -- just as his daughter is reduced to Frieda 
the Husk, a silent empty shell who sometimes hums incoherently as she 
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wanders about, seemingly aimlessly -- becomes emblematic of what south 
Africa threatened to become at the end of the eighties: a chaot i c 
conflagration of violence and self-destruction. 
But the most significant blank spaces, the most noteworthy 
absences in Nicol's novel, are the women of the second class. Thei r 
silence is reminiscent of the silence of the women of Conrad's Heart 
of Darkness. And like that novel's problematic relationship with the 
imperial enterprise, its critique and inscription of the model, 
Nicol's The Powers That Be is both an interrogation of the 
representational politics in South African literature, and ironi cally, 
an inscription of the very practices it is critiquing. 
IV. Signs and Wonders 
Nicol's novel is filled with allegorical signs, and the reading of 
signs and omens. Mad Minnaar's prophecies depend on comets and 
meteors, goats running wild, the direction from which individuals 
approach the settlement upon arrival -- approach from the sea is 
considered a good omen; approach from the land its opposite. 
Significantly, Nunes first appears to the villagers as a sign in Mad 
Minnaar's prophecies, so that he is indeed, as Montague Planke states, 
"a dark enigma" (14 ) . It is Lady Sarah who infor!I\3 him that 
you came from the land. At least I washed out of the sea. 
And you know what Mad Minnaar says: "There is alwa ys a bad 
wind off the land." (31). 
This belief is so strong in the settlement that even Samuel's parents, 
on their first arrival, are made to row out to sea and re-approach t he 
settlement from the ocean. And even then they are quar antined. 
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However, the sea does not always offer up good, as the washing up of 
several strange bodies on the shore proves. It is this apocalyptic 
event, 
the naked, eyeless, wounded remains of men old and young, 
women, girls, boys who had been tortured, witness: whipped 
soles, mutilated genitals, lacerations, bruises, burns 
that weren't the doing of the sea (134), 
which signals the horrors that Nunes would inflict on the village. It 
also indicates the violence that must be occurring in the world 
outside the village, the world from which "[t]he settlement was lost" 
(106). Finnegan (1989:9) argues that "the violence of South African 
history is an ever-present menace -- the terribl e tides of 
contemporary repression wash mutilated corpses onto the beaches". But 
whereas prior to the arrival of the corpses on t he beach, Mondling 
could state that ''this place ... is at one end of the earth, unsullied 
by official or unofficial plunders, tranquil, paradise amidst mayhem" 
(34) , "[t]hese victims ... Mangled, misshapen, human flotsam and 
jetsam" (135) are signs that this is no longer t he case. The mayhem 
is centred on the settlement with Nunes's arrival, and the obscure 
origins of the bodies remain unsolved. It can only be guessed that 
they may be indicative of the violence into which the world outside 
the greater South Africa -- had been plunged. The most significant of 
the washed up bodies are the 
three young women, by their looks not long dead, not 
bloated, discoloured or sea-ravaged like the others, still 
beautiful, still soft-skinned, imaginably warm ... the 
violated (136), 
which reduces the village to utter horror and sadness. The barbarity 
of their deaths is an indictment of a world whi ch has "the miracles of 
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the modern age" (176), but practises the barbarities of which it 
accuses its enemies. As in Conrad, where the true brutes are the 
Europeans who plunder Africa, and in Coetzee, where the true 
barbarians are the officials of Empire, so in Nicol's reading of South 
Africa, true evil in the apartheid era lay with the powers that be, 
with the torturers and victimisers. 
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Fletcher (1964:160) argues that "agents ... of allegory are semantic 
elements, signs which act and represent", and the discmrnion of the 
four texts in this thesis shows how the sign of the subaltern subject 
is representable in the allegorical when and even as it remains 
inexpressible in the real. 
Therefore, as the Magistrate illustrates, 
no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever 
ignore or disclaim its author's involvement as a human 
subject in his own circumstances (Said 1996:11). 
Coetzee's text, as my analysis in the second chapter shows, is 
therefore both an inscription and an interrogation of the liberal 
humanist novelistic discourse dominant in apartheid South African 
fiction. Consequently, its concern with subaltern representation, 
which is a crucial part of liberal humanist discourse, is a concern 
with the structural impossibilities of such an enterprise. As Spivak 
(1988:287) argues, "[w]hen we come to the concomitant question of the 
consciousness of the subaltern, the notion of what the work cannot say 
becomes important". The barbarian woman remains a blank, her self 
inexpressible in the text, so that she is constituted as an image, 
insofar as an image always recalls an elsewhere, an absence. 
Similarly, the Magistrate comes to the realisation that 
[w]e can discover the other in ourselves, realize we are 
not a homogeneous substance, radically alien to whatever 
is not us ... others are also "I"'s: subjects just as I 
am, whom only my point of view~- according to which all 
of them are out there and I alone am in here separates 
and authentically distinguishes from myself. I can 
194 
Conclu::,ion 
conceive of these others as an abstraction, as an instance 
of any individual's psychic configuration, as the Other --
other in relation to myself, to me; or else as a specific 
social group to which we do not belong (Todorov 1984:3). 
Similarly, as I show in the third chapter, the slave woman narrator of 
Stockenstr~m's novel illustrates the impossibility of the other to 
speak as Spivak (1988:287) states, "' [t]he subject' implied by the 
texts of insurgency can only serve as a counterpossibility for the 
narrative sanctions granted to the colonial subject in the dominant 
groups". Therefore, the allegorical mode becomes the means through 
which that alterity is posited, not merely represented. 
It is in Read's autobiographical A Question of Power that the 
representation of this coming to speech is most radically attempted. 
We find that the allegory of oppression in a patriarchal, racist, 
colonial context is formulated and structured as an allegory of 
madness. As such, the coming to speech is necessarily a boundary 
cro::ising, for a3 Foucault (1965:76) postulates, madness is linked ,,.,ith 
silencing and the irruption of animality. What Read's 
autobiographical allegory of subjectivity illustrates is that in 
coming to speech, the 'mad' subject re-invents the categories of 'mad' 
and 'sane' as they are constituted by patriarchy . .After all, as 
Felman (1993: 35) states, "[w]hat the narcissistic economy of the 
Masculine universal equivalent tries to eliminate , under the label 
'madness', is nothing other than feminine difference". 
In the final chapter, the analysis of Nicol's The Powers That 
Ee, shows how stereotype is interrogated so that it becomes the site 
which masks and figures subjectivity f o r the gendered subaltern, in 
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that it is the inversion of these representations of the self by an 
other that situated the agency of insurgency. 
Consequently, I contend that it is in allegorical writing that the 
subjectivity and agency of insurgent subalterns is shown up in terms 
of the limitations which proscribe it, and the possibilities which are 
negotiatable within these constraints. 
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